

The Development of the Science of Theology from Simple to Complex Questions between it and Philosophy

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Abstract

The science of theology faced various stages from its emergence to maturity by its development at the levels of content and methodology. It was launched initially by asking questions in the religious text related to the belief of believers. Also, its launching were linked with the events that were dictated by the successive social and political changes. The effects of scholars were directed to fortify and defend the faith, trying to preserve the specifics of the content and methodology of this science. In contrast, the presence of foreign cultures in the field of Islamic thought affected them inevitably, especially Greek philosophy. Although researchers of theology were reticent in accepting the intellectual mixing between philosophy and speech but they even alienated from it. However, in the end he imposed himself a forbidden marriage between two different tributaries in Islamic thought. In this context, I am doing this research as an attempt to trace the development of speech science and its formation through three major topics. The first is about the emergence of the science of speech through simple questions from within the text as well as the initial external influence represented in behavior. The second is concerned with the development of disciplined theory for its fundamental terminology and specifics. The third one is related to the methodology of blending and communication with philosophy, wondering about the extent of this forbidden marriage and its limits. This is somewhat obvious through an extrapolation of historical events and mental transformations in the internal structure of the contents of science of theology and methods.

Keywords: *Theology, Emergence, Maturity, Development, Transmission, Principles, Methodology, Analogy, Logical Limit, Fundamental Limit.*

Introduction

This research delves into tracing the reasons for the emergence of the science of theology and the mechanisms of its development, as well as re-examining the levels of methodological and substantive transformations to uncover the depth of originality in its Islamic identity. It also aims to reveal the aspects of external influence to understand the constants and variables within the intellectual system of this science.

Ibn Khaldun mentioned in a chapter of the introduction where he discussed the science of theology that in his time people had become self-sufficient without the need for theology after its purposes were exhausted. Its goal was to establish beliefs and confront those who deviated from them. However, now the atheists and innovators had perished, and the scholars of the Sunnis were content with what they wrote and recorded. Rational proofs were only needed when they defended and supported, and now only theology remained, with many of its ambiguities becoming detached from the divine. The question we face as we go through this situation from Abu Al-Imran Al-Bashari is the reason that made a scholar like Ibn Khaldun decree the death of the first Islamic intellectual movement that had a role in reviving Islamic thought and assimilating the intellect entering the field of Islamic knowledge. Considering that the author of the introduction believes that states reappear whenever they decline, what lies behind this harsh judgment on the science of theology? Was Ibn Khaldun, who was convinced by the Ash'ari classification of Islamic creed, aware that the lofty boundaries of the science of theology had reached their extent and surpassed the issues of the nation, imposing philosophical limits with no remaining issues that occupy the Muslim society to entice additional production?

In my opinion, the reasons that prompted Ibn Khaldun to take this position are twofold: first, his philosophy of society was fundamentally based on the notion that history repeats itself in necessary cyclical periods with the same tools, and he did not believe in linear progression forward. He saw that the science

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of theology had exhausted its substantive purposes and the need did not necessitate its revival, much like people need to revive states. Second, he saw the stability of the majority of the Sunni society on the Ash'ari creed as imposing this classification out of fear that debates would continue on issues exhausted in the knowledge market, with no need to delve into the fundamentals that no longer have embarrassments warranting a deep dive into their principles. However, is it not our right to question outside of Ibn Khaldun's logic whether there are aspects of creed in their human dimension that deserve intellectual consideration through advanced methodological approaches to the science of theology? Although this aspiration is not a component of this research, we aim to be aware of it by questioning the circumstances of the emergence of the science of theology and its development in the early centuries, the mechanisms of this structural development within the frameworks of the main Islamic sects, and the extent of the science of theology's influence by philosophy both substantively and methodologically after the severance imposed by the fundamentalists due to their belief in the sanctity of the connection between two tributaries that differ in reference, mechanisms, and purpose. This is intended to explore the possibility of restoring the foundational horizon of this science by reactivating it in the field of human and societal issues.

Accordingly, this research addressed, through a problematic approach, questions the extent to which the science of theology remains faithful to its internal principles? as well as its ability to engage with external cultural influxes and its capacity for objective assimilation of these tributaries to preserve its constants without breaking away from the demands of cultural civilization?

This was addressed through the following outline:

First Chapter: The Emergence of the Science of Theology; the Embarrassments of Reality and Text on the Thresholds of Reason

- The Science of Theology: The Reality of Its Emergence
- Factors Surrounding the Religious Text
- Internal Factors and the Intrusion of Reason into the Religious Text

Second Chapter: The Development of Islamic Theology; the Dialectic of Method and Content

- The Methodological Basis for the Development of Cultural Society
- The Development of Theological Content

Third Chapter: The Forced Confluence between Philosophy and Theology

- Philosophical Content at the Doors of the Science of Theology
- The Impact of the Philosophical Method on the Science of Theology

Conclusion and Results

First Chapter: The Emergence of the Science of Theology the Embarrassments of Reality and Text on the Thresholds of Reason

Rational thinking originated in Greece, and perhaps if people at that time had been given the opportunity to examine the reality of societies, no one would have expected an intellectual civilization to emerge sweeping minds and hearts, originating from tribes embracing the desert in the Arabian Peninsula. However, returning to the Quran, which was not specifically revealed for a certain ethnic group as the previous scriptures were, the Quran came as a guidance book for all people, encompassing principles of existence and knowledge. "The Quran was not, among the Companions, merely a book of moral

exhortations or a historical account sent down for lessons from past centuries, but rather a metaphysical, physical, humane, ethical, and practical book that outlined the main lines of all existence. It is the book of the universe from its creation to its end, and it was essential for those who believed in it to grasp the principles of their thinking within it. " Once they connected with their book, their intellectual reality changed, making it possible to speak of an intellectual movement with two main directions: the first dealing with definitive issues through a compositional methodology that establishes general principles in jurisprudence as included in the divine revelations, and the second confronting doctrinal issues filled with rational questions about the ambiguous verses and absolute metaphysical judgments. Although this latter direction was delayed compared to the time of prophecy, it will rise later under the influence of several objective factors.

- *The Science of Theology: The Reality of Its Emergence*

By the reality of its emergence in the science of theology, I mean the doctrinal issues necessitated by theological questions related to the nature of existence and its cause, especially since the text provided believers with comprehensive issues concerning the general principles of creed that respond to the ideological need based on the centrality of monotheism and the denial of intermediaries. However, the broadening of legitimate scientific inquiries and the reception of various cultures by the Ummah, in addition to what political events and their ethical repercussions revealed—issues that extend the question to the origin of creed—all this was due to dealing with issues that arose from challenges faced by the Muslim society, some internal and some external. Muslims were compelled to confront them, some of which were questions that every person contemplates about origin and destiny, much like the naturalists in ancient Greece, led by (Thales) , the question of the origin of existence and he said it was (water). Social and political problems also emerged, concerning the daily reality of people, perhaps most notably that "the Shia separated from the Sunnis, and the Shia developed doctrines different from the Sunnis regarding the issue of leadership, becoming one of the subjects of the science of theology."

As mentioned earlier, the Quran was revealed to the early Muslims, and their focus was not on searching for what occupied them other than action. However, reality does not accept emptiness. In addition to leadership, "other problems emerged related to the concept of faith and judgment on the issue of major agents, or rather the problem of names, judgments, predestination, and free will, all of which in turn are subjects of the science of theology." Since the Quran did not limit the intellect from contemplating and thinking, real events pushed Muslims to question and delve into causes and seek answers. The ideology of Muslims was destined to face many internal shocks and restore harmony to many issues shrouded in ambiguity to be able to strengthen their threatened identity against intellectual winds from various sources, all of which carried the new culture loaded with significant questions. Islamic thought, and the Quran itself, provided a vast field of freedom of thought that formed fertile ground where divergent currents grew, presenting ideas that attempted to explain the cosmic system and questioned the relationship between humans, God, and the world . Thus, the reality of the presented issues significantly contributed to the emergence of the initial questions that led to the appearance and maturation of the science of theology, starting from the middle of the first century to the beginning of the second century of Hijra.

- *Factors Surrounding the Religious Text*

A follower of the history of the emergence of the science of theology easily notices that the emergence of the largest sects was caused by political, social, or intellectual events. Although these events were not originally historical in a way that we could build upon, they demonstrate that these sects are products of their environment, and their internal tensions are signs of the origin. For example, Moses' staff was not originally a means of saving the Israelites but a sign of that. Therefore, the structural foundation of the science of theology was rooted in Islamic thought and the new Arab society, obsessed with the garment of monotheism. These signs only surfaced on the surface, with a depth immersed in the new human identity with its global dimension. For instance, the sign of the emergence of the Shia was the dispute over leadership, the sign of the emergence of the Mu'tazila was Wasil ibn Ata's secession from Hassan al-Basri's circle, the sign of the emergence of the Ash'ari was the result of a debate on the matter of propriety and

the more appropriate, and the sign of the emergence of the Kharijites was due to the disagreement on the issue of arbitration. Thus, we see that these signs indicate the foundations of establishment, followed by differences within these sects, leading to branches that diverge on some issues and naturally and objectively develop within the context of changing circumstances and accompanying questions. However, do these signs not hide thin threads that feed the philosophy of these sects with a surge of ideas influenced by proximity, cultural interaction, and civilizational push?

The Islamic present was shaken by what the people of various sects transmitted in beliefs and ideas alongside the early absorption of these cultural flows. Perhaps the most prominent factor was the early initiation of the translation movement of a set of rational sciences in the second half of the first century of Hijra. "In this era, the name of Khalid ibn Yazid ibn Muawiya (d. 85 AH/704 CE) shines as a pioneer of translation, concerned with books on medicine, alchemy, and astronomy. He was the first Arab figure to research rational sciences... He conceived the craft and ordered a group of Greek philosophers to translate books in the craft from Greek and Coptic into Arabic."

Khalid ibn Yazid ibn Muawiya was translated to by Ibn al-Nadim in the index , and thus the spread of doctrines and ideas from Persia and especially the Levant was inevitable, as they were centers of human civilization and the origin of dualism and trinitarian doctrines. This was alongside the doctrines of India and the Greek intellect loaded with philosophies and various contemporary sciences. Historians have mentioned some reasons that were strong drivers for researching the emergence of the science of theology, perhaps the most prominent being the question about the nature of the word in the book of Muslims, and the incapacity of a man from the people of hadith sent by Harun al-Rashid to debate a scholar from the Sumniyyah (Buddhism) , except what necessity demanded from debates and theoretical provocations.

The real embarrassment does not lie in the convergence of these different currents and the resulting natural push that refines the movement of ideas in their informational field and helps them develop in addressing the real problems of society. The difficulty is that these ideas responded to an environment that had no role in the history of rational debate or philosophical analogies and had no significant contribution to the writing movement. All these tools, however, are guarantees and fortresses that preserve cultural identity from distortion and disappearance. Thus, the inquiries of the science of theology were a refined cultural weapon confronting the influx and assimilating from it what it provided in terms of methodological foundational elements without compromising the constants of Islamic thought, which was based on monotheism in pure Arabic. These constants, considering the products of Islamic knowledge, were founded on free thinking open to the Quranic text, which accepts the other with the courtesy of dialogue and does not prevent it from thinking, making the field of liberation based on justice and ethical dialogue. This is the objective incentive to preserve the duality of monotheism/freedom within the cultural genesis field.

An example that reveals this previous civilizational depth in human history is the verse: *سَدَّ بَيْلٌ إِلَى عَدَايَ* (This is because freedom is an emerging consciousness issue accompanied by a reaction to a subject, as "identity is not a fixed subject or a factual reality, but a dynamic possibility that interacts with freedom. Identity is based on freedom because it is a sense of self, and the self is free. Freedom is based on identity because it is an expression of it." Thus, it can be considered that the science of theology was established to fortify the intellectual foundations of creed through the awareness of the necessity of theoretical confrontation with cultural flows without isolating or preventing them from expressing themselves, where scientific debates were the prevalent mode of civilizational interaction. This made external factors tools for enriching and charging Islamic ideas both methodologically and substantively, and the science of theology was what prevented passive dissolution in this tense theoretical field.

- *Internal Factors and the Intrusion of Reason into the Religious Text*

Is it necessary for consciousness to be liberated from doctrines to achieve scientific thinking that allows us to understand existence without external coercion? Does religion represent an epistemological obstacle

leading to reliability and closure? Or is religion a necessary factor for liberating humans from the stereotypical social constraints and material boundaries?

In reality, facing these serious questions, we can say that religion is dangerous to the extent that its utilization process outside its moral structure is strong, and it is beneficial to the extent that it acts as a balance between the demands of reality and the spiritual and ethical needs of the individual and social consciousness. Islam, since its first appearance, has been a call to liberation from the restrictive constraints of closed societies within tribal norms. When the text was revealed, it initiated an intensive combing process of the intellect, with methodological functions diversifying through interaction with the nature and objectives of the verses. This directed thinking towards the cognitive legitimacy of the intellect, competing for methodological establishment with transmission, as the Quranic verses, which are the primary source of knowledge of the foundations of religion, were not all precise. Allah the Exalted says: ﴿آيات منه لا كتاب لك تاب عليك أنزل الذي وهم﴾. م تشابهات) وأخر الك تاب أم هن مدكمات

The response of reason was due to several problematic issues raised by reading the Quranic text, such as verses on predestination and free will, issues of justice, attributes, and so forth. These problems raised questions that emerged from a holistic conception of the vertical relationship between the Creator and the creation and their human manifestations, needing intellectual regulation in reality, not outside it. Therefore, it is not surprising that the emergence of the science of theology was the foundation of a science for the life of the Muslim human, unlike Christian theology, which was concerned with justifying contradictions within the irrational structures of their religious texts.

It is true that it can also be said that the science of theology was influenced by the cultures and religions it interacted with, but we can also assert that this science found its answers within the religious text, not outside it. Thus, the first concern of each sect was to adhere to the reference of transmission even if they were rigid in their interpretation of the text. Additionally, the substance of Islamic theology did not methodologically rely in its foundational stages on any measures outside the fundamental measures that primarily depend on induction to derive judgments in both jurisprudence and creed. "Islamic logic was the methodology through which Islamic scholars constructed various Islamic sciences, foremost among them grammar, jurisprudence, and theology. Moreover, the logical methodological basis on which these Islamic sciences were founded was analogy, according to the grammarians and the fundamentalists, or inference by evidence on the unseen, according to the theologians." This enabled Islamic sciences to adhere to the art of writing and witness significant flourishing once Muslims realized the necessity of examining the texts before them. "The Quran had only compelled Muslims with the explicit meanings of its precise and ambiguous verses to research, observe, think, and deduce, and if its understanding were easy and comprehension straightforward, superficiality that tempts imitation and rigidity would prevail. Difference is a companion of the freedom of opinion and thought." Additionally, the Quran imposed the necessity of starting anew, using parables, seeking evidence, presenting proofs, and challenging with historical accounts. This was not a retrograde process of reality colliding to demolish its strength elements but a factor that stimulated minds and wills to liberate themselves from normative restrictions that hindered thought, contemplation of natural existence, and its relationship with the metaphysical. Thus, the science of theology was credited with expressing what Jabri called "Islamic Arab rationalism." The claim by most thinkers that the science of theology was only a direct reaction to questions outside the field of Islamic culture facing the religion's beliefs within its Arab framework is a significant injustice. The science of theology, even in confronting the ideas influxing into its cultural incubator, utilized the mechanisms of the text and its various analogies in grammar, theology, and jurisprudence, and its fundamental contents residing in the codices of the Quran and hadith, without neglecting the evident proofs in the natural world around it. Therefore, it is naive to consider that the rational science of theology emerged purely as a reaction to politically emerging events or culturally shocking ideas. The doctrinal discourse in Islamic culture did not begin with the science of theology but was preceded and paved the way for it by jurists and hadith scholars who had their positions, even if reserved, on the most important doctrinal issues, whether in rejection, suspension, or interpretation. Observing the opinions of the four major imams reveals this disparity between rejection, moderation, and acceptance. "In Arab rhetoric, rationality is first and foremost determined within the Quranic discourse, specifically in the dialectic of the rational and the irrational in its speech."

*Second Chapter: The Development of Islamic Theology**The Dialectic of Methodology and Content*

When we speak of theology, we mean the rational methodology that is based on the affirmation of religious doctrines and reasoning upon them. As we know, these doctrines are fundamentally derived from transmission, represented by the Quran and the Sunnah. These two sources necessitate their authority through the rational proof of the existence of God and the truthfulness of prophethood. Once these two principles are rationally established, revelation can be utilized as a source of doctrinal knowledge. If we were to delve deeper into the legitimacy of this, we might question who legitimizes the authority of reason for reasoning if reason itself refrains from using itself as evidence. Thus, we are faced with two realities upon which Islamic theology is founded and represented as methodological tools in the service of religious doctrines: transmission and reason. As Al-Ghazali states, "All aspects of this science are confined to the contemplation of the essence of God, the attributes of God, the actions of God, the Messenger of God, and what has come to us on his tongue regarding the definition of God." However, some impose two indispensable conditions on this contemplation for the theologian:

First Condition: The researcher must begin his creed from the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger, meaning that his issues must be faith-based, inherently part of the religion.

Second Condition: The goal of the researcher and the purpose of his study must be the defense of this faith through reason, meaning that the Sharia must be affirmed by reason.

The concept of religious doctrines essentially means that they are the foundation of monotheism and the truth of prophethood, as all other doctrines are related to and branched from them. While Islamic scholars, whether in the principles of jurisprudence or in the principles of religion, agree on this, some branches were later added and then ingrained among their adherents, distinguishing the theological sect from others. For example, the Mu'tazila added the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil, and what this practical principle entails concerning the issue of leadership. Furthermore, all the principles of the Mu'tazila revert to two foundations: monotheism and justice. Justice is based on monotheism, and the principle of justice extends to the remaining associated principles. Consequently, we can observe the development of theological contents alongside the evolution of the cultural society. Later, we were able to consider "the principles of religion as follows: the knowledge of God, His positive and negative attributes, what is befitting to describe Him, what is forbidden to describe Him, and prophethood, leadership, and resurrection." These are principles that the Muslim intellect works to defend, taking one of three positions: either affirmation, strong preference, or suspension. This makes the subjects of theology require methodologies either derived from transmission, with examples present in the foundational texts, or rational. The rational methodology here does not mean relying solely on pure rational principles without any other means; rather, it encompasses all that corresponds to the transmission-based methodology, such as inferential or inductive evidence, empirical, social, or emotional evidence, and everything that can be utilized aside from transmission in defending doctrines and fortifying their cultural identity against distortions from flows that contradict the nature of monotheism. Therefore, research methodologies evolved with the development of theological contents, and as necessitated by the arena of doctrinal debates with their dialectical or evidential obligations, where theology either approaches or diverges from the methodologies of other sciences as needed, as will be elucidated later.

- *The Methodological Basis for the Development of Cultural Society*

Science, in any form, begins with a phenomenon or several phenomena that are observed either by reason or by the senses—events in reality or occurrences in nature, or mental relationships. Through these, problems emerge, and attention turns to them through examination, questioning, or hypothesis, and the evaluation of terms. How to deal with them establishes methodologies, which develop as these phenomena evolve and become present in social fields. Theology is not an aberration among sciences; it was in its environment where reason uncovered theoretical embarrassments surrounding doctrinal texts, in addition

to internal issues and related matters that confused simple perceptions of practical judgments, such as the perpetrator of major sins, as well as external influences, whether substantive or methodological. Thus, theology adopted the familiar inferential methodology of Sharia scholars, and theologians adapted it "in several ways, the most famous of which are:

- A. The Method of Analogy
- B. The Method of Induction
- C. The Method of Inferring the Non-Existence of the Meaning from the Non-Existence of Its Evidence
- D. The Method of Debate."

This approach suited the stage where scholars benefited from the Quranic methodology itself, which called for contemplation and reflection on creations and required the revitalization of creation from its inception, among other inferential methods and techniques. However, the most controversial method was debate, which does not rely on correct premises nor does it guarantee the truth of its outcomes. "This method is mostly intended to overpower the opponent, regardless of whether the claim is true or not." Additionally, the method of analogy was criticized for fundamentally relying on representing the unseen based on the evidence, under the pretext that analogizing the Creator with the creation is not rational.

Theology, as defined by its proponents, "is the affirmation of the known in relation to it the affirmation of religious doctrines, as it seeks the conditions of the Creator such as eternity, unity, power, will, and others, as well as the conditions of the creation such as existence, non-existence, composition from parts, acceptance of annihilation, and so forth—anything that is a part of Islamic doctrine or a means to it." Since the subject of theology is the known, we cannot conceive of analogy as a rational act that aligns with the same logical mechanisms in philosophy. As we know, philosophical analogy relies on correct premises leading to the revelation of an unknown result, whereas in theological analogy, the result is known, as is the major premise. Thus, this analogy must be inverted; we start from the known result to seek the cause that mediates between the two parties of the analogy. This is an analogy used by Sharia sciences to seek common causes between principles and branches. In general, it can be said that in the early stages that theology experienced, Aristotelian analogy received the worst reception for a primary reason: such analogies are aligned with philosophy and differ from doctrines. Moreover, fundamentalists in general—in both jurisprudence and doctrine—established their own logic, where one of its most important conditions was responding to its substantive human-oriented contents. They made it a practical logic devoid of metaphysics, unlike Aristotle's intention of making it a necessary thought in conformity with existence, or as Hegelian followers call it, abstract thought.

As previously mentioned, the methodology was not alien to the contents despite some flaws that theologians attempted to address as their studies advanced and became more concerned with precise theology. The methodologies were not imposed on theological issues as claimed by those who attribute the principles of this science to external sources. Instead, we observe a significant harmony between methodologies and doctrinal issues that theology addressed to affirm and defend, with a practical dimension that deals with doctrinal issues touching Muslims in their cultural reality.

The Development of Theological Contents

Talking about the development of theological contents leads us to say that we are dealing with a cultural variable influenced by the intellectual and social transformations surrounding it. Otherwise, considering these contents as fixed due to their association with doctrinal subjects, which represent the principles of religion, is a form of wishful thinking. Observing the trajectory of theology, one notices its development and the branching of its subjects according to social and political realities and what the text's authority requires in legitimizing these events, their causes, and their judgments in line with a continuous intellectual process that interacts internally and externally. Realities represent the pulses of society and its system's

joints, and managing them necessitates a creative intellect that produces new ideas regardless of the legitimacy or deviation of these transformations. Theology, like other research fields, accommodates these cultural receptions and reformulates them. Consequently, this science, especially in its stages of emergence and maturation, underwent significant development in its contents in coherence with the seriousness and tense nature of transformations during critical phases of Islamic intellectual history.

From the Problem of Determinism to the Issue of Faith and Action

The issue of declaring the perpetrator of major sins an apostate caused significant anxiety among Muslims, as under this pretext, the greatest Companions and Tabi'un, indeed the majority of the Muslim community, were under threat of apostasy. Additionally, the Shi'ites intensified their stance by restricting political leaders to the Ahl al-Bayt and considering faith in their right to leadership as a fundamental doctrine. In the face of this rigidity, the issue of postponement emerged, implemented by the Umayyads' rule, rejecting combat and not tying faith to action to avoid the phenomenon of apostasy that the community faced. Some believe that "historical evidence indicates that the Murji'ah were among the groups that emerged early following the problem of arbitration, and their political positions in supporting the Umayyad state worked to balance between the Shi'ites who refused to enter society and adhere to the caliphate and the Kharijites who saw Islam as applicable only to themselves." However, their lenient stance toward committing sins attracted severe criticism, as they hoped the transgressor would find mercy from God, thereby opening the door for heretics and sinners, despite the initial postponement serving as a safeguard for Muslim lives.

The ideas of this group spread and their sects proliferated. Some have categorized them into four types: "There are four types of Murji'ah: Murji'ah of the Kharijites, Murji'ah of the Qadariyyah, Murji'ah of the Jabariyyah, Murji'ah of the Mu'tazila, and the pure Murji'ah." These types vary based on the strictness of the sects they belong to or their leniency in the relationship between faith and action. One of the Murji'ah imams stated, "Anything below shirk is inevitably forgiven, and if a servant dies upon monotheism, what transgressions he committed or sins he committed do not harm him." Thus, between the two extremes of doctrine—determinism and predestination—the Murji'ah attempted to mediate, but they were closer to determinism, leaving a dominant void in this middle ground. If the nature of things refuses to allow a void, the emergence of an idea attempting to benefit from both extremes is inevitable once its stirrings arise to express itself. Consequently, the issue of status between the two extremes emerged, which became the essence of the Mu'tazila's principles, where theological discourse within the Islamic cultural circle remained doctrinal, and its terminologies did not exceed what people were accustomed to from the rulings of the text (e.g., disbelief, faith, vice, sin, licentiousness, eternal damnation in hell, etc.). If the principle of justice among the Mu'tazila forms a knot of disagreement with their opponents, due to the rationalization of this principle causing embarrassment for the attribute of power among the Sunnis in general, we find that the Mu'tazila's principle of being between the two extremes represents the foundation upon which the principle of justice was established. The rational criterion, considering that the perpetrator of major sins is neither a believer nor a disbeliever, and that his eternal damnation in hell is obligatory for God if he dies without repentance, disrupts the definers of attributes by imposing a generality on the attribute of power. They believe that reason has become a judge in what is originally judged. Regardless of how we view this stance, whether with or against it, we infer from this Mu'tazilite principle a bias towards societal issues, even if through the arbitrary interpretation of Sharia rulings. "Thus, the ruling among the Mu'tazila is a social matter, guided by religion as an inherently dominant conscience, not through governmental coercion, and the foundation of justice for them is primarily human responsibility." Therefore, the Mu'tazila established, like the Kharijites, faith based on the principle of action, making it a compound of this principle. If the cornerstone of action collapses, faith collapses as well, and the only difference between them is that the Kharijites were more daring and inclined to enforce rulings by the sword compared to the Mu'tazila.

Third Chapter: The Forcible Confluence Between Philosophy and Theology

Islamic theology was built upon doctrinal questions arising in the text or provoked by real events. It has strived for centuries to preserve its Islamic uniqueness in its contents and methodologies. Despite the influence of incoming cultures, theologians like Sharia scholars remained cautious towards them. In fact, their rejection of philosophical terminology and methodologies was so decisive as to renounce them

completely. On one hand, the difference in reference and mechanisms prevented this convergence despite the cautious rationalization imposed by the boundaries of cultural proximity and assimilation, enabling Islamic theology to preserve its contents and strictness despite the attempt of reason to confine its doctrinal foundations. However, philosophical disciplines also had their authority, as the Mu'tazila, for example, appropriated many of their philosophical terminologies to theological texts, albeit cautiously. Additionally, a prominent scholar like Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali stood against philosophers, but their thought imposed that connection through the standard boundaries represented by logic. To what extent did Islamic theology withstand in preserving its fundamental peculiarities? And what are the limits of its mixing with philosophy?

Philosophical Contents at the Doors of Islamic Theology

If the first generation of Mu'tazila already established the most important features of Mu'tazilite principles with Islamic doctrinal concepts and terminologies, the second generation, which encountered incoming religious sects and the rich terminologies of Greek philosophy regarding deities and natural sciences, mixed theology with philosophical concepts. "The Mu'tazilite movement began with Al-'Alaf (d. around 235 AH) contemporaneous with the translation movement. When Greek philosophy was translated during the early Abbasid period, the Mu'tazilite scholars amalgamated philosophical methodologies with their research, dedicating a branch of science they called theology. " What concerns us is that this influence of philosophy produced within theology new contents and new opinions, especially regarding the nature of the relationship between essence and attributes. It is known that most philosophers' views on deities automatically imply the negation of attributes, thereby negating divine activity in general.

Although the Mu'tazila did not adopt the Greek school's doctrines literally, they found in their opinions a pathway to rationalizing the metaphysical doctrines of Islam, which were theoretically and practically constrained. It was as if Islamic thought, fundamentally based on the methodology of narration, was living in a rational void awaiting the emergence of such a sect to create a balance between transmission and reason. "This historical role of the Mu'tazila represents, in reality, the positive revolutionary phase of their theological inquiries, not in terms of their intrinsic value, but in terms of the historical action they caused thanks to the general social situation's ability to respond to opposing thought." Accordingly, the Mu'tazila first alerted us to the centrality of their thought in the Islamic field, becoming one of the main elements in scientific establishment alongside jurisprudence, hadith, and language. The Mu'tazila are the realistic representation of theology in its systematic philosophical form. Everything written after this school was merely a reaction to their ideas, so their substantive addition was very strong, both in domesticating reason finally as the existing support to balance transmission and because this reason attached the theoretical political substance to its philosophical system, resulting in an inspiring attraction that meets the demands of this content. "This attractiveness arises from it being exposed to the roots of the principles and issues on which the ideology of the caliphate is fundamentally based, and its influence in shaking these roots was stronger than the Kharijite wars despite their violence. " Although Muslims had differed on the issue of leadership since the first day the Prophet (PBUH) joined the higher companion, discussing it in a political sense and within the framework of practical philosophical thought was fundamental with the Mu'tazila, through the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil, which was originally in declaring the separation between revelation and what must be rationalized in the human dimension, such as ethics. "It is worth reminding that the general goal of Mu'tazilite debate was represented by the gentleness of God and His justice, which essentially represents the function of the claim that the moral values attributed to actions are independent of revelation. " This independence from revelation, as well as divine gentleness, effectively ensures that religion can reasonably intervene in human real-life issues, making religion the foundation for ethical action primarily stemming from reason. Thus, the Mu'tazila liberated political philosophy from scriptural constraints, adhering to theoretical establishment that made its effectiveness stronger than all previous conflicts.

The Mu'tazila made moral theory an important factor in separating reason from transmission. They also influenced natural philosophy, seeing God's effect on matter as a causal effect, which later Islamic philosophers adopted. Thus, we find Al-Kindi "in his view of natural sciences followed the path of the Mu'tazila in denying God's direct effect on matter, and this is what philosophers unanimously accepted, saying: God Almighty does not directly conduct actions by His essence, but through causes. " In my

opinion, this was influenced by the logic that had early entered Islamic thought, but without the scope of prohibiting the predecessors from delving into rational sciences. Nevertheless, its influence on Islamic knowledge is evident through serious attempts to rationalize them, especially in grammar, which adheres to rational principles despite its intransigence to logical analogies. There is no doubt that the logic of Aristotle was well known to Muslims, especially with the development of translation during al-Ma'mun's reign, and Islamic thought at that time increasingly needed systematic organization. "Does this indicate that Islamic-Arab thought chose Aristotle's logic at that time to be the methodology that the need for development called upon as a guide in coordinating various intellectual processes?" We will return to logic, as it later became a pillar in the methodological development of theology. However, it must be pointed out that the term logic itself, and its rational terminologies, were present extensively in theology, especially with Al-Ghazali and later Ash'ari scholars. This caused the contents of theology that utilize some philosophical contents to merge with them so that the reader cannot distinguish between theology and philosophy, but its methodological influence was stronger, as will be explained in the coming paragraphs discussing the influence of philosophical methodology on theology. As for terminological contents such as substances, accidents, individual essence and void, the indivisible part, latency, and other philosophical terms, no one denies them, and they were charged with the statements of theologians, even though many rejected them because they were, in their view, borrowed from philosophers and atheists and originally Greek.

The Impact of the Philosophical Method on Islamic Theology

Adherence to the Fundamentalist Method and the Emergence of Al-'Alaf as the Philosopher of Theologians

Adherence to the Fundamentalist Method

Theologians have consistently insisted on maintaining a distance between their science and philosophy, even a complete initial break between the two methodologies. However, many scholars point to the presence of an undeniable methodological presence, whether through the historical induction of the translation movement, the influence of some sects by incoming knowledge, especially Greek, or by considering the reliance on logic in various Islamic studies, which is a rational analogy despite the distinctiveness of inferential methods in theology compared to philosophical studies. If we assume that the presence of logic in Islamic sciences is the shortest path to knowing the philosophical methodological presence in theology, we must know that theologians, not to mention other scholars of jurisprudence and language, distinguish between fundamental logic and rational logic, vehemently rejecting the latter. Ibn Taymiyyah stated, "For this reason, Muslim scholars and religious imams continue to denounce it, denounce its people, and forbid it and its people." This is for many reasons, including that it assumes correct premises. If we can err in these innate premises, it is obvious that their truth cannot be known except through analogy, which leads to contradiction and confusion. Also, they claim that conceptualization can only be known by definition, which theologians reject, considering that philosophers intend it as the essence, a combination of genus and species. This definition is either impossible or difficult, as they themselves acknowledge, which is not comprehended in most concepts. As for definition in the terminology of theologians, it is used to differentiate between concepts and to know the difference between them. Most of them are known through induction, which is the view of the majority of theologians and their sects, famous in the books of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari, Qadi Abu Bakr, Abu Ishaq, Ibn Furq, Imam al-Haramayn, and others. Only those who introduced Aristotelian logic after Al-Ghazali in the late fifth century disagreed with them.

The point of difference in analogy between philosophers and fundamentalists—the foundations of religion and jurisprudence—clearly shows, on one hand, that the result of rational analogy is unknown while it is derived from known premises, whereas in fundamentalist analogy, the result is known by the text. This is the fundamental disagreement between philosophy and theology. Rational inference among theologians aims to affirm the known, not to comprehend the unknown. Therefore, their first inferential method "is analogy of the unseen to the seen, this is fundamentalist analogy, so the compared subject among theologians is the principle among fundamentalists—the compared subject is the branch—and the common factor between the principle and the branch, or between the seen and the unseen, is the cause among fundamentalists." Thus, apart from some terminologies and rational presence attempting to establish an ethical law based on human reference, there is an absence and rejection of the philosophical

methodology within theology. However, the theological arena was not devoid of an active philosophizing movement, exemplified primarily by Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Alaf (135-235 AH), philosopher of the Mu'tazila, which had a significant impact on the development of this sect and on theology in general.

Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Alaf and the Beginning of the Theologians' Philosophy

Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Alaf was born in Basra, a center of Islamic culture and a meeting place of sects, most of which were fed by Greek philosophy, Jewish, Christian, and Persian religious schools had their intellectual presence and opinions arising from direct contact with rational studies. Basra was an arena of debate, where Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Alaf distinguished himself from his youth with intelligence and strong debate skills. This interaction with various knowledge areas significantly affected the philosophical maturity of this great theologian, who influenced the direction of theology from the second half of the second century of Hijra.

We cannot say that al-'Alaf applied the philosophical methodology to theology or provided it with a logical mechanism and provided it with rational analogies as later Ash'ari scholars did. But al-'Alaf's influence from philosophy was adopting many of its opinions in various theological matters. Much of these ideas were clearly influenced by philosophy, such as his view on the transcendence of God Almighty. Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Alaf believed that the Creator Almighty does not operate within the confines of time and place, similar to Aristotle's view that existence in time does not mean the same existence with time, and that eternal beings like God are not in time because they are not in motion. While the latter philosopher explains this view, al-'Alaf presents his opinion without explanation because he defends doctrine. Also, the idea that "attribute is the essence of the self" is a form of transcendence by style. "The difference between the statement 'the essence itself is not through knowledge,' and 'the essence is known through knowledge' is that the former denies an attribute while the latter affirms that the essence is in itself an attribute, or affirming that an attribute is in itself the essence. If Abu al-Hudhayl affirms these attributes and their essence to the self, it is inherently the creeds of Christians or the conditions of Abu Hashim, and Greek philosophers saw attributes as manners (styles). The old meaning is the denial of primacy, and the new meaning is the denial of necessity." This caused the Mu'tazila's sheikh to lean towards the philosophical idea of style and negation of attributes in opposition to rival religions.

What all scholars attest to is that al-'Alaf benefited from Greek philosophy and that his thought represented a decisive turning point in the history of theological debate. Some accuse him of mixing philosophical opinions with doctrines, especially in the issue of attributes and saying that God is an entity with knowledge of Himself. However, others see that al-'Alaf adapted philosophical ideas to his theological methodology and took them as a means to respond to opponents inside and outside Islamic thought. He incorporated what was consistent with doctrinal principles and rejected what he saw as not aligned with doctrinal principles. Regardless of scholars' positions on al-'Alaf's thought, there is no disagreement about his role in activating theological thought and preparing it to accommodate philosophical methodologies and terminologies, making it an undeniable cognitive reality. Within the Ash'ari school, which began rejecting Greek reason and ended up with a mixture of theology and philosophy.

Al-Ghazali and the Prelude to the Association between Theology and Philosophy

The observer of the introduction to logic included in Al-Ghazali's "Al-Mustasfa" from his "Ilm al-Usul" (Principles of Jurisprudence) realizes that Al-Ghazali attempted to combine the inductive analogy of the fundamentalists and logical analogy. In this introduction, he touches upon the laws of definition and their demands: some are requested in the form of "Is it?" meaning the principle and the condition; some are requested in the form of "What?" meaning either to explain the term or to induct what distinguishes its reality, or to request the essence and reality of the thing itself; some are requested in the form of "Why?" meaning a question about the cause; some are requested in the form of "Which?" to distinguish what was known in its entirety from what it was mixed with. Through understanding these limiting laws, we see that Al-Ghazali combined and harmonized the inductive analogies used by the fundamentalists in both jurisprudence and theology, which aim to distinguish the limited from others, and the analogies used by logicians that directly aim to know the essence and reality of the thing. As we know, this was initially rejected

before Al-Ghazali, but he, aware of the sciences of his era and probing their depths, attempted to counter what contradicts the foundations of Sharia and did not reject what he saw as serving these foundations. He said: "As for logics, none of them are related to religion, neither by negation nor by affirmation, but they are concerned with the study of the ways of evidence and measures, the conditions of the premises of proofs, how to arrange them, the conditions of a correct definition and how to arrange it, and that knowledge is either conception and its means of knowing through definition, or affirmation and its means of knowing through evidence, and there is nothing in this that should be denied." Al-Ghazali, upon observing various inferential and dialectical methods, found no justification for excluding logic among them. Al-Ghazali authored in all these methodological patterns "works including writings dedicated to the methodology of producing certain knowledge, the most important of which are 'The Criterion of Knowledge,' 'The Proof in Logic,' 'Studies on the Reality of Knowledge and Its Stages of Perfection,' among which 'The Balance of Action,' 'The Straight Measure,' and 'The Savior from Misguidance,' works examining the secrets of divine wisdom, most notably 'Wisdom in the Creatures of God.'"

Thus, Al-Ghazali established a union that was initially forbidden by preceding scholars, whether in jurisprudence or in doctrine, except for the early relative influence of Mu'tazila sheikhs toward the general rational trend of philosophers. Al-Jahiz said: "A theologian does not compile the domains of theology, mastering the craft, nor is he fit for leadership, until one who excels in religious discourse in the same way excels in philosophical discourse." The Ash'ari, who mastered the depths of Mu'tazila thought, opposed this trend and did not accept philosophical logic, despite rationalizing some doctrinal issues. Then, Ash'ari scholars accepted some natural proofs as a methodology to affirm the antiquity of the universe, such as the issues of individual essence, the indivisible part, and the fact that existence is not separated by time, which the Mu'tazila adopted similarly to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar's view. Their inference in these issues was cautious, and their senior scholars criticized philosophers' proofs in deities and Qadi Abd al-Jabbar criticized several doctrines in causality and explanation, paving the way for the theory of custom that Al-Ghazali would later establish. Despite this criticism, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar was influenced structurally by the rational trend that began to appear in Ash'ari studies. "He took the lead in leadership in their method, refined it, and established rational premises upon which the evidence and gazes rely, such as individual essence, void, and that form does not remain a form, and that two times do not remain..." Imam al-Haramayn continued this, and in his works, some philosophical inferential methods appeared. He invalidated Qadi Abd al-Jabbar's inferential rule (the invalidity of the evidence allows the invalidity of the meaning). He affirmed that the invalidity of the evidence does not allow the invalidity of the meaning, but rather, other evidences can be considered.

I mentioned earlier that Imam Al-Ghazali accepted logic within the theological system, and in reality, he did not exclude other foundational methodologies but declared their validity alongside what could be utilized from other methodologies. Thus, it can be said that Al-Ghazali's declared confrontation with philosophers was partial in some theological matters, where he stated: "As for deities, they have more of their fallacies, as they could not fulfill the proof they stipulated in logic, and therefore, the differences among them increased." However, it can be definitively stated that merely legitimizing logic through its settlement within the theological boundaries is an announcement of a forcible convergence that was forbidden between philosophy and theology, as the issues of deities are inherently based on debate and cannot be resolved through logical analogy nor achieved through philosophical evidence, where definitive premises are impossible, and they can only be differentiated through transmission or evidences explicitly stated by the source. As for thoroughly assimilating logic with such methodological strength, it is what led to the subsequent mix that led later scholars to hold contradictory stances: some of them incorporated logical methodologies in their fundamentalist works to the extent that differentiation between them became impossible, while others rejected this association, holding a decisive stance vehemently in their rejection. It is worth noting that after this stage, Islamic theology would delve into detailed and partial studies, losing much of its humanistic interests, similar to many other Sharia sciences awaiting another renaissance after a subsequent civilizational shock that stimulates its revival.

Conclusion

It appears that Islamic theology has registered its objective and influential presence in the Islamic intellectual arena for centuries, interacting with the foundations of other Islamic sciences, and confronting external cultural influxes representing the common rational approach that imposed itself through the early translation movement, followed by the later assimilation of rational methodology after attempts of legitimate rejection, thus fortifying doctrines and preventing structural distortions. However, with the expansion of Islamic knowledge areas, philosophy found its way into theological studies through definitive terminologies and logical analogies, making it impossible for the reader to distinguish between theology and philosophy. Nevertheless, its methodological influence was stronger, as will be explained in the forthcoming paragraphs discussing the influence of philosophical methodology on theology. As for terminological contents such as substances, accidents, individual essence and void, the indivisible part, latency, and other philosophical terms, no one denies them, and they were charged with the statements of theologians, even though many rejected them because they were, in their view, borrowed from philosophers and atheists and originally Greek.

I conclude with some key results and recommendations, including:

Results

Islamic theology possesses originality in its emergence and formation within its Islamic intellectual framework.

Islamic theology attempted to rationalize its issues influenced by incoming ideas and the early translation movement transmitting rational studies.

Fortifying intellectual identity is not achieved by rejecting the thoughts of others and excluding them, but by creating innovative methodologies that interact with emerging issues.

Incorporating philosophical methodology within the theological system reveals the inability of this thought in a later stage to initiate new methodologies that surpass the epistemological impasse represented by the forcible shift from human issues to metaphysical embarrassments and their partialities.

Recommendations

Re-examine the underlying causes behind the internal formation of Islamic theology to understand the real interaction with human issues.

Re-read the theological heritage with modern approaches that realistically root and benefit from external production.

Believe that Islamic theology represents the authentic Islamic-Arab philosophy rooted in doctrinal and linguistic foundations, and its revival has become a civilizational necessity for a possible revitalization process.

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