

Humanitarian Assistance in the Minawao Camp through the Eyes of its Refugees: Perception and Accountability Challenges in a Context of Protracted Displacement

Marie Rosette MAGNE¹, Abdoulaye Boureima HASSANE², Coffi Cyprien AHOLOU³

Abstract

For a decade, the Minawao camp in Cameroon has been hosting Nigerian refugees facing inadequate humanitarian assistance. Drawing on a methodology that combines ethnographic immersion, focus groups, a questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews with refugees, this study examines refugees' perception of aid in a crucial context of accountability and refugee legitimacy. The findings reveal a decline in the quality of assistance, non-inclusive camp management, limited understanding of aid mechanisms, and fundamental notions related to refugee status. This situation fosters a sense of non-accountability towards the camp, reducing their engagement in camp activities, despite humanitarian agencies' efforts to improve living conditions. Refugees are calling for inclusive management and a reorientation of programs toward autonomy, grounded in their real needs and aspirations for a safe return to Nigeria. The study advocates for a revision of accountability practices through increased refugee participation in decision-making processes, promoting more responsible and tailored humanitarian aid, and empowering refugees to take an active role in shaping their futures.

Keywords: Perception, Humanitarian Assistance, Accountability, Refugees, Minawao.

Introduction

The situation of refugees is a matter of global concern (Nations Unies, 2018, p. 1). This issue is particularly significant for African states, which, amidst a multiplicity of humanitarian crises, strive to uphold their commitments to sustainable development (Tiomo & Simeu Kamdem, 2023, p. 243). They host almost 40% of the world's refugees (HCR, 2024, p. 15) while they themselves are comprised mainly of low- and middle-income countries whose state capacities are largely overwhelmed. Consequently, the precarious protection of refugees in Africa (Cambrézy, 2007, p. 15) presents a multitude of challenges for the various stakeholders, including humanitarian organisations, host states and the refugees. These challenges are magnified in protracted refugee situations, where displaced individuals are no longer merely awaiting immediate solutions.

A protracted refugee situation refers to scenarios where over 25,000 refugees from the same country of origin remain in exile in a low- or middle-income host country for at least five consecutive years (HCR, 2021, p. 20). The scope, complexity, and scale of refugee crises have increased, necessitating protection, assistance, and durable solutions for affected populations (Nations Unies, 2018, p. 1).

Central Africa is no exception to this phenomenon of refugees in protracted situations and a forced and constrained mobility, as seen in Cameroon (Wali Wali, 2010a, p. 34). Refugees in this region primarily reside in camps (Fall, 2022, p. 22) where they receive essential aid. Although, this traditional approach to humanitarian assistance, remains crucial, it has long been critiqued in the context of protracted refugee situations. Since the signing of the Grand Bargain in 2016, there has been a gradual shift in both discourse and practice toward transforming traditional humanitarian paradigms (Audet, 2022, p. 460). Among the key changeset is the movement for the "localization of humanitarian aid," emphasizing the reinforcement of local action and redefining refugees' roles. The Grand Bargain underscores the importance of aid localisation (Audet, 2022, p. 460; Coordination Sud & OngLAB, 2020, p. 18) aiming to achieve one of its ten commitments "A participation revolution: including people receiving aid in decision-making processes that affect their lives" (IASC, 2017, 2021, p. 4). This vision was further reiterated in the Global Framework for Action and the Global Compact for

¹ Regional Centre of Excellence on Sustainable Cities in Africa (CERVIDA-DOUNEDON), University of Lome, Lomé 01 BP 1515, Togo ;rosette1magne@gmail.com ID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-3130-6020> (Corresponding author)

² Doctoral School of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Geography, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Abdou Moumouni University, Niamey, Niger

³ Regional Centre of Excellence on Sustainable Cities in Africa (CERVIDA-DOUNEDON), University of Lome, Lomé 01 BP 1515, Togo

Refugees, following the 2016 New York Declaration, with its objective of empowering refugees (Nations Unies, 2018, p. 4).

Localisation seeks to implement inclusive humanitarian assistance, where refugees actively participate in discussions and decision-making on issues affecting them (IASC, 2017). By valuing refugees' voices, humanitarian practices embrace a fresh and necessary perspective, transitioning from standardised assistance to a more inclusive approach. Achieving this, it is first necessary to reinstate in the discussion, refugees' views on the aid they receive within a framework of a co-construction of an assistance strategy where responsibilities between humanitarian actors and refugees are clearly defined. This study aligns with these efforts by examining refugees' perceptions of the aid provided in Minawao Camp and their aspirations.

The Minawao Refugee Camp (MRC), situated in Cameroon's Far North since 2013, provides an illustrative example of the challenges outlined above in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Le Cameroon, a lower-middle-income country where about four in ten people live below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2024), is grappling with three significant humanitarian crises (Arsenault, 2024, p. 22-24):

- The Anglophone crisis in the country's West,
- The Central African crisis, leading to the establishment of five refugee camps in the East region and two in Adamawa region
- The Boko Haram-driven security crisis in the Far North since 2009 (Vincent et al., 2017). which has worsened with violence in the Lake Chad region, prolonging refugees' stay (HCR, 2024, p. 6).

By early 2024, the MRC hosted approximately 76,093 Nigerian refugees, becoming a space of both temporary and permanent residence after ten years. While consultation mechanisms exist within the camp through refugees committees, they lack genuine decision-making authority and primarily serve as spaces of dialogue manage and regulate refugees (Bouagga, 2019, p. 9; Caratini, 2007, p. 164-165). Furthermore, research by Magne and Aholou (2024a) identifies a significant mismatch between refugees' aspirations and the programs developed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, abbreviated to HCR) as the primary cause of the failure of the refugee empowerment strategy. This disconnect aligns with the broader critique that the real needs of aid recipients, especially refugees, are often overlooked in humanitarian responses approaches (Aburamadan et al., 2020). In light of the above, how can the real aspirations of Minawao Camp refugees be understood and valued to foster inclusive humanitarian action as recommended? Centred around this question, the present study begins by a non-exhaustive literature review on the issue of refugees' perceptions of received assistance. Subsequently, an analysis and discussion of refugees' viewpoints on the different sectors of assistance provided in Minawao Camp will be undertaken.

Theoretical Context

The nature of humanitarian interventions sometimes generates mistrust between beneficiary populations and humanitarian organisations, due to an approach often focused on the protection of human rights rather than on the specific needs of beneficiaries (Grayson, 2016, p. 3, 13). In order to address these accountability challenges, various initiatives such as the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross Movement, the Sphere Project (launched in 1997), and the Humanitarian Accountability Project (2003), aim to redefine the relationship between humanitarian organisations and aid beneficiaries (Grayson, 2016, p. 10-12). These initiatives also promote a shift in the perception of refugees. They are increasingly seen not merely as passive recipients of aid (Maarawi, 2024, p. 18-20), but as partners actively involved in the design of assistance projects (Corbet, 2016, p. 75). This approach is reinforced by the imperative to establish sustainable humanitarianism, which ultimately promotes the empowerment and resilience of refugees.

Since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the localisation of aid has become a major issue within the humanitarian community. Some countries in the Global South, asserting a form of "humanitarian sovereignty," have implemented rules and controls governing foreign interventions. In response, the humanitarian system

has emphasized the effectiveness of aid localisation, thus promoting a transfer of responsibilities to local actors (Savard et al., 2020, p. 21).

However, this transition remains constrained by the organizational cultures of NGOs and UN agencies, which are more oriented toward accountability to donors than to the beneficiaries they are supposed to serve (Savard et al., 2020, p. 2). Thus, humanitarian aid, often criticized for this tendency to cater to donor interests, raises questions about its alignment with the needs of recipient countries (Beaulieu et al., 2022, p. 3). According to Savard (2020, p. 5), beneficiaries face difficulties in influencing humanitarian operations that concern them, as host countries (developing nations) are rarely included in the evaluations requested by donors. Furthermore, evaluation and impact reports of aid remain inaccessible to the affected populations and are not translated into local languages, exacerbating this inaccessibility and their lack of understanding.

The localisation of aid also raises questions about its capacity to strengthen the effectiveness of responses to humanitarian crises. While the Grand Bargain adopted during the 2016 Summit aims to reform a humanitarian system deemed dysfunctional and dominated by international actors (Barbelet et al., 2021, p. 9), the implementation of this approach continues to be hampered by financial constraints and overly contextual analyses (Parvais Max, 2024, p.17-19). The experience of the Covid-19 pandemic has also underscored the urgency of rethinking humanitarian practices to meet beneficiaries' needs and to promote more equitable partnerships (Beaulieu et al., 2022, p. 2). Thus, the effective involvement of local actors, including refugees, remains essential to ensure appropriate and sustainable humanitarian interventions, provided that the structural and financial obstacles weighing on the localisation of aid are removed.

Methodology

Site Presentation

Located in a rural area and isolated from surrounding villages, the camp is surrounded by vast stretches inhabited lands, except to the west by the village of Gadala, the Gawar district 5 km to the south, and the Zamai district approximately 10 km to the north. The Minawao refugee camp, established over 623 hectares, is placed under the supervision of the Cameroonian State. Assistance is coordinated there by the UNHCR and its technical partner responsible for camp management, together forming the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) framework. On the ground, the State is represented by security forces (police and gendarmerie) as well as the camp administrator's team, which is notably tasked with deliberating on refugee status and ensuring state representation in decision-making processes.

To promote participatory governance, the UNHCR established sectoral committees in 2015, organized according to areas of assistance, alongside refugee committees structured by social categories. These include: the committee of elders, the committee for women and families, the youth and recreation committee, the committee for Persons with Specific Needs (PSNs), the vigilance committee, and the central committee led by the refugee president. The camp is structured into 957 communes grouped into 83 blocks and four residential sectors.




Figure 1. Study site location

Data collection and analysis

Data collection was conducted during a six-month ethnographic stay in the Minawao camp. Surveys among refugees often reveal biases, the most notable being respondents' tendency to adopt a narrative of victimization in the hope of receiving increased assistance. To minimize the impact of this tendency, this research employed three complementary approaches: immersion acceptance, transparency about the objectives and methodology of the research project, and training and awareness-raising. These approaches were important in preparing voluntary refugee participants for the survey. They were informed that the study would not lead to the distribution of goods (in-kind or cash), was not commissioned or sponsored by UNHCR or any humanitarian agency, carried no bias, and was grounded in the shared understanding of the insufficiency of aid to meet all their current needs.

After completing the immersion phase (four months), the main data were collected using three principal survey tools:

- Focus group: organized according to the target groups identified, the number of volunteer members to be invited was defined in advance according to the criteria of gender representativeness and equal representation of the four residential sectors. Six focus groups were held, as follows.

Table 1: Focus group sampling

Target group	Group composition	Number
Young people aged 15 to 18	3 People per area of residence	14 ⁴
Adults Persons with Specific Needs (PSNs)	3 People per area of residence	12
Young people (+18ans)	2 Young people per sector including president, vice-president and secretary of the youth committee	14 ⁵
Women	2 women per sector including Women's Committee Chair, Vice-Chair and Secretary	12

⁴ In practice, there was a surplus of 2 volunteer refugees.

⁵ In practice, there was a surplus of 2 volunteer refugees.

Target group	Group composition	Number
Community leaders	Head of 4 residential sectors, 2 block chiefs per sector, 2 imams, 2 pastors, refugee president, vigilance committee president, wise men committee president	18
Community Relays	2 relays per sector of humanitarian response activities	18
Total		86

The group discussions began with the fundamental hypothesis that the camp is a fully autonomous territory governed by the refugees themselves. Therefore, humanitarian aid should be regarded as an external contribution within the exchanges process. For each sector of assistance, the refugees provided feedback based on their own experiences and observations. The outcome of their debates formed the basis of their assessment of humanitarian assistance which was recorded in form of a SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats) analysis. The processing of the collected information involved grouping data from the target groups by assistance sector, followed by a synthesis of the findings.

- The questionnaire: The sample size was determined using Slovin's formula: $n = \frac{N}{1+Ne^2}$

n: sample size; e: margin of error, set at 0.05 and N: total population, estimated at 73,887 (HCR, 2022) at the beginning of the survey in June 2022.

The respondents were selected using stratified random sampling at a rate of 4 to 6 individuals per block. Based on the occupancy density and the number of blocks in each residential sector, the questionnaire was administered to 472 volunteer refugees using the Kobocollect software. Data processing and storage were performed using SPSS and Excel. The evaluation of humanitarian assistance at this stage employed a point-based coding system ranging from 0 to 5 for each service provided since 2013. The responses were processed to calculate the annual average assessment for each sector.

- Semi-Structured Interviews (SSI): These sessions were conducted following a question guide that allowed refugees to narrate their personal journeys while emphasizing their assessment of the humanitarian assistance received. The selection of interviewees was based on the nature of their experiences and their availability. According to discussions with camp officials and refugees, the refugee population can be categorized into four main groups, as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2: SSI sampling of refugees

Designation	Number of refugees surveyed	
Refugees who lived with Boko Haram	4	
Refugees repatriated and returned to camp	Repatriation with UNHCR or formal	5
	Spontaneous or informal repatriation	5
Refugees who lived at least 3 years in Cameroon before acquiring refugee status	7	
Total	21	

The accounts were analysed to identify points of divergence or convergence in the interviewees' assessments of the assistance received and the camp's significance to them. This involved a content and semantic analysis of the transcripts. Despite the diversity of their profiles, the refugees' accounts of the assistance they had received were found to be similar.

Results and Discussions

1.1. Description of respondents

Table 3 presents the initial characteristic elements of the surveyed refugees. The results of the survey indicate that the average age of respondents ranged from 28 to 40 years old, with 48% of respondents being women. Additionally, an average of 82.47% of surveyed refugees have been residing in the camp for at least five years (between 2013 and 2017) (see Appendix A) and are primarily household heads. These data indicate that the information was collected from individuals likely to provide informed assessments of the humanitarian assistance received.

Table 3: Initial characteristic of respondents

Type of survey	Average age	Distribution by sex		Length of time in camp		Position in household			
		Women	Man	2013 à 2017	2018 à 2022	Head of household	Spouse	Adult	others
Focus group	28	47.67 %	52.33 %	77.91 %	22.09 %	34.88%	34.88 %	13.95	16.28 %
Questionnaire	39	41.53 %	58.47 %	88.56 %	11.43 %	66.11%	24.79 %	7.36 %	0
SSI	40	57.14 %	42.86 %	80.95 %	19.05 %	66.67%	33.33 %	0	0

The second characteristic of the respondents is their position in the camp's governance system, according to their nature or position of responsibility. The statistics detailed in Table 4 show that the sample of respondents to the questionnaire takes account of the diversity of refugee categories, ranging from vulnerable people (PSNs) to relay refugees (4.24%), Bulama (2.75%), leaders and volunteer workers, all at 1.48% each.

Table 4: Categorisation of refugees surveyed

	Questionnaire	Focus group	SSI
According to their nature			
PSNs refugee	4.66%	13.95%	0%
Seasonal resident	2.97%	0%	0%
Ordinary and permanent refugee	92.16%	86.05%	100%
Other	0.21%	0%	0%
According to their position of responsibility			
Community relay	4.24%	20.93%	4.76%
Bulama	2.75%	0.00%	0%
Community leader	1.48%	20.93%	0%
Religious leaders	1.48%	4.65%	0%
Ordinary and permanent refugee	87.29%	53.49%	95.24%
Voluntary worker	1.48%	0%	0%
Other	1.27%	0%	0%

In accordance with Table 1 (previously seen in the methodology section), the various target groups from the focus groups and semi-structured interviews (SSIs) converge on these results. These initial findings indicate that the sample used is representative of the diversity of statuses and types of refugees present in the Minawao camp. It can therefore serve as a reliable foundation for the present research.

Perception of humanitarian assistance provided in the camp

Table 5 or each sector of assistance, the annual evaluation of the humanitarian response by refugees (See Appendix B for each assistance sector). Although the scores are generally satisfactory, a detailed analysis highlights, on the one hand, a regressive trend in humanitarian assistance. This decline is particularly pronounced in the areas of food security, livelihood development, and assistance to PSN. The regression in these three sectors exacerbates refugees' vulnerability and their dependence on aid. On the other hand, the scores reveal a certain inertia in assistance, which could reflect a "maintenance of life" induced by a routine of humanitarian support.

This regressive state of humanitarian assistance reflects the realities of numerous camps, as "the humanitarian system is on the brink of collapse," according to Mr. Lowcock⁶ (2017) during the 36th plenary session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Indeed, although donor generosity increases annually, the funds and resources remain insufficient to effectively address the multiple crises and victims (Boinet, 2024; ECOSOC/6930, 2018). On the ground, individual material and financial aid to refugees was significantly reduced in favor of collective projects within the framework of the self-reliance policy promoted by UNHCR, as observed in Congolese refugee's camp in Gabon (Wali Wali, 2010b, p. 247).

Table 5: Refugees' overall assessment of assistance

Assistance sector	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
CCCM	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3
Cohabitation with host community	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	4
Community Governance	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3
Child protection	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3
Civil security	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3
Management of sexual violence	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	3
PSNs Management	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
Drinking water supply	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Hygiene and sanitation	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	4
Food security	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	2	2
Livelihood	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
Education	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3
Health	3	4	4	3,5	3	3	3	3	3	3
Mobility and spatial planning	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Shelter/Housing	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Environment	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4

According to the administered questionnaire, 32.20% of refugees (compared to 67.80%) reported having observed regressive changes in humanitarian assistance, on average since 2017. The results in Figure 2 reveal that these changes mainly concern the sectors of food security and livelihood. Using the ranking system

⁶ Remarks made during the opening statement by Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

employed, drinking water supply and education emerged as the two secondary sectors that, according to the refugees, have experienced regressive changes.




Figure 2. Preferential classification of assistance sectors that have undergone regression

In parallel, all interviews reported a decline in food aid, aligning with the priority assistance sectors previously mentioned, as expressed by these refugees:

"... Then I was settled in a tent house in what is now Sector 4. The reception was good, and we ate to our satisfaction, even meat. There was a ticket system for food. From 2014 to 2017, everything was fine. They distributed plenty of food (rice, beans, gari, oil, flour, soap), and we cooperated well with people. From 2017 to 2021, reductions began, but no one informed us that the food supply would be reduced..."

"From 2014 to 2016, everything was fine, but in 2016-2017, I noticed a reduction in food and water."

Specifically, the results obtained in the area of food security and livelihood development, as recorded in Table 6, reveal the refugees' willingness to meet their own needs while acknowledging the efforts of the assistance provided. However, reluctance to join UNHCR training programs and the opacity of UNHCR administrative procedures have been highlighted. Refugees note that the lack of professional opportunities in the region, combined with the reduction in aid, insufficient food rations, and limited arable land, exacerbates their vulnerability to food insecurity and hampers their prospects for self-sufficiency. Furthermore, the efforts of humanitarian agencies are undermined by the indiscipline and greed of certain refugee leaders, which limit equitable access to resources, particularly food supplies and support for the creation of Income-Generating Activities (IGAs). According to the research findings of Magne & Aholou (2024a, p. 4-6, 10-11) this assessment of assistance can be explained by several factors. These include the misalignment between the training programs offered by the UNHCR and the refugees' existing skills and their actual needs for self-sufficiency, the geographical isolation of Minawao camp, and the limited employability of refugees as community liaisons for humanitarian agencies. In terms of food security, the monthly food distribution (the primary source of sustenance) operational since the camp's opening does not meet the minimum caloric intake requirement of 2,100 kilocalories per refugee (Magne & Aholou, 2024b, p. 7). Furthermore, authors highlight an insufficient number of food distribution sites and above all, a paucity of diversity in the food basket.

Table 6: Assessment of assistance in the food security and livelihood sector

Strengths	Weaknesses
Refugees' willingness to work Existence of community relays and volunteers Development of IGAs Access to practical training Regular monthly food distributions	Limited access of PSBs to IGAs Reluctance to learn some trades and laziness on the part of some refugees, especially men Greed among some refugee leaders Dropping out of school in favour of small informal jobs Insufficient food rations Indiscipline during food distribution Lack of jobs and farmland
Opportunities	Threats
Possibility to work outside the camp	Opacity of Asylum Procedures for Refugees Ambiguity in the selection process for NGO-led training programs Reduction in donations and lack of jobs in Minawao and the surrounding region

In terms of education, the data presented in Table 7 indicate that refugees value the quality of teaching provided and highlight the active involvement of parents in their children's education. However, there is a significant lack of teaching materials and educators, primarily due to teacher strikes affecting Cameroon and the government's failure to deploy a sufficient number of qualified teachers. Although opportunities for higher education exist, the scarcity of scholarships and the limited number of available slots prevent refugees to make plans for higher education. Coupled with the poverty in the camp, many refugees abandon their studies in favor of small jobs or stop after obtaining their secondary school diplomas.

Similar findings have been reported in the works of Gauthier (2024, p. 20) and Daouda Bana (2022, p. 45), which highlighted challenges in accessing education in Mali and Niger, respectively. Consequently, refugees are advised to consider enrolling in private institutions that are less affected by such disruptions (Fall, 2022, p. 39). However, the geographical isolation of the camp in Minawao and the existing assistance strategy do not allow for the implementation of this option.

Table7: Assessment of assistance in education sector

Strengths	Weaknesses
Free schooling, provision of supplies, and quality of teaching Increased literacy and well-equipped school infrastructure Parental involvement in education	Lack of educational resources and teachers Negative influence of cultural norms and traditions Undisciplined students
Opportunities	Threats
possibility for higher education and employment International scholarships and NGO donations	Strikes caused by teachers' salary delays Shortage of qualified teachers provided by the Cameroonian government Limited access to scholarships Negative impact of the climate

In terms of health, the healthcare system is particularly appreciated for emergency evacuations, free medication, and the integration of refugees as volunteer health workers, as illustrated in Table 8. With regard to the shortcomings of the system, the refugees reported a lack of material and human resources in the three health posts. These deficiencies, combined with the weight of traditional practices and weak communication between healthcare personnel and patients, push refugees towards self-medication. Contrary to previous findings, some refugees argue that “the major problem in the camp is healthcare. There are no medications in our hospitals, nothing to eat. You go to the health post with a high fever, but there is no assistance [...] ».

As observed by (Hamit Kessely, 2020, p. 120), the displaced people residing in the Kimiti camp in Chad express satisfaction with the quality and cost-free healthcare services, an essential support for these vulnerable and precarious populations. However, despite the aforementioned shortcomings, they continue to frequent the camp's health facilities, thanks to the active involvement of the Chadian state and other NGOs, whose joint efforts strengthen infrastructure, train medical personnel, and ensure the continuity of essential services (Hamit Kessely, 2020, p. 120). Experiences with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Afghan refugees in Iran corroborate this conclusion (Kiani et al., 2021, p. 29; Matsumoto et al., 2019, p. 41,47) The effectiveness of the humanitarian response requires strong cooperation and involvement from NGOs and the host government.

Table 8: Assessment of assistance in health sector

Strengths	Weaknesses
Soins, évacuation et médicaments gratuits pour tous Présence de réfugiés volontaires et bénévoles dans les centres de santé Existence d'infrastructures médicales et médecins compétents Sensibilisation sur l'importance des soins	Automédication Insalubrité et irresponsabilité de certains réfugiés face aux soins et vaccins Insuffisance de ressources hospitalières et de médicaments Faible communication entre le personnel soignant et les malades
Opportunities	Threats
Soins gratuits et accès aux médicaments hors du camp grâce aux ONG et le gouvernement Possibilité de transfert des cas d'urgences et appuis des ONG et du gouvernement camerounais	Présence des épidémies et pandémies Baisse de la mise à disponibilité du personnel médical et des médicaments par le Cameroun Trotte vers l'hôpital et absence de transfusion sanguine

The provision of potable water, sanitation, and hygiene services was extensively discussed by the refugees, with the results summarized in Table 9. Although infrastructure exists, the camp is afflicted by a lack of hygiene and significant health and environmental risks, exacerbated by shortcomings in the healthcare sector and a dearth of attention paid to women's hygiene needs. In response to these challenges, refugees have undertaken small initiatives to improve their comfort in our house; a dynamic more observed at the Torodi camp in Niger. As Daouda Bana (2022, p. 41) notes, residents of the Torodi camp regularly organize community clean-up sessions, which, by mobilizing the community around cleanliness and health prevention, strengthen social cohesion and integration into host areas. This dynamic, however, is not observed in Minawao, where refugees tend to rely entirely on NGOs and the UNHCR.

Table 9: Assessment of assistance in the WaSH sector

Strengths	Weaknesses
Presence of functional sanitation facilities and water points constructed by NGOs and refugees. Support from NGOs in providing sanitary equipment, toilet desludging by NGO, and hygiene awareness.	Insufficiency and poor hygiene conditions of sanitary facilities and water points. Deficit in water purification equipment. Inefficient management of various waste types. Lack of sealed containers for sanitary pits.

Refugees' involvement in manual toilet desludging and water point sanitation. Self-treatment of water through boiling.	Insufficient consideration of women's hygiene needs.
Opportunities	Threats
Access to the national water network	Soil unsuitable for drilling. Drying up of rivers and groundwater pockets during the dry season.

The provision of decent housing is largely dominated by refugees' self-construction using earth bricks. However, findings from the investigations summarized in Table 10, reveal that this activity is limited by refugees' scarce financial resources and the insufficient support from UNHCR and its partner NGOs. Due to the gradual reduction in the distribution of shelters and construction materials, refugees fear the eventual cessation of assistance in this sector. Similar to the Minawao camp, Nigerian refugees in the Diffa region also face insufficient humanitarian shelter interventions. Since their settlement, the majority continue to live in makeshift shelters they construct themselves or are hosted by local families in earth houses (Mahamadou, 2017, p. 128).

Table 10: Assessment of Assistance in the Shelter and Decent Housing Sector

Strengths	Weaknesses
Refugees' self-construction of earth houses and ability to purchase construction materials. Distribution of family shelters to new refugees and PSNs by NGOs. Donation of construction materials by NGOs.	Financial constraints limiting self-construction of shelters and insufficient distribution of construction materials. Looting and destruction of houses. Unhygienic living conditions in rooms. Discrimination in the distribution of construction materials by community intermediaries. Sale of distributed materials and shelters by some refugees. Reduction in the number of distributed shelters
Opportunities	Threats
	Cessation of certain assistance programs. Rainfall causing destruction of houses

In the protection sector, the assessment elements are summarized in Table 11. The findings highlight the effective mobilization of assistance, peaceful coexistence within the camp, and the dynamism of the vigilance committee primarily composed of refugees. However, some limitations, categorized as weaknesses, were identified. These issues are exacerbated by discriminatory NGO interventions and existing prejudices against refugees among Cameroonian security forces and forestry services. These discriminatory practices discredit NGOs and the quality of their interventions. Based on the case of Malian refugees in the Tabarey-Barey and Abala camps in Niger, Sidibé Mariam (2019, p. 147) identifies anthropogenic and cultural factors as the primary causes of these practices, with their main manifestation being weak coexistence among camp residents. These externalities can be mitigated through social cohesion initiatives and programs, as demonstrated in the Malian refugee camps in the Tillabéry region (Sidibé Mariam, 2019, p. 158).

Table 11: Assessment of Assistance in civil and social protection

Strengths	Weaknesses
Dynamism of the vigilance committee. Support from Cameroonian security forces. Lighting in the camp. Existence of effective social protection structures.	Low reporting of cases of domestic violence, theft, and malnutrition. Discriminatory interventions by NGOs and international organizations. Prejudices from Cameroonian police and NGOs workers

Engagement of some parents in moral education and the promotion of peaceful coexistence.	Insufficient solar lighting infrastructure. Discriminatory within distribution of materials, donations, and kits. Abandonment of children by some parents. Poverty, child labour, and early marriages. Sale of food supplies leading to cases of malnutrition. Loss of male authority in some households due to assistance favouring women.
Opportunities	Threats
Access to government health programs. Accessibility to Cameroonian refugee protection institutions. Free movement within Cameroon.	Discriminatory interventions by NGOs and international organizations. Insufficient Cameroonian security personnel. Prejudices from Cameroonian police and forestry services against refugees. Conflicts between refugees and the host community.

Environmental protection has been an assistance sector since 2017. Refugees acknowledged their understanding of environmental issues, particularly concerning vegetation cover. As a result, they participate in camp afforestation and the use of ecological charcoal. However, a majority of refugees continue deforestation practices and vandalise young plants. These actions are justified by the high cost of ecological charcoal and the daily need for cooking to ensure household survival. In the context of establishing refugee camps, the absence of sustainable camp management invariably leads to vegetation and soil degradation, loss of biodiversity, and changes in the quality and quantity of water resources (Black, 1998, p. 24; Kakonge, 2000, p. 24; UNHCR, 2019). In the case of Minawao, refugee activities have significantly contributed to the degradation of vegetation cover within a 15 km radius, with a focal point being the Zamaï Forest Reserve, which experienced a -37.38% reduction in vegetation cover from 2015 to 2022. Authors also note that wood is sold to generate income, as observed among Malian refugees in the town of Ayorou, where over 50% engage in wood sales as an integration strategy (Abdoulaye Boureima, 2022, p. 50).

Table 12: Assessment of Assistance in the Environment and Land Management Sector

Strengths	Weaknesses
Afforestation, cleaning, and promotion of environmental preservation. Training and use of ecological charcoal. Provision of vehicles for the transport of PSNs. Construction of rainwater drainage ditches by refugees.	Deforestation, refusal to reforest, and vandalism of plants. Open burning of waste. Insufficient ecological and sanitary infrastructure. High cost of ecological charcoal and lack of materials for self-production. Open defecation. Construction on free spaces and public roads. Creation of excavations in roads for making earth bricks. Camp impassable during the rainy season.
Opportunities	Threats
Government support for environmental initiatives. Maintenance of the access road to the camp.	Climatic factors and severe weather deteriorating the soil and road networks.

Perception of UNHCR camp management and prospects

Focus group results in Table 13 reveal that refugees take pride in their community organisation, internal peace-promotion activities, and awareness campaigns. Refugee committees, established since 2015, are perceived as minimally functional and ineffective in representing their interests. They denounce the lack of consideration given to their opinions by NGOs, a situation compounded by the lack of rigor and responsiveness of some

representatives. The annual changeover of camp managers and the weakness of their management exacerbate this situation, leading to a lack of respect for community leaders and camp management agencies, by the refugees.

Moreover, 51.06% (compared to 48.94%) of refugee's report that their relationship with the host community is relatively well supported by the CCCM. Unlike Minawao refugees, Sidibé Mariam (2019, p. 143) shows that refugees in the Tabarey-Barey and Abala camps are involved in camp management through various committees. UNHCR and the National Commission for Refugee Eligibility (CNE) are working to ensure that refugees are consulted through these committees. Additionally, NGO activities and information dissemination in these camps must go through refugee committees.

Table 13: Assessment of Camp Management

Strengths	Weaknesses
Internal organization with community representatives and leaders. Peaceful coexistence. Promotion of peace. Internal community awareness campaigns.	Delayed response from leaders and camp managers to complaints and issues. Lack of rigor among community representatives in conveying refugees' opinions. Disrespect towards some leaders and the camp manager by refugees. Failure to consult refugees in decision-making processes by NGOs.
Opportunities	Threats
Freedom of religion. Legal and administrative assistance. Camp security ensured by government forces.	Annual change in camp management and poor management practices. Opacity of UNHCR procedures.

The absence of genuine inclusive management in the camp, raised during focus groups, is substantiated by the fact that 89.62% of surveyed refugees (compared to 10.38%) reported that they are neither involved nor consulted in the decision-making and reflection processes concerning major camp decisions. Additionally, 68.22% (versus 31.78%) of refugee's report being unaware of the overall program of activities or humanitarian assistance led by aid agencies. This lack of awareness regarding the global agendas of aid agencies is further illustrated by the fact that, when a major project or activity is implemented in the camp, 66.10% of surveyed refugees state that they were not informed in advance. The same holds true for decisions with significant impacts on the entire camp, taken by humanitarian agencies, as shown in Figure 3.

These findings on the lack of refugee involvement in Minawao's humanitarian operations align with the work of Charpin Catherine (2014, p. 22) in Haiti, who highlights an "imposed" form of assistance where refugees are not consulted. This absence of participation often leads to ineffective humanitarian aid, poorly adapted to the realities and specific needs of refugees (Hilhorst et al., 2021, p. 364) raising a critical issue of accountability in the Minawao camp. Indeed, affected populations; who are the primary stakeholders must be at the heart of the three key components of accountability (Hilhorst et al., 2021, p. 366) :

- Consideration, which involves listening and communication through participatory approaches;
- Transparency, reflecting the duty to report;
- Responsibility and ownership of actions and inactions, to take credit as well as blame.




Figure 3. Knowledge of the major projects and decisions made in the camp

Moreover, this exclusion of refugees is further illustrated by the fact that 71.61% (compared to 28.39%) highlighted the lack of information and the unavailability of evaluation conducted within the camp. According to Pérouse De Montclos (2006, p. 40), the organisational culture of UNHCR barely allows for accountability to the refugees that this agency is mandated to protect. As a result, humanitarian agencies act as both judge and party regarding the quality of their own services (ibid., p.42-43) with evaluation procedures often limited to verifying beneficiary lists established by the same aid actors (Pérouse de Montclos, 2017, p. 183). Furthermore, these evaluation procedures are often critiqued for relying on factual analyses while neglecting the impact of refugee perceptions (Wake & Barbelet, 2020, p. 137).

In this context of non-inclusive management, increasing insufficiencies in humanitarian assistance, and aid dependency, it is important to highlight that a significant proportion of refugees lack knowledge of fundamental concepts related to their status and their implications. Respectively, 82.20%, 81.99%, and 68.64% of refugees are unfamiliar with the concepts of refugee status, refugee camps, and the lifecycle of a camp. They report having received no training or awareness campaigns on these subjects, despite their being fundamental to the design and management of humanitarian assistance.

The absence of refugee input, the lack of clear and timely information on programs presented in an understandable way for refugees, and the failure to assess their level of understanding of aid, create biases. These gaps result in misunderstandings of humanitarian agents' actions and, consequently, in refugee non-adherence to humanitarian programs (Wake & Barbelet, 2020, p. 133). Another consequence of this lack of knowledge is the oversimplification of the definition of refugees to that of mere beneficiaries, as was the case in the Sahrawi camps. In these camps, refugees understand the “true image of the refugee”—one that motivates humanitarian intervention and is the only image believed to ensure access to greater aid (Corbet, 2016, p. 77). As the author explains, if refugees deviate from this victimized status, they risk no longer being seen as beneficiaries. Beneficiaries, therefore, manipulate the idealised image assigned to them in order to better assert their subjectivity.




Figure 4. Knowledge of the basic concepts relating to refugee status

However, after a decade in the camp, 55.72% of the refugees surveyed did not feel responsible for the Minawao camp. For example, in the event of breakdowns, 61.45% of the refugees denied responsibility for any contribution to repairs, as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Assessment of the degree of responsibility of refugees towards the Minawao camp

The final point discussed with the refugees concerns the perspectives envisioned. The UNHCR generally promotes three “durable solutions”: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in a third country. Findings (table 14) show that 81.14% of surveyed refugees are unaware of these mechanisms as durable solutions offered by the UNHCR in response to the prevailing situation in the camp. It is worth recalling that, in the absence of transparent communication and trust between humanitarian agencies and refugees, the opacity of UNHCR procedures, highlighted during focus groups, reinforces refugees’ lack of understanding and mistrust.

Regarding repatriation to Nigeria, 6.56% of refugees have already undertaken it, either through UNHCR assistance (3.81%) or spontaneously (2.75%). Interviews with these refugees reveal that their reasons for returning to the Minawao camp are diverse, mainly revolving around security concerns, as evidenced by the following three testimonies:

“ When I arrived in Bama (repatriation site), Boko Haram resumed shooting almost every day. The organizations did their best, but we had neither security nor enough basic needs as promised. I was afraid for myself and my newborn baby. We were suffering. The baby cried all the time because of the gunfire. So, I left Bama. My husband also urged me to leave. I arrived here in February 2022. Since my return, life has been very difficult; I depend on neighbors' charity.”

“My seven children and I returned (were repatriated) because we heard that the country/village (Banki) was at peace. That was false. When we arrived, we suffered without a word. I took my children to Amtchidé by taxi, then to Maroua, and finally to the camp. My husband welcomed us, and life goes on”.

“I chose to repatriate to Banki. I spent 3 months there. Although there was the DGV (General Food Distribution), it was better here in Minawao (in terms of quantity). At Banki, the gunfire traumatized me”.

Despite such cases, which may discourage refugees from returning home, 61.23% still express a desire to repatriate within the next two years. Among them, 54.66% are willing to settle in a secure locality in Nigeria other than their village of origin. However, only 30% of surveyed refugees favor integration into Cameroon, while 15.47% are prepared to initiate the process of naturalization in Cameroon. It is essential to note that refugees' aspirations for return depend on multiple factors, including unbearable living conditions in the camp and the security situation in their place of origin.

Indeed, there is a contrast between the aspirations of Minawao refugees, Malian refugees in Niger, and Liberian refugees in Conakry. A UNHCR study on Malian refugees in Niger revealed that the majority do not wish to return to their region of origin but prefer to settle elsewhere, further away (HCR, 2018, p. 39). However, research by Simon-Lorier (2014, p. 427) indicates that voluntary repatriation remains the preferred solution for Liberian refugees in Conakry, Guinea. This operation, supported by the UNHCR, enables refugees to return to their places of origin with reintegration assistance.

Table 14: Refugees' views on the durable solutions promoted by the UNHCR

	Yes	No
Do you have any knowledge of the durable solutions advocated by	18.86%	81.14%
Do you plan to repatriate in the next program or within 2 years m	61.23%	38.77%
Would you accept returning to a safe place in Nigeria other than your village	54.66%	45.34%
Would you agree to settle in Cameroon elsewhere than in the camp ?	30.51%	69.49%
Would you agree to naturalize cameroonian ?	15.47%	84.53%

Conclusion

This study examined the perception of humanitarian aid by refugees in the Minawao camp, revealing major challenges related to the declining quality of assistance, the lack of inclusiveness in camp management, and the inadequacy of participation mechanisms. These findings highlight a central paradox: although refugees express a desire for autonomy, current structures reinforce their dependence, while limiting their role in decision-making. What's more, the lack of consultation with refugees in decision-making processes and the inadequacy of communication and transparency mechanisms exacerbate their feeling of not being responsible for the camp. These results underscore the need for a paradigm shift in camp governance. It would be efficient to move from a logic of simple assistance to a co-constructive approach, where refugees are no longer considered as passive beneficiaries, but as active partners. Integrating their aspirations and skills into the planning and implementation of programmes is crucial to restoring their dignity and strengthening their resilience. Taking greater account of their needs will enhance their autonomy.

This research has contributed to the debate on the localisation of aid and the accountability of humanitarian actors. It provides a critical perspective on the current limits of refugee empowerment, based on empirical data from the prolonged displacement of Nigerian refugees in the Minawao camp. It also points out that the reconfiguration of humanitarian practices may be essential to respond effectively to complex and protracted crises. For humanitarian professionals, these results call for strategic adjustments, such as training camp managers in participatory approaches and implementing transparent communication mechanisms. These measures could promote more inclusive governance

Finally, future research should delve deeper into strengthening refugees' agency in various contexts. For instance, a comparative analysis of camps that have adopted participatory approaches could yield valuable insights. Additionally, exploring digital tools as vectors of empowerment and communication between refugees and humanitarian agencies could open up new perspectives for humanitarian action in the 21st century. These different perspectives are part of a process of designing humanitarian assistance models based on the co-construction of solutions for a more united and sustainable humanity.

Reference

- Abdoulaye Boureima, H. (2022). *Intégration socioéconomique des réfugiés maliens dans la ville d'Ayorou* [Mémoire de Master]. Université Abdou Moumouni.
- Aburamadan, R., Trillo, C., & Makore, B. C. N. (2020). Designing refugees' camps: Temporary emergency solutions, or contemporary paradigms of incomplete urban citizenship? Insights from Al Za'atari. *City, Territory and Architecture*, 7(1), 12. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40410-020-00120-z>
- Arsenault, É. (2024). *Réfugiés et personnes déplacées internes, pareils pas pareils? Ethnographie au cœur du régime humanitaire au Cameroun* [Maîtrise en anthropologie - avec mémoire Maître ès arts (M.A.), Université de Laval]. <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/149425>
- Audet, F. (2022). La localisation de l'aide humanitaire: Un chantier de recherche en pleine émergence*. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, 43(4), 459-467. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2022.2140128>
- Barbelet, V., Davies, G., Flint, J., & Davey, E. (2021, juin). *Interroger la base de preuves sur la localisation humanitaire: Une étude de la littérature*. Revues documentaires de l'Humanitarian Policy Group. <https://odi.org/en/publications/interrogating-the-evidence-base-on-humanitarian-localisation-a-literature-study>
- Beaulieu, J., Robitaille, K., Laganière-Bolduc, R., Farley, S., & Ladry, N.-J. (2022). Lunettes féministes intersectionnelles pour envisager une localisation de l'aide inclusive et sensible au genre. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, 43(4), 530-549. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2022.2100747>
- Black, R. (1998). L'impact des réfugiés sur l'environnement écologique des pays d'accueil (Afrique subsaharienne). 1998, 23-48.
- Boinet, A. (2024, juillet 2). *Financement de l'aide humanitaire Archives*. Défis Humanitaires. <https://defishumanitaires.com/tag/financement-de-laide-humanitaire/>
- Bouagga, Y. (2019). Camps et campements de réfugiés. *Historiens et géographes, Association des professeurs d'histoire et de géographie, Dossier: Migrations*, 47-52. <https://doi.org/halshs-02364534>
- Cambrézy, L. (2007). Réfugiés et migrants en Afrique: Quel statut pour quelle vulnérabilité? *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, 23(3), 13-28. <https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.4199>
- Caratini, S. (2007). La prison du temps. Les mutations sociales à l'oeuvre dans les camps de réfugiés sahraouis Première partie: La voie de la révolution. *Afrique contemporaine*, 221(1), 153-172. <https://doi.org/10.3917/afco.221.0153>
- Charpin, C. (2014). L'aide humanitaire, une cible pour l'humour post catastrophe. 2014, 39, 15-31.
- Coordination Sud, & OngLAB. (2020, mars). *LA LOCALISATION DE L'AIDE. Plus de proximité permet-il d'assurer l'autonomie des projets déployés?* Coordination Sud. <https://www.coordinationsud.org/wp-content/uploads/synthese-etude-localisation-aide.pdf>
- Corbet, A. (2016). Au-delà du "bénéficiaire": La vraie image du réfugié. Thomas Ribémont. Figures des bénéficiaires dans l'action humanitaire. *Hal Open Science*, 69-80.
- Daouda Bana, A. (2022). *Insertion socioéconomique des personnes déplacées à Torodi* [Mémoire de master]. Université Abdou Moumouni.
- ECOSOC/6930. (2018, juin 19). *ECOSOC: « Le système humanitaire est au bord de la rupture », avertit Mark Lowcock en ouvrant le débat annuel du segment des affaires humanitaires | Couverture des réunions & communiqués de presse*. Nations Unies | Couvertures des réunions et communiqués de presse. <https://press.un.org/fr/2018/ecosoc6930.doc.htm>
- Fall, M. M. (2022). *Education non / Post-primaire en contexte humanitaire: Le cas de jeunes maliens réfugiés au Niger* [Thèse de Doctorat, Université d'Ottawa]. <https://ruor.uottawa.ca/items/3ba7d809-5a98-4133-957a-7f103cedd540>
- Gauthier, A. (2024). *Espoirs Déçus à Konna: Analyse de l'approche de stabilisation et de l'accès aux services sociaux de base à Konna, Niono et Ménaka* (Rapport d'étude 2024; p. 36). OXFAM.
- Grayson, C.-L. (2016). Le camp de réfugiés de Kakuma, lieu de méfiance et de défiance. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, 37(3), 341-357. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2016.1153458>
- Hamit Kessely, B. (2020). *Migration sous contrainte et vulnérabilité dans l'accès aux ressources et aux services sociaux de base des déplacés de Kimiti, Est du Tchad* [Thèse]. Université Abdou Moumouni.
- HCR. (2018). *Rapport_VersionCourte_Réfugiés*.
- HCR. (2021). *Tendances mondiales. Déplacement forcé en 2021* (p. 48) [Annuel]. HCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/fr/media/rapport-tendances-mondiales-2021>
- HCR. (2024, juin). *Global trends Forced displacement in 2023*. <https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends-report-2023>
- Hilhorst, D., Melis, S., Mena, R., & Van Voorst, R. (2021). Accountability in Humanitarian Action. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 40(4), 363-389. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdab015>
- IASC. (2017, juillet 1). *Engagements par axe de travail | IASC* [Official site web]. Inter-Agency Standing Committee. <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain/engagements-par-axe-de-travail>

- IASC. (2021, juin). « Grand Bargain 2.0 » Cadre et annexes approuvés. IASC. <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/sites/default/files/migrated/2021-07/%28FR%29%20Grand%20Bargain%202.0%20Cadre.pdf>
- Kakonge, J. O. (2000). A review of refugee environmental-oriented projects in Africa: A case for environmental impact assessment. *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal*, 18(1), 23-32. <https://doi.org/10.3152/147154600781767565>
- Kiani, M. M., Khanjankhani, K., Takkiri, A., & Takian, A. (2021). Refugees and Sustainable Health Development in Iran. *Archives of Iranian Medicine*, 24(1), 27-34. <https://doi.org/10.34172/aim.2021.05>
- Maarawi, E. (2024). Étude des modèles d'inclusion et des représentations des réfugiés syriens au Liban. *Hal Open Science*, 35.
- Magne, M. R., & Aholou, C. C. (2024a). Humanitarian aid and economic development: Analysis of sustainable resilience strategies for refugees in the Minawao camp (Cameroon). *Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development*, 8(15), 10092. <https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd10092>
- Magne, M. R., & Aholou, C. C. (2024b). Refugees in the Minawao camp: Status and erosion of social assistance in the face of the SDGs. *Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development*, 8(11), 8706. <https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i11.8706>
- Mahamadou, B. A. (2017). *L'accueil des réfugiés nigériens victimes du conflit boko haram par la population de la ville de Diffa* [Mémoire de master]. Université Abdou Moumouni.
- Matsumoto, M., Wimer, G., & Sethi, A. (2019). Health needs of refugees: Port of arrival versus permanent camp settings. *Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal*, 25(5), 306-314. <https://doi.org/10.26719/2019.25.5.297>
- Nations Unies. (2018). *Pacte mondial sur les réfugiés*. UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/5c700c524.pdf>
- Pérouse De Montclos, M.-A. (2006). De l'impartialité des humanitaires et de leur perception par les bénéficiaires: Les enjeux politiques de l'aide internationale au Burundi: *Autrepart*, n° 39(3), 39-57. <https://doi.org/10.3917/autre.039.0039>
- Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2017). Le Nigeria, Boko Haram et la crise migratoire. *Outre-Terre*, N° 53(4), 174-189. <https://doi.org/10.3917/oute1.053.0174>
- Savard, M.-C., Audet, F., & Leroux, M. (2020). La localisation de l'aide au prisme de la Covid-19: Question de choix ou dernier recours? *Alternatives Humanitaires/Humanitarian Alternatives*, 15, 68-78.
- SIDIBE, M. (2019). *UNE APPROCHE SOCIOPOLITIQUE DE LA QUESTION DES RÉFUGIÉS DANS LA CRISE DE L'ÉTAT AU MALI* [Thèse]. Université de Bordeaux.
- Simon-Lorieri, H. (2014). Conditions de vie et projets migratoires des réfugiés libériens à Conakry (Guinée) et Accra (Ghana). 2014, 652.
- Tiomo, O. R., & Simeu Kamdem, M. (2023). Gestion des Réfugiés Centrafricains du Camp de GadoBadzéré dans la Région de l'Est (Cameroun): A la Recherche de Solutions Durables. *European Scientific Journal, ESJ*, 19(20), 241. <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2023.v19n20p241>
- UNHCR. (2019). *Global trend, forced displacement in 2018* (p. 76) [Rapport annuel]. HCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf>
- Vincent, N. E. J., Funteh, B., Henri, M. M., & Léa, M. N. N. J. (2017). Le conflit Boko Haram au Cameroun: Pourquoi la paix traîne-t-elle? *Séries FES sur la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique n*, 21, 36.
- Wake, C., & Barbelet, V. (2020). Towards a Refugee Livelihoods Approach: Findings from Cameroon, Jordan, Malaysia and Turkey. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 33(1), 125-142. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez033>
- Wali Wali, C. (2010a). Les réfugiés congolais au Gabon: Modes de circulation et d'installation dans un espace frontalier: Thèse soutenue par Christian Wali Wali le 25 juin 2010 à l'Université de Poitiers. *e-Migrinter*, 6, 94-97. <https://doi.org/10.4000/e-migrinter.1337>
- Wali Wali, C. (2010b). Les réfugiés congolais au Gabon: Modes de circulation et d'installation dans un espace frontalier: Thèse soutenue par Christian Wali Wali le 25 juin 2010 à l'Université de Poitiers. *e-Migrinter*, 6, 94-97. <https://doi.org/10.4000/e-migrinter.1337>
- World Bank. (2024, octobre 17). *Cameroun—Vue d'ensemble* [Text/HTML]. World Bank. <https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/country/cameroon/overview>

Appendix

Appendix A: Breakdown of respondents by year of arrival at the camp

Years	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Total	
Number questionnaire	34	223	114	28	19	16	7	12	7	12	472	
Number focus groups	67						19					
Number of interviews	5	9	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	0		

Source: Surveys 2022

Appendix B: Sectoral assessment of humanitarian assistance by refugees

- CCM

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	18.00%	6.00%	20.00%	28.00%	14.00%	14.00%
2014	3.90%	1.95%	12.68%	26.34%	32.68%	22.44%
2015	1.79%	2.87%	13.62%	29.75%	36.20%	15.77%
2016	1.32%	1.64%	18.75%	27.96%	36.51%	13.82%
2017	2.16%	2.16%	22.84%	27.16%	32.10%	13.58%
2018	2.06%	3.24%	25.88%	24.71%	31.47%	12.65%
2019	2.29%	6.88%	23.78%	22.92%	28.65%	15.47%
2020	2.76%	8.29%	26.24%	20.44%	29.01%	13.26%
2021	3.18%	7.69%	24.67%	21.75%	25.73%	16.98%
2022	3.28%	14.75%	25.96%	9.84%	24.86%	21.31%

Cohabitation with host community

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	28.85%	1.92%	3.85%	28.85%	23.08%	13.46%
2014	5.99%	8.29%	6.91%	24.42%	34.56%	19.82%
2015	4.15%	7.35%	13.42%	32.59%	27.80%	14.70%
2016	2.70%	4.50%	15.32%	29.43%	35.74%	12.31%
2017	2.25%	4.23%	17.18%	25.35%	33.24%	17.75%
2018	1.08%	4.85%	16.17%	26.15%	33.69%	18.06%
2019	0.80%	4.26%	15.96%	28.72%	29.52%	20.74%
2020	2.31%	6.43%	16.71%	25.45%	28.79%	20.31%
2021	3.96%	6.44%	18.07%	23.02%	26.73%	21.78%
2022	5.77%	9.13%	18.27%	14.42%	26.44%	25.96%

Community governance

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	14.55%	0	6.36%	16.36%	22.73%	40.00%
2014	3.73%	2.24%	6.34%	22.01%	35.07%	30.60%
2015	3.24%	2,36%	11,50%	21.83%	39.23%	21.83%
2016	2.80%	2.24%	15.69%	26.89%	33.89%	18.49%
2017	3.57%	4.12%	18.41%	23.63%	28.02%	22.25%
2018	4.50%	5.82%	20.63%	21.69%	25.66%	21.69%
2019	3.94%	6.82%	20.47%	19.69%	27.03%	22.05%
2020	3.36%	7.49%	23.26%	20.67%	25.32%	19.90%
2021	2.29%	8.91%	25.45%	17.81%	23.92%	21.63%
2022	4.99%	14.71%	23.44%	8.23%	25.44%	23.19%

Child protection

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	12.50%	2.08%	14.58%	31.25%	31.25%	8.33%
2014	2.40%	2.88%	9.13%	26.92%	35.58%	23.08%
2015	1.71%	1.02%	15.02%	21.84%	40.61%	19.80%
2016	1.60%	2.24%	15.71%	26.60%	37.18%	16.67%
2017	3.36%	3.98%	18.04%	24.16%	35.47%	14.98%
2018	2.83%	4.82%	20.96%	24.36%	31.73%	15.30%
2019	2.25%	7.58%	22.19%	21.63%	32.58%	13.76%
2020	4.03%	7.26%	27.15%	20.16%	27.69%	13.71%
2021	1.54%	9.77%	26.74%	20.05%	20.05%	21.85%
2022	5.97%	15.84%	22.34%	12.21%	28.05%	15.58%

Civil security

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	18.00%	6.00%	10.00%	26.00%	30.00%	10.00%
2014	2.79%	2.79%	6.05%	20.00%	37.67%	30.70%
2015	0.66%	1.32%	9.24%	25.74%	37.29%	25.74%
2016	1.22%	1.52%	15.24%	22.87%	36.28%	22.87%
2017	2.05%	2.64%	18.77%	21.41%	32.84%	22.29%
2018	1.91%	3.55%	17.21%	23.50%	31.42%	22.40%
2019	2.12%	5.84%	20.42%	24.14%	25.99%	21.49%
2020	2.05%	8.70%	22.76%	21.48%	24.81%	20.20%
2021	1.54%	9.77%	26.74%	20.05%	20.05%	21.85%
2022	3.47%	14.36%	24.75%	13.12%	22.03%	22.28%

Management of GBV

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	12.50%	2.08%	27.08%	20.83%	29.17%	8.33%
2014	2.19%	1.64%	9.84%	32.79%	34.43%	19.13%
2015	1.58%	1.98%	13.83%	34.39%	30.83%	17.39%
2016	1.13%	3.38%	17.29%	30.45%	33.83%	13.91%
2017	2.12%	2.12%	20.49%	29.33%	32.16%	13.78%
2018	1.72%	1.72%	21.99%	26.12%	30.58%	17.87%
2019	1.97%	4.26%	21.31%	24.59%	28.52%	19.34%
2020	2.48%	5.26%	20.43%	19.50%	28.79%	23.53%
2021	2.07%	9.17%	25.74%	17.46%	20.41%	25.15%
2022	5.41%	13.11%	20.51%	11.11%	23.08%	26.78%

Management of PSNs

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	14.58%	4.17%	14.58%	22.92%	29.17%	14.58%
2014	3.11%	3.11%	12.95%	29.53%	29.53%	21.76%

2015	1.49%	2.97%	18.22%	24.16%	36.43%	16.73%
2016	3.60%	2.52%	18.35%	30.94%	30.94%	13.67%
2017	2.39%	2.73%	17.75%	29.01%	29.69%	18.43%
2018	3.55%	4.19%	23.23%	23.23%	27.74%	18.06%
2019	4.38%	6.25%	20.31%	25.63%	24.69%	18.75%
2020	5.44%	6.34%	25.68%	21.45%	24.77%	16.31%
2021	6.07%	10,40%	27.17%	24.28%	17.05%	15.03%
2022	8.52%	17.90%	26.70%	9.94%	19.60%	17.33%

Supply water

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	17.78%	6.67%	24.44%	15.56%	24.44%	11.11%
2014	8.14%	10.86%	13.12%	24.43%	27.60%	15.84%
2015	6.58%	6.90%	20.06%	30.41%	25.71%	10.34%
2016	4.96%	4.96%	19.83%	33.24%	28.28%	8.75%
2017	4.43%	5.82%	27.70%	25.76%	26.32%	9.97%
2018	3.50%	5.25%	24.78%	32.65%	22.74%	11.08%
2019	3.88%	5.43%	22.48%	32.04%	24.29%	11.89%
2020	3.28%	6.06%	28.03%	27.53%	23.48%	11.62%
2021	2.94%	8.09%	25.25%	33.09%	16.42%	14.22%
2022	5.97%	13.60%	18.62%	25.54%	20.29%	15.99%

Hygiene and sanitation

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	26.53%	2.04%	16.33%	28.57%	18.37%	8.16%
2014	6.13%	6.60%	14.62%	23.58%	33.02%	16.04%
2015	3.91%	4.56%	17.26%	28.66%	33.88%	11.73%
2016	2.15%	4.92%	17.23%	34.46%	31.69%	9.54%
2017	3.25%	3.85%	17.46%	28.40%	30.77%	16.27%
2018	3.87%	4.14%	16.85%	28.73%	29.83%	16.57%
2019	4.53%	2.40%	18.93%	27.73%	27.20%	19.20%
2020	3.32%	4.60%	16,88%	24.81%	28.13%	22.25%
2021	2.74%	6.73%	18.70%	21.95%	25.69%	24.19%
2022	6.25%	7.45%	19.95%	15.38%	25.48%	25.48%

Food support

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	17.65%	0	5.88%	19.61%	39.22%	17.65%
2014	3.57%	2.23%	4.91%	22.77%	36.16%	30,36%
2015	3.37%	2.15%	9.82%	20.25%	36.20%	28,22%
2016	1.44%	2,31%	14.41%	20.75%	34.29%	26,80%
2017	2.46%	4,37%	18,03%	17.76%	30.60%	26,78%

2018	3.13%	3.91%	18,49%	25.78%	25.00%	23,70%
2019	3.58%	4.35%	26.85%	30.18%	19.95%	15,09%
2020	3.01%	6.27%	31.08%	40.35%	12.78%	6,52%
2021	2.92%	19,46%	43.31%	19.71%	11.68%	2,92%
2022	5.06%	38.55%	24.82%	12.05%	15.66%	3,86%

Livelihood

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	19.15%	0	12.77%	31.91%	25.53%	10.64%
2014	3.24%	2.16%	10.81%	32.43%	32.97%	18,38%
2015	6.79%	3.77%	15.09%	29.81%	33.21%	11.32%
2016	8.48%	3.53%	15.55%	34.98%	32.86%	4.59%
2017	10.93%	3,97%	21.52%	28.81%	27.48%	7.28%
2018	11.18%	4.79%	16.29%	30.03%	30.35%	7.35%
2019	12.20%	6.10%	22.26%	24.09%	29,27%	6.10%
2020	14.33%	6.73%	19,59%	27.78%	27.49%	4.09%
2021	13.22%	8.62%	25.00%	19.83%	26,72%	6.61%
2022	15.83%	15.56%	20.83%	12.78%	29.17%	5.83%

Education

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	10.00%	4.00%	20.00%	20.00%	32.00%	14.00%
2014	2.70%	2.70%	11.71%	19.37%	33,33%	30.18%
2015	0.95%	1.89%	10.09%	20.19%	40,69%	26.18%
2016	2.35%	2.94%	12.94%	17.94%	38,82%	25.00%
2017	2.83%	3.12%	15.30%	19.55%	32.86%	26.35%
2018	5.19%	1.37%	19.67%	20.77%	30.05%	22.95%
2019	4.49%	2.64%	25.59%	15.57%	26.91%	24.80%
2020	3.60%	7.20%	23.65%	19.79%	25.45%	20.31%
2021	3.96%	12.38%	28.71%	15.35%	19.55%	20.05%
2022	5.38%	19.07%	24.45%	8.80%	20.29%	22.00%

Health

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	10.00%	6.00%	24.00%	12.00%	32.00%	16.00%
2014	2.75%	5.96%	15.60%	22.94%	27.52%	25.23%
2015	0.97%	2.58%	15.16%	28.39%	30.97%	21.94%
2016	1.20%	2.99%	13.77%	32.04%	29.04%	20.96%
2017	1.13%	3.12%	22.38%	24.36%	26.06%	22.95%

2018	2.41%	3.48%	17.11%	27.81%	30,48%	18.72%
2019	1.80%	5.15%	23.45%	22.16%	26,80%	20.62%
2020	2.24%	6.48%	20.95%	25,69%	23,94%	20.70%
2021	1.98%	6.91%	24.20%	22.22%	24,44%	20.25%
2022	5.28%	11.75%	24.46%	12.71%	22.06%	23.74%

Spatial planning and mobility

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	20.75%	1.89%	22.64%	26.42%	16.98%	11.32%
2014	2.51%	4.02%	18.09%	27.64%	33.17%	14.57%
2015	2.59%	3.33%	22.59%	32.59%	28.52%	10.37%
2016	1.75%	3.16%	22.11%	38.95%	27.02%	7.02%
2017	3.03%	3.70%	20.54%	31.99%	33.00%	7.74%
2018	2.22%	5.06%	23.42%	24.37%	31.96%	12.97%
2019	1.52%	5.78%	17.63%	29.48%	31.91%	13.68%
2020	1.22%	6.73%	25.38%	23.24%	30.58%	12.84%
2021	2.33%	6.98%	26.74%	24.71%	25.58%	13.66%
2022	2.03%	11.05%	25.00%	13.66%	29.94%	18.31%

Shelter

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	16.00%	6.00%	24.00%	18.00%	26.00%	10.00%
2014	2.74%	3.20%	12.33%	25,11%	31,51%	25.11%
2015	0.97%	4.19%	15.48%	28.39%	36.45%	14.52%
2016	2.45%	3.37%	19.63%	32.52%	30.98%	11.04%
2017	3.78%	4.94%	22.09%	24.13%	29.36%	15.70%
2018	4,74%	5.01%	20.89%	27.30%	26.18%	15.88%
2019	4.57%	5.11%	24.46%	23.39%	29.57%	12.90%
2020	4.17%	6.25%	21.35%	26.30%	29.17%	12.76%
2021	5.17%	8.79%	23.00%	26.36%	25.06%	11.63%
2022	7.00%	17.50%	21.00%	13.75%	27.50%	13.25%

Environment

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
2013	21.15%	3.85%	9.62%	44.23%	15.38%	5.77%
2014	2.28%	7.31%	10.96%	34.70%	28.77%	15.98%
2015	1.27%	3.17%	19.68%	27.94%	33.33%	14.60%
2016	1.21%	2.12%	18.79%	36.36%	30.30%	11.21%
2017	1.44%	3.74%	20.40%	26.15%	33.62%	14.66%
2018	2.75%	3.03%	20.94%	24.79%	31.68%	16.80%
2019	3.41%	3.94%	15.49%	26.25%	31.76%	19.16%
2020	2.55%	4.34%	20.41%	23.72%	28.06%	20.92%

2021	3.23%	8.68%	19.60%	18.61%	29.78%	20.10%
2022	5.37%	11.22%	16.83%	12.44%	29.02%	25.12%