

Tunisian and Guinean Support for the Algerian Cause through Border Movements and International Conferences

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Abstract

The mechanisms of continental affiliation and the African dimension present during the Algerian liberation revolution brought with them support from a number of African countries. Among these were Tunisia and Guinea. Each of these nations offered distinct African assistance that strengthened the Algerian cause, both in its armed struggle and in its political advocacy at international conferences. This support was evident in the border movements between Tunisia, Algeria, and Guinea, and in the organization of conferences that aimed to promote the Algerian issue, grant it international visibility, and secure African and global backing. This also involved highlighting the revolutionary efforts of Algerian heroes and citizens. From this context arises the central research question: What was the nature of the Tunisian and Guinean support for the Algerian cause? Did this support succeed in raising international awareness about the Algerian issue? Was the support material, moral, or both? To address this problem, it is necessary to define the broader framework of Tunisian and Guinean support in the face of global public opinion, especially through the United Nations. It is also essential to examine the regional and continental dimensions of this support.

Keywords: *African Support, Algerian Revolution, Border Coordination, International Conferences, Tunisia and Guinea.*

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Introduction

Algeria, as an African country, was not isolated during its liberation revolution from developments in African and international forums. Political leaders and activists worked to give the Algerian cause an African, Maghrebian, and international identity. This was done by coordinating political and military efforts with neighboring states such as Tunisia, and African countries like Guinea. As a result, African support for the Algerian cause emerged clearly, particularly through border coordination and conferences. These efforts facilitated Algeria's struggle and helped pave the way for negotiations regarding its sovereignty. This brings us back to the following questions:

What was the nature of Tunisian and Guinean support for the Algerian cause? Did this support succeed in introducing the Algerian issue to the international stage? Was the support material, moral, or both?

To answer these questions, one must first examine the political, military, economic, and media context of the Algerian revolution. It is also important to analyze the nature of Tunisian-Algerian cooperation through border movements and conferences, in addition to the Guinean position and its approach to the Algerian question.

1. The Political Context of the Algerian Revolution: The political situation during the Algerian revolution witnessed significant developments. These milestones shaped the general path toward independence. One of the most notable moments in the revolution's history was the creation of the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA).

This committee was formed as an organized body to prepare for armed struggle. It was a successor to the Special Organization (Khalifi Abdelkader, 2010, p. 8). The CRUA was established on March 23, 1954, at the headquarters of the Islamic Scouts in Bab El Oued. Its leadership included four members: Mustafa Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Boudiaf, and two centralists, Bachir Dkhili and Ramadan Bouchboubah (Issaoui

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Mohamed, 2012, p. 35). The committee also issued a newspaper titled *Le Patriote* (Issaoui Mohamed, 2012, p. 35).

It is worth noting that the committee was founded after the Special Organization failed to resolve the conflict between the two factions of the Messali party: the Messalists and the Centralists.

According to Farhat Abbas, the Revolutionary Committee was well organized (Farhat Abbas, 2011, p. 174). It gave rise to a 22-member group. He stated, "Boudiaf was granted full authority to appoint its administration. He was the one who founded the group of nine members that I mentioned. Some of them left the country, while others remained active inside Algeria. The Revolutionary Committee also reached out to the new constitutional authorities in Tunisia and to the Istiqlal Party in Morocco. It aimed to coordinate the revolution on a North African level and strengthen the fight against colonialism. In Cairo, the same office coordinated the activities of the three movements and secured support from Gamal Abdel Nasser and the leaders of Arab states" (Farhat Abbas, 2011, p. 174).

The meeting of the 22 was held on July 25, 1954, at the house of activist Elyas Derriche in the Medina district of Algiers. Around twenty-two people were invited to the meeting (Khalifi Abdelkader, 2010, p. 8). During this gathering, the first signal was given to begin armed struggle, along with the decision to divide the country into five zones.

As Dr. Yahia Bouaziz explains, the topic of the meeting and the selection of the 22 participants focused on organizing armed resistance. The assignment of members and their deputies was as follows:

1. Mustafa Ben Boulaid: Zone 1 – Aurès-Nemencha, assisted by Bachir Chihani, Abbas Laghrour, and Ajeel Ajoul.
2. Didouche Mourad: Zone 2 – Al-Sumam/Northern Constantine, assisted by Lakhdar Ben Tobbal and Amara Ben Aouda.
3. Krim Belkacem: Zone 3 – Kabylia, assisted by Amar Ouamrane.
4. Rabah Bitat: Zone 4 – Central Algeria, assisted by Zoubir Bouadjadj, Souidani Boujemaa, and Bouchaib Ahmed.
5. Larbi Ben M'hidi: Zone 5 – Oran, assisted by Abdelhafid Boussouf, Abdelmalek Ramdan, and El-Hadj Ben Alla. The Sahara region was left for later organization Yahia Bouaziz, 2013, p. 116).

2-The November 1 Declaration and Its Implicit Dimensions : The November 1 Declaration was the first political and revolutionary document issued in writing by the National Liberation Front. It was not affiliated with any specific ideological movement (Meyad Rachid, 2020, p. 20). It came as a response to the harsh and escalating French colonial policies in Algeria, and to the worsening situation faced by Algerians.

The drafting of the declaration followed several meetings among committed nationalists. Those who finalized the draft were Mohamed Boudiaf, Didouche Mourad, Larbi Ben M'hidi, and Mustafa Ben Boulaid (Meyad Rachid, 2020, p. 165). Its preparation was based on consultation, given the importance of the event. Mohamed Boudiaf was assigned to write the text in the form of a pamphlet. The members agreed to meet again on October 22 to review the draft written by Boudiaf. He was assisted by Mohamed Al-Aïchaoui (Meyad Rachid, 2020, p. 165).

The declaration was sent via express mail to Cairo, where it was broadcast at the agreed time (Meyad Rachid, 2020, p. 166).

The declaration contained a number of principles and ideas, including the call for armed struggle and defense of the homeland, emphasizing the urgency to begin military operations. It affirmed that what is taken by force can only be recovered by force. The declaration addressed three key axes:

1. The conditions and circumstances that led to the outbreak of armed resistance (Lounissi Rabah, 2002, p. 20).
2. The conflict with colonialism and the definition of preconditions for any negotiation with French authorities (Lounissi Rabah, 2002, p. 20).
3. The recovery of independence and the formation of the foundations of a national state.

The declaration emphasized national unity, stressing the priority of national interest and cohesion over any other consideration. It also called for the principles of freedom, democracy, and justice.

The principles of the November 1 Declaration carried with them implicit dimensions, including the political, social, cultural, and civilizational vision of a future independent Algerian Republic.

3-The Soummam Conference The Soummam Conference was held on August 20, 1956, in a secure mountainous area—the village of Ifri, in the Azzelaguen tribal region, located in what is today the municipality of Ighzer Amokrane in Béjaïa Province. The location was chosen for its safety, surrounded by mountains and easily accessible for the delegates. The event was protected by Colonel Amirouche and his commanders stationed in the Soummam Valley, with five battalions ready to respond to any emergency.

According to Dr. Bachir Saadouni, as reported in *El-Moudjahid* magazine, the reasons for holding the conference were summarized as follows: “In its early phase, the revolution faced many obstacles. The National Liberation Army units were still weak and scattered. They had not expanded enough to maintain regular communication. Contact between leadership bodies was difficult. The spread of revolutionary action across regions was slow. There was a serious shortage of weapons and very limited financial resources. Coordination among different operations was extremely weak... There was no formal national authority. The revolution was in need of a clear political framework” (Saadouni Bachir, 2018, p. 10).

The delegations that took part were as follows:

- Zone 2 Delegation, led by Martyr Zighoud Youcef, accompanied by Colonel Ali Kafi and others.
- Zone 3 Delegation, led by Krim Belkacem, accompanied by Mohamed Amirouche.
- Zone 4 Delegation, led by Amar Ouamrane, accompanied by Colonel Mohamed Boufara.
- Algiers Delegation, led by Abane Ramdane, with a group that included Abdelmalek Temam.
- Zone 5 Delegation, led by Larbi Ben M'hidi (Saadouni Bachir, 2018, p. 7).

The delegation of Zone 1 did not attend due to the assassination of Mustafa Ben Boulaïd.

The Outcomes of the Conference: The conference produced a series of political, military, and financial decisions aimed at organizing the revolution and advancing it towards achieving sovereignty and national independence. One of the key outcomes was the formation of leadership bodies, including the National Council of the Revolution, which was composed of 34 members—17 permanent and 17 supplementary. This body served as a legislative authority and was intended to convene once a year. Alongside it was the Committee for Coordination and Execution (Saadouni Bachir, 2018, p. 12).

The Committee for Coordination and Execution acted as an executive authority, managing all administrative powers. It was composed of five members, selected from the National Council of the Revolution (Saadouni Bachir, 2018, p. 12).

It is worth noting that some leaders, such as Zighoud Youcef, carried the message that independence was imminent. A notable achievement was the implementation of the Soummam Conference decisions in Zone

2, according to the testimony of Ali Kafi, who acknowledged the pivotal role played by Abane Ramdane during and after the conference (Sahraoui Abdelkader, 2014, p. 70).

4-The Formation of the Provisional Government: After the Tangier Conference, held from April 27 to 30, 1958, with the participation of the three Maghreb political parties—the Istiqlal Party, the Neo Destour Party, and the National Liberation Front the discussions addressed an important issue (Saadouni Bachir, 2014, p. 343): “The conference recommends the formation of an Algerian government, in consultation with the governments of Morocco and Tunisia.” An agreement was reached on this matter.

The Formation of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic – GPRA): All members of the Committee for Coordination and Execution (CCE) met at the committee’s headquarters in Garden City, Cairo, on 17 September 1958, to establish the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). After three days of discussions, attention turned to Abdelhamid Mehri, the youngest member of the CCE, who was holding a paper containing the names of the government members (Hamid Abdelkader, 2007, p. 203) “The official announcement of the government’s formation was made in Cairo on 19 September 1958. On the same day, the first public statement was issued by the head of the provisional government. The statement outlined the circumstances that led to its formation and the main objectives it aimed to achieve. Ferhat Abbas delivered the declaration in front of nearly one hundred journalists.” (Bouloudja Souad, 2016, p. 184)

Members of the Provisional Government: The members of the Provisional Government were as follows: Ahmed Ben Bella as Vice President; Krim Belkacem as Minister of Armed Forces; Ben Tobbal as Minister of Interior; Abdelhafid Boussouf as Minister of Communications; Lamine Debaghine as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mahmoud Chérif as Minister of Armament; Abdelhamid Mehri as Minister of African Financial Affairs; Benyoucef Benkhedda as Minister of Social Affairs; Ahmed Tawfiq al-Madani as Minister of Cultural Affairs; Ahmed Francis as Minister of Finance; and M’hamed Yazid as Minister of Information. Algerian political prisoners in France—Rabah Bitat, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Mohamed Khider—were appointed as Ministers of State. (Hamid Abdelkader, 2007, p. 203)

Recognition and International Support: After the establishment of the Provisional Government, it received international, Arab, and African recognition. This support played a key role in internationalizing the Algerian cause in various global and Afro-Asian platforms, particularly in countries that had recently gained independence and understood the value of freedom and sovereignty.

Among those who recognized the Algerian cause was General de Gaulle, who, for the first time, acknowledged the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. However, he framed this recognition with a set of conditions that almost made it unachievable. In a speech delivered on 16 September 1959, he presented three possible solutions: integration, meaning equal rights and responsibilities for all Algerians including Muslims; a federal union, meaning governance by France in a strong association; or separation, which meant independence.) (Meloudi Siham, 2014, p. 307) This third option, however, was presented as highly risky

5. *Evian Negotiations:*

In light of the heavy sacrifices made by Algerian revolutionaries, and the growing political momentum for self-determination, de Gaulle reaffirmed the Algerian people’s right to choose their own future. On 14 June, he declared: “In the name of France, I address the leaders of the uprising. I declare to them that we await them here so that we may find together an honorable solution to the ongoing conflict, to settle the matter of arms, and to safeguard the hopes of the fighters. After that, everything will be done so that the Algerian people may peacefully express their will. There shall be no decision other than theirs.” (Saadouni Bachir, 2016, p. 378)

The Provisional Government responded positively to Algeria and France entering into secret and public negotiations. These talks were interrupted many times by obstacles placed by France. The French side resisted, rejecting many proposals.

The refusal and intransigence of France triggered popular demonstrations. For example: the protest of 11 December 1960, the march of 17 October 1961, protests on 1 November 1961, and on 27 February 1962 (Saadouni Bachir, 2016, p. 378). In 1962, France accepted to negotiate under the Évian agreements. A ceasefire was agreed on 19 March 1962.

The Algerian negotiating side presented political, economic, social, and cultural conditions. After many back and forths, both parties agreed to terms. One key point was reducing the duration of French military presence. France was to withdraw its last soldier. The last French base at Mers El Kébir was to be vacated by 1968. By 1971 the hydrocarbons sector passed under Algeria's control. National sovereignty was asserted across all Algerian territory.

2-The Military Situation of the Liberation Revolution:

Military training intensified with the years of the revolution. Fighters were trained weekly. They learned weapon use, carrying, disassembly, reassembly, and cleaning (Issaoui Mohamed, 2012, p. 6).

Some of the military training centers included:

- The Draa Ades center: a cave inside a dense forest in the local Atlas.
- The Bousmalah center: also a cave in a dense forest in the Atlas chains.
- The Qarawaw center: the house of a militant. (Issaoui Mohamed, 2012, p. 42)

Along with training, there were manual methods for making explosives managed by specialists.

Among the strategic methods used in military operations were forming cells in cities; training fighters; spreading insecurity by setting ambushes; attacking postal centers; sudden raids; skirmishes; and retaliation against the enemy (Issaoui Mohamed, 2012, p. 48).

They took care to preserve and hide all weapons. They stored them in places like the Idols' depots, in the Aghwat, in tribal areas, in Algiers, in the Aurès Mountains, and in Condé-Semendo now Zighoud Youcef, after French police failed to locate them during searches (Jabli Taher, 2012, p. 349).

Also, they depended on weapons purchased between 1947-1948, estimated at about 500 pieces. These were brought into Algeria via routes through Ghadames, then the Wadi, Biskra, and M'sounsh (Jabli Taher, 2012, p. 349).

The issue of armament was one of the first essentials for external delegations. Ahmed Ben Bella was charged with obtaining weapons. He negotiated with Egyptian authorities, especially Gamel Abdel Nasser, to support the Algerian cause with arms. He succeeded due to a commitment from the Egyptian government. This came through a promise made during a report by Fathi Al-Deeb to Ben Bella (Abdul Sattar Hussein, 2020, p. 134). According to French reports, "armament in Wilaya One and Wilaya Two was "good" because of the role of the eastern border in smuggling weapons. The Wilaya Three, Four, and Six suffered shortages in arms supply" (Hifdh Allah Boubker, 2012, p. 6). Meanwhile, Wilaya One and Five were most fortunate in terms of armament" (Hifdh Allah Boubker, 2012, p. 6).

3. The Economic Situation During the Liberation Revolution

The Algerian economy experienced significant deterioration during the period of the liberation revolution. In the mid-1940s, according to Dr. Boujela Abdelmajid, the Algerian population approached 500,000. This number increased on the eve of the armed uprising, while both urban and rural areas remained in poor condition due to widespread poverty and deprivation (Boujela Abdelmajid, 2008, p. 16).

One of the key factors contributing to the worsening economic situation was the replacement of manual labor with modern agricultural machinery. This shift led to a clear decline in employment opportunities. In 1954, approximately 25% of agricultural workers were employed for no more than 45 days per year (Boujela Abdelmajid, 2008, p. 16). Moreover, 50% of them worked less than 100 days annually (Boujela Abdelmajid, 2008, p. 16). As a result, there was a noticeable reduction in the need for labor. The number of modern tractors increased from 5,900 in 1947 to 19,000 by 1954, while the number of harvesting machines rose to 3,200.

Overall, as noted by Boujela Abdelmajid, the economic and social conditions continued to deteriorate despite the potential for growth and employment in the sector. Furthermore, revenues from agriculture remained largely in the hands of the European minority, with only a small share reaching Algerians. This situation led to dire consequences for the majority of the population, who remained deprived both materially and nutritionally' (Boujela Abdelmajid, 2008, p. 17).

The Formation of Major Colonial Economic Empires : Large economic empires were established by the colonial settlers in alliance with French capital (Kebaili Houari, 2007, p. 159). Among the most prominent colonial businessmen was Henri Borgeaud, a senator and owner of leading commercial, industrial, agricultural, and financial companies in Algeria. His companies produced around 40,000 hectoliters of wine annually. He owned vast vineyards across Algeria and founded several major firms. These included Chapeau de Gendarme, the General Company of North Africa, the North African Real Estate Union, and the North African Agricultural Products Trading Company. He also owned Cers Company, Jules Vincent et Peugeot Latil, the North Africa Factory in Casablanca, the Chlef Mills, and the North African Cork and Derivatives Company. In addition, he ran woodworking workshops, the Cie Textile Company, and a tobacco company (Kebaili Houari, 2007, p. 159).

In total, Henri Borgeaud controlled about eighteen commercial enterprises. This clearly shows that the economy was largely dominated by the colonial settlers.

Prominent Colonial Business Figures and the Economic Dominance of the Colons : Among the colonial businessmen was George Blachett (Kebaili Houari, 2007, p. 160), a deputy in Algiers. His annual income reached one and a half billion francs. He owned extensive esparto grass lands and founded the Moroccan Esparto Company, along with the Algerian Water Corporation.

Another major figure was Laurent Schiaffino, who served as the head of Algeria's economic region. He held substantial shares in the phosphate company based in Constantine, in addition to his investments in other firms (Kebaili Houari, 2007, p. 160).

These examples show the extent to which the colons controlled Algeria's economy—both in agriculture and industry. The European community benefitted from the returns of production, while Algerian laborers received only minimal wages for their work.

The Media Landscape During the Algerian Liberation Revolution: The political, military, and economic conditions during the revolution were closely tied to media activity. Revolutionary leaders paid significant attention to the role of media in internationalizing the Algerian cause.

Revolutionary media aimed to mobilize the public by highlighting the need for national independence. It documented the daily sacrifices made in cities and villages and showed the persistent will to continue the struggle for sovereignty. The revolutionary media used various forms: written materials, oral communication, and audio broadcasts. It also sought to frame the Algerian cause as one of international solidarity, gaining the support of nations that upheld the right to self-determination.

Among the written media, the November 1st Declaration was broadcast to the masses via Voice of the Arabs Radio. In addition, pamphlets circulated to promote the goals of the revolution and highlight the role of its leaders. The newspaper El Moudjahid became the official voice of the National Liberation Front

(FLN). Another outlet, *La Libre*, was published in French from the Qal'a base in the summer of 1955 (Jellouli Mokhtar, 2023, p. 483).

Political and intellectual meetings in clubs and associations also played a key role. These gatherings supported the cause by informing people about the victories of the National Liberation Army and spreading hope for independence.

One of the most effective audio tools was “Free Algeria Radio”, launched on December 16, 1956 (Jellouli Mokhtar, 2023, p. 483). It broadcast news about the revolution and the fighters. On January 1, 1957, it announced a call for an eight-day strike (Jellouli Mokhtar, 2023, p. 484).

Among the journalists working for this station were Issa Massaoudi, Madani Hawas, and Mohamed Bouzidi. The station operated through a mobile GM6 transmitter mounted on a truck (Jellouli Mokhtar, 2023, p. 485). It was first based in El-Kantara, Morocco, then resumed broadcasting from Nador in 1959 (Jellouli Mokhtar, 2023, p. 485). Programs were presented in Arabic, French, Kabyle, and Algerian dialect. The station helped convey the realities of the resistance and informed listeners about external support from allied countries like Tunisia and Guinea, aiming to internationalize the Algerian issue.

2. Tunisian Support for the Algerian Cause

1. Political Support Through Conferences

The official Tunisian position consistently supported the Algerian right to self-determination and national sovereignty. In response, France accused Tunisia of arming Algerian fighters. As a result, the French government suspended its annual financial assistance to Tunisia, which amounted to approximately \$50 million (Lassalegh Khalifa & Yahiaoui Abdelwahab, 2023, pp. 850–851).

Tunisia also protested the hijacking of FLN leaders who were on a Moroccan airline en route to Tunisia. Following the incident, the Tunisian government summoned the French ambassador and demanded the immediate release of the captured revolutionaries (Lassalegh Khalifa & Yahiaoui Abdelwahab, 2023, p. 851).

In the United Nations, Tunisia submitted a detailed report outlining the oppression faced by the Algerian people under French colonialism, stressing the urgent need for Algerian independence (Lassalegh Khalifa & Yahiaoui Abdelwahab, 2023, p. 852).

One of the notable initiatives of Habib Bourguiba was his offer to France to relinquish Bizerte in exchange for Algerian independence. However, this proposal was entirely ignored by the French government.

Despite its own economic challenges, Tunisia opened its political space to support Algeria. It hosted several conferences and symposiums to reaffirm the necessity of full independence for Algeria.

2-Mahdia Conference

On June 17, 1958, Tunisia called for a Maghreb Conference in the city of Mahdia. It included representatives from Morocco and the FLN. Ferhat Abbas was appointed to chair the conference (Tayeb Rezoug, 2020, p. 55).

Attendees from the Tunisian side included:

- Bahy Ladgham Vice President of the Council
- Sadok Mokaddem Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Tayeb Mehri Secretary of State for Internal Affairs

- Ahmed Tlili and Abdelmajid Chaker members of the Neo Destour political bureau

From Morocco:

- Ahmed Balafrej Prime Minister
- Abderrahim Bouabid Deputy Prime Minister

From Algeria, alongside Ferhat Abbas, were Krim Belkacem and Abdelhafid Boussouf, members of the Coordination and Execution Committee. Also present were Commander Qassi head of the Tunis base, Ahmed Francis, Ahmed Boumendjel, Aït Ahsan, and Rachid Kaid, Secretary General of the General Union of Algerian Workers (Lassalegh Khalifa & Yahiaoui Abdelwahab, 2023, p. 855).

The conference agenda included the following:

- Implementation of the Tangier Conference resolutions supporting the Algerian revolution
- Condemnation of De Gaulle's policies and the idea of integration in Algeria
- Discussions on the withdrawal of French forces
- Establishment of a Provisional Algerian Government and how to support it
- Formation of a Permanent Bureau and Consultative Council with 30 members (Lassalegh Khalifa & Yahiaoui Abdelwahab, 2023, p. 856)

Despite these efforts, France had already contacted both Tunisia and Morocco to secure their national interests. As a result, both countries softened their stance, and the Mahdia Conference ended without fully implementing the Tangier recommendations (see Annex 1).

3- Recognition of the Provisional Government

Tunisia fully supported the Algerian Provisional Government, formed on September 19, 1958, and was among the first to recognize it. It also facilitated the government's operations from Tunis, where public support for the Algerian cause was strong due to the shared history and geographic proximity.

4- The Tunis Conference

The Second Conference of African Peoples was held in Tunis, from January 25 to 30, 1960. African support, especially from Tunisia, was evident. Habib Bourguiba declared during the sessions that Africa was united in seeking liberation from colonial domination (Belbali Abdelkarim, 2022, p. 603).

The event was attended by 73 African delegations (Bousslimani Abdelrahman, 2024, p. 305). It aimed to support liberation struggles, with the Algerian cause at the forefront.

One key topic discussed was France's nuclear testing in the Algerian Sahara, which was condemned as illegal and abusive (El Sabah, 1960, p. 3).

The conference adopted the following resolutions:

1. Urging all independent African states to recognize the Algerian Provisional Government
2. Allocating regular financial contributions from African countries to support the Algerian people
3. Calling for the withdrawal of African soldiers serving in the French army

4. Creating a volunteer African army under the Algerian National Liberation Army
5. Appealing to the United Nations to enforce peace and recognize Algeria's right to independence (Belbali Abdelkarim, 2022, p. 605)

Despite some political limitations, the Tunis Conference marked a strong political stance in favor of Algeria. While some considered the conference unsuccessful due to internal disagreements, such as Bourguiba's opposition to allowing the African Liberation Army into Tunisia, it still demonstrated significant support for the Algerian struggle (Belbali Abdelkarim, 2022, p. 606).

2. *Tunisian Military Support Through Border Operations*

Tunisia provided military assistance to the Algerian cause by allowing weapons to be transported across the Algerian-Tunisian border. The movement extended along the full length of the border and included access from the Libyan side. This significantly facilitated the operations of Algerian fighters. The arms supply process was highly sensitive, especially with the involvement of Tunisian resistance elements. Several key crossing points were used to smuggle weapons, despite France's efforts to tighten control over Algeria's eastern and western borders.

Weapon Crossing Points on the Algerian-Tunisian Border : There were secret arms depots shared between Tunisia and Algeria. These locations were jointly monitored. Weapons arrived from Egypt, Libya, and other friendly or allied nations by land and sea. The main centers included: Tunis, Maghrine, Souk El-Arba, Tagerouine, Kairouan, Hassi Draham, Ghardimaou, Haïdra, Talit, Redeyef, Nefta, Fériana, Gafsa, Kasserine, and Metlaoui (Bougrioua Lamiya, 2006, p. 158).

"Weapons were delivered to the fighters using transport animals such as camels and mules, and sometimes by cars owned by the fighters" (Bougrioua Lamiya, 2006, p. 158).

Other important locations included Zanzour, located 14 km from Tripoli, and Beni Qasr, where weapon smuggling was carried out in an organized manner. The main hub was El Assa Base, 12 km from the Tunisian border. According to the source, "Tahar Lassoued, his nephew Bachir, and Ben Bella were responsible for overseeing the weapons arriving from Libya" (Bougrioua Lamiya, 2006, p. 149).

Key Weapon Storage and Training Centers

- Raghd Al-Bain – main weapons depot
- El Assa – arms depot
- Tiji (Tanon Depot) – training center located 40 km east of Talon
- Housh – secondary storage with training activity, 35 km east of Tiji (Bougrioua Lamiya, 2006, p. 149)
- Talout – major storage and training site in southeastern Dhehiba, near the village of Tahar Lassoued, 30 km west of Gabès (Bougrioua Lamiya, 2006, p. 150)

In addition to these, the northern and southern areas of Nementcha also played an important role in arms smuggling routes.

Strategy of the Tunisian Liberation Army in Support of Algeria "The Tunisian Liberation Army coordinated its efforts with the National Liberation Army by operating across the Matmata and El Hamma mountain ranges. The route extended through the Aurès and Nementcha regions to the Jebel El-Askari in Gafsa. It should also be noted that Algerians participated in the elimination of resistance opponents" (Bougrioua Lamiya, 2006, p. 152).

Let us not forget the Algerian-Tunisian resistance in the Chott el-Jerid mountain range. Among the groups active in that region were Taher Ben Lakhdar, Gharbi Taleb Al-Arabi, and the Algerian Ammar Bouamrani in Tunisia, among others. (Bougrioua Lamiya, 2006, p. 153)

Tunisia was not the only supporter of Algeria. Other African countries, such as Ghana and Guinea, also played important roles.

3-Guinean Support for the Algerian Cause : Guinea, like other African nations, supported the Algerian cause. This support was visible in official conferences and seminars. According to Abdallah Meqlati, African powers developed radical positions against colonialism. These movements aimed to liberate African nations and to support African struggles. (Meqlati Abdallah, 2012, p. 244)

Among the notable events was the First Conference of African Peoples, where Algeria was represented by Ahmed Boumendjel and Frantz Fanon. The conference was held in Accra from 5 to 13 December 1958. They declared that France was committing acts of racial extermination, and they opposed the use of African soldiers in colonial wars. (Khaldi Hussein, 2010, p. 61)

Key resolutions of the conference included:

- Joint cooperation for the liberation of Africa
- Support for countries not yet independent
- Abolition of political borders imposed by colonial powers
- Support for the Algerian people's right to independence
- A call for African countries to recognize the Provisional Algerian Government
- Designation of a day for African solidarity with Algeria (Khaldi Hussein, 2010, p. 61)

The first official African states conference was held in Accra, between 15 and 22 April 1957. It was the first pan-African conference hosted by the capital of Ghana. Eight independent states participated. The theme was "Africa for Africans", and the Algerian cause was highlighted, along with the demand for Algerian independence.

The second conference took place from 8 to 13 December 1958, with participation from the Convention People's Party (CPP) led by Kwame Nkrumah. The event welcomed 300 delegates representing 62 organizations, parties, and trade unions. The Guinean delegation chaired the conference. Nkrumah also spoke in his capacity as leader of the host nation and of the CPP. Among the slogans raised was:

“O peoples of Africa, unite. We have nothing to lose but our chains. We must gain our freedom and dignity. Africa for Africans.” (Amiri Abdelkader, 2017, p. 43)

The conference made several important decisions:

- Elimination of imperialism and foreign oppression
- Advancement of the African nation within an African framework (Amiri Abdelkader, 2017, p. 43)
- Mobilization of global public opinion against the denial of political and human rights for Africans (Amiri Abdelkader, 2017, p. 44).

Guinea, under the leadership of Ahmed Sékou Touré, called for political unity across the African continent. He envisioned a federation of African states. (Amiri Abdelkader, 2017, p. 47).

This vision is affirmed in his statement: "With such faith and strong determination, the Algerian people supported and strengthened the liberation of other African nations. They opened the way for the independence of many more. Through their political movement and their ongoing struggle, Algeria showed that all of Africa says no to occupation" (Gilali Houria, 2016, p. 377).

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the Algerian cause stood as a just and legitimate struggle for sovereignty and national independence. It received both material and moral support from the sister state of Tunisia, and from Guinea, alongside other African countries that backed the Algerian struggle.

This reflects the extent of African and Maghreb solidarity, with Tunisia playing a leading role. This support was political and military, and it included granting territorial access to revolutionaries and political leaders. All these efforts were directed toward ending colonialism and ensuring the right to self-determination, especially for the Algerian people, who long fought for their dignity and national sovereignty.

The resistance was thus African, Maghrebi, and Algerian, united in its goal to end French colonial rule in Algeria.

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