

Being As the Unity of Substance and Accident in the Metaphysics of the Peripatetic

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Abstract

Representatives of “Falsafa” rationalistically interpreted the ontological and logical-epistemological nature of the categories. They tried to highlight the most general concepts about the world and ways of knowing it. Objective reality appears to Peripatetic thinkers, primarily as the unity of substance and accident. Therefore, the categorical table of the Eastern Peripatetics was built according to a certain system and, to a certain extent, corresponds to the principle of substantial connection of categories. The basis of the substrate of categorical statements is substance. Separate categories such as quality, quantity, relation, place, time, action, possession and others concretize from various sides and reveal its content and essence. Representatives of medieval Arabian philosophy on the basis of the teachings of ancient philosophers proposed number of philosophical concepts in their treatises. The separate categories put forward by Peripatetics as time, space, place, quality, quantity are revealed in their essential characteristics.

Keywords: *Categories, Primary Cause, Primary Existence, Good, Possibility, Reality, Being, Other.*

Introduction

Being and everything that is in it, according to representatives of medieval Eastern Peripatetism, consists of two things. Those things from the essence of which their existence does not necessarily follow are called possible-existent, on the contrary, things from whose essence existence always necessarily follows are necessarily existing. As the initial component of causal relationships, the essence of the First Existent, the necessary basis of beings of a lesser order, the existence of which is possible or necessary through “Otherness” (1.65). The “Other”, thanks to which all other existing things acquire reality, is the “First Cause” [1].

The First Cause or the First-Existing prototype of Allah - in the medieval Arabic language “Falsafa” acts as an absolute necessity, it has no reason for its existence, exists through itself, in its essence and existence directly coincide, its existence is conditioned by its own essence, and this is its substantiality. If in itself it is an “absolute substance,” then in relation to the objective world it acts as an “absolute accident.” This means that the necessary being (God) is indefinite within itself, its activity is abstract [2].

This point of view is close to the Aristotelian concept of the eternity of the world, set out by Stagira in the treatises “On Heaven”, “Physics”, “On Origin and Destruction” and the book “Metaphysics”. Farabi believes that it is obvious and decided by Aristotle that the sky is eternal, and everything inside it disappears and appears. The eternity of the world in ancient philosophy, of course, was not asserted by Aristotle alone. The creationist point of view - the creation of the world from nothing by a personally understood deity - was excluded in pagan Greco-Hellenistic philosophy. But this does not mean that the world-explanatory schemes of antiquity were not fundamentally different, including within the objective philosophical tradition within which Eastern Peripatetism should be considered [3].

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Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus - only with, so to speak, a summary presentation of ancient objectivism in its opposition to spiritualism, do they have something in common. The difference in positions regarding the world as a whole was expressed by Aristotle himself when he contrasted himself with Plato: "The sky in its entirety did not arise and cannot be destroyed, contrary to what some claim about it; on the contrary, it is one and eternal and its full life span has neither beginning nor end, but contains and embraces infinite time" (2.341). "Meanwhile, there are some who believe that something that has not come into being can be destroyed, and something that has come into being can remain indestructible, as is stated in the *Timaeus*, where Plato says that the heavens came into being, however, will henceforth exist forever. Elsewhere, proving eternity, the "unbornness" of time, Stagirate states: "Plato alone gives birth to it: he says that it arose along with the Universe..." (3, 436) [4].

Plato, as we know, really interprets the problems of the world as a whole, the problems of the cosmos in terms of its "generation" as a result of the special purposeful activity of the "demiurge," "the creator and parent of this Universe," creating the cosmos according to a certain model. Aristotle, in his own words, was the first to cease to understand the existence of the Universe as a result of generation and, instead of cosmogony with its ultimately genetic explanation, actually for the first time gives in the form of a structural-immanent analysis a cosmological description of the eternally existing universe [5].

To understand the reasons and results of this difference, it is important to emphasize the following. It is known that teleology as a statement of goal-setting in all processes occurring in the world means a general characteristic of an objective view. However, the principle of teleologism, accepted as a general attitude, can receive different expressions depending on the understanding of the ontological status of the objects to be interpreted.

Roughening up the views of Plato and Aristotle, it is permissible to say that Plato's concept of ontologically really existing ideas as models for things can explain the very interaction of these qualitatively heterogeneous formations only along the paths of teleology, which is external in nature - the integrity of a thing has a basis in its desire for its idea as a goal, the idea, as such, is something external to the goal. In relation to the world, this means recognizing the need for a reality completely external to it, a force that best arranged everything as it is now, and the "arrangement" is caused by the will of the "creator and parent of this Universe," who wished that all things become as similar as possible to himself [6].

As for Aristotle, in his understanding the world, the universe, is a single being, but represented by two aspects, spheres, "levels" of being, existing. Like Plato, Aristotle believes that supersensible entities are real, but unlike Plato, he believes that they are not opposite to the sensory entities of material-objective reality until the recognition of some special existence of "models". Taken together, both levels make up being: supersensible and sensual essences, types of things and the things themselves in their individuality, form and matter - all this is existence, being, since form for Aristotle is an integral characteristic of being "one of the two rows of being itself is an object of thought" (4.31). Stagirate sees the interaction between these levels of existence in processuality, in one form or another always characteristic of all phenomena and objects, of everything that exists. Processuality and dynamism are explained through the introduction of two new concepts into philosophy - "possibility" and "reality": what constitutes existence, being, is not "generated", it is the result of the transition from possibility to reality, from a potential state to an actual state, emergence - not the generation, but the actualization of possibility [7].

This transition occurs as a result of the "Purpose Cause" inherent in everything - the desire for a complete state of the real, called "Entelechy" by Aristotle. This is the desire for the limit, completeness, "entelechy" which is not brought into existence, but is characteristic of it - "after all, every thing can sometimes develop energy, sometimes not" (5.14) and "in the absence of any external obstacles it will become a being in reality through myself" (6.148). In other words, the goals are in the things themselves, and therefore this is an immanent teleology. According to Aristotle, in all its parts the universe has an internal goal - the achievement of "good", understood as eternity and immutability. It is this goal that serves as the cause of movement, the driving force of all development. The goals themselves differ from a value point of view, depending on the type of movement and the degree of filling with "good" of each given part. "One being possesses the highest good or is involved in it, another immediately achieves it as a result of a

few actions, a third - through many, and a fourth does not even try to achieve it and is content with getting closer to this final goal. This is why the Earth does not move at all, and the planets close to it have a small number of movements: they do not reach the final goal, but only approach it to the extent that they are able to join the divine principle. The First Heaven reaches it immediately - through one movement, and the stars located in the middle between the first and last heavens, although they reach it, do so through many movements" (7.152).

Discussion

The problem of the relationship between faith and reason, theology and philosophy is the most important problem in the spiritual culture of the Middle Ages. Discussion of it occupied a central place in the doctrines of a variety of thinkers. The solution to this problem determined many aspects of medieval culture, influenced religious life and the development of science of that time [8].

Philosophical reflection existed within a theological framework throughout the Middle Ages. According to medieval theologians, the unification of philosophy with theology was conducive to the deepening of philosophical knowledge itself. From the attempts of Christian theologians to reconcile faith and reason, medieval scholasticism arose - a system of religious philosophy characterized by fundamental submission to the dogmas of theology [9].

Scholasticism, as a specific type of medieval scholarship, became one of the most remarkable and striking features of the intellectual culture of the Middle Ages. The main problem of scholasticism was the relationship between two, largely mutually exclusive, spheres of human consciousness (and - accordingly - two types of reality) - religious experience and rational knowledge. In heated theological disputes and sophisticated philosophical disputes of that time, the question of the status of the sciences, the "liberal arts", and their role in the life of society, the main ideological position of which was theocentrism, was resolved. "The whole world, both visible and invisible, was thought, or rather seen, depending on God, and every thing, including the human intellect, its principles and norms, was measured by divine thought."39

In such a situation, the question that the medieval masters posed was, in fact, how much reason can help a person's faith in achieving his highest goal - the salvation of the soul. And the answer that mature scholasticism gave was distinguished by an unusually optimistic view of the possibility of a harmonious combination of faith and reason [10].

The truths of faith and reason can be reconciled. Faith does not contradict reason, but exceeds it. Revelation tells a person what is not yet (or never) accessible to the human mind. Guided by faith, reason leads to the same goal as faith - to the love of God, and this is the highest purpose of man. Faith and reason are in harmonious harmony. "Believe and think what you want!" - Thomas Aquinas might say, paraphrasing an old saying of Augustine [11].

However, medieval scholasticism (represented by Aquinas) did not come to such a decision immediately. It took a long journey and a lot of effort from thinkers of different directions and schools to achieve this most balanced solution. And very soon, already in the 14th century, it was lost. "From the origins of patristics to the end of the 14th century," writes E. Gilson, "the history of Christian thought is the history of continuous efforts to show the agreement of natural reason and faith where it exists, and to achieve it where it is absent."

Already Albertus Magnus made a clear division between the fields of theology and philosophy, without mixing or contrasting them. Being one of the most educated people of his time, Albert introduced into use scholasticism a body of natural science knowledge presented in the writings of Aristotle and Arabic-speaking scientists.

The distinction between philosophy and theology was largely due to the more complete assimilation of Aristotle's philosophy by Western European scholasticism. "To a huge extent," writes F. Copleston, "it was the growth of knowledge about Aristotelian philosophy, which owed nothing to the Judeo-Christian

tradition, that made it necessary to make a clear distinction between philosophy and theology. After all, Aristotle viewed philosophy as a “science.”[12]

In relation to the world as a whole, Aristotelian teleology postulates a certain highest goal, which at the same time is the final result, the completion of all development. As the realization of all the possibilities of existence, as the most complete reality, it is something divine, there is God - entelechy in relation to the Universe. Understood in this way, the Aristotelian god must contain within himself the energy of all other realized possibilities, entelechies, forms, and be, in the words of the Stagirite, “the form of forms.” God is, as it were, a more supersensible entity in the series and in comparison with other supersensible entities, which for Aristotle are “immobile and eternal entities” that determine the eternal movements of the planets. However, and this is very important, in the light of the Aristotelian understanding of two levels, “rows” of one single being, “God” is excluded from this being in general as something transcendent, outside - existential, he is only the highest in one of the “rows,” levels of being, the highest and the most perfect among the supersensible essences of forms [13].

The task of philosophy, according to Aristotle, is the knowledge of supersensible essences, principles and causes of all things. But since the supersensible level of being is always, with the exception of one case, one “beginning”, given only together with sensory entities, then their knowledge is inextricably linked with the knowledge of the material-objective, thing-physical level of existence, which is what physics does as the “second philosophy”. Thus, the Aristotelian concept justifies the cognitive value of the sensory level of being and contributes to a concrete study of nature, albeit a purely speculative one [14].

It was these features of its own - the need to cognize existence at the level of sensory material-objective reality, nature, as well as the opportunity to interpret God as a certain kind of the most perfect, but still cognizable entity among other supersensible entities of a single being - Aristotelian philosophy attracted Farabi in the first place.

For Aristotle and Farabi, form and matter, the appearance of a thing and the thing itself constitute an inseparable whole. Form can exist only in matter, Farabi believes, following Aristotle. In Aristotle’s treatise “On Purposes” in *Metaphysics*, the Arab thinker specifically highlights this idea of the Stagirite, that what exists in them, in Platonic ideas, does not need them [15].

The concept of origin is fundamentally different in these structures. The main characteristic of the root cause in Aristotle and Farabi is thinking: “The mind thinks of itself, its thinking is thinking about thinking, isn’t it in some cases knowledge itself, the subject of knowledge.” (8.30) The mind, through participation in the subject of thought, thinks of itself no, absolutely Farabi has no other points of contact with Neoplatonism [16].

Conclusion

The problem of the relationship between faith and reason, science and religion is still relevant today. Without exaggeration, we can say that this is one of the most discussed problems not only in the philosophical, but also more broadly in the entire scientific world community, as evidenced by the constantly appearing numerous publications on this topic, as well as modern public discussions. Naturally, over the past centuries there have been certain changes in the understanding of the problem itself [17]. If Thomas Aquinas and other classics of Western religious thought, giving priority to theology, interpreted philosophy as a science subordinate to theology, then already in modern times the implementation of this position encountered great difficulties. It is all the more difficult to defend the undivided right to the truth of theology in the age of scientific and technological progress.

At the same time, in the second half of the 20th century. philosophical trends appear that show the limitations of the natural scientific mind of the modern era. The problem of the relationship between reason

and faith is increasingly associated with a different understanding of the very nature of rationality, with the study of various types of rationality (G. Bachelard, I. Prigogine, H. Putnam, J. Searle) [18].

Today there are different solutions to the problem of the relationship between faith and reason, science and religion. On the one hand, the neo-Thomist direction, striving for the harmonization of reason and faith, is preserved; on the other hand, the concept of their complete separation is strengthened, which is supported and deepened mainly by representatives of the natural sciences. Let us present several opinions belonging to both the first and the second [19].

In neo-Thomism, especially since the second half of the 20th century, there has been a reorientation from a purely theocentric point of view in solving all problems to a more balanced, conformist position. The need to “modernize” the classical heritage is widely recognized. A new, more flexible approach to solving the problem of the relationship between reason and religious faith was formulated in the document (constitution) “The Church in the Modern World” adopted by the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), as well as in subsequent works of Catholic thinkers [20].

An authoritative representative of neo-Thomism, J. Maritain believes that the proper problem of our time is “the reconciliation of knowledge and wisdom, the harmony of life and spirit.”⁵³ Proving the need for harmony of faith and reason, Maritain considers the primacy of theology and related metaphysics as the “highest forms” to be fruitful knowledge... forming wisdom” over specific theoretical sciences. Based on the fundamental distinction between essence and being, Thomas explains the hierarchical structure of existence, the existence of imperfection (and, ultimately, evil) and, finally, the absolute perfection of divine being. At the same time, if in his early works (“Comments on Sentences”, treatise “On Existence and Essence”) Thomas understands being mainly as actuality, real existence, then in later works (both “Summas”, treatise “On Potency” and etc.) being appears as a complex, multi-level, analogical concept, which is based on the concept of perfection (perfectio) [21].

In the surrounding reality, we observe not entities, but individual things. A separate existing thing is a substance (substantia), consisting of matter and form (if we are talking about corporeal beings). Together with Aristotle, Thomas believes that the main task of metaphysics is the study of substances. It is substance that is being in the fullest sense of the word, since it has individual existence.

The perfection of a concrete being, according to Thomas, is determined by one main criterion - the degree of its individuality. The more individual, independent, and independent a being is in its existence, the more perfect it is. Therefore, substances are more perfect than accidents, since they have individual existence, while accidents exist only in substances [22].

Among substances there is also a difference in the degree of individuality: some are less individual (for example, grains of sand on the seashore), others are more individual. In the material world, maximum individuality is achieved in living nature, and among living substances - in man. In the immaterial world, individuality is of a completely different order. Due to separation from matter, there each spiritual substance (angel) represents a special species, i.e. As many species as there are, there are as many individuals.

Thomas gives, in fact, the Aristotelian definition of substance: “Substance is called a subject (subiectwn), or suppositum (suppositum), which independently exists (subsistit) in the genus of substance,” and “is subject to accidents.” The perfection of the existence of a substance is thus determined by its independent existence and ability to be a bearer of accidents.

However, the independent existence of a substance does not mean its absolute independence in the order of being. Only God is completely independent in this sense. The independence of a substance means that it does not need any other subject for its existence, as an accident.

Accidents do not have independent existence; they exist in substance, giving it additional certainty, and can only be cognized through it. For example, the quality "white" does not exist in the same way that Socrates exists, i.e. not independently, but in something else. We can say that "something white" (like a piece of paper or something) exists. As Thomas writes, "only substances exist independently, but accidents are called beings not because they exist, but rather because something exists through them: thus, whiteness is said to exist insofar as its subject is something white. That is why Aristotle says that accidents, for example, quality or motion, are not called unconditionally existing, but "the essence of being."221

Thus, we can say that accidents have a lesser degree of being than substances, but a greater degree of being than potentially existing (*esse in potentia*), which can only become real in the process of becoming, or, moreover, a purely mental being (*ens rationis*), which has no existence in reality at all.

Only substance has the highest degree of being, since it "exists as if by itself" (*quasi per se subsistens*) and is different from anything else. Therefore, substance is the first of all existing things and is "immediately existing and existing in itself (*ens per se*).” Thomas concludes: "The term "substance" designates not only that which is being in itself, for being cannot in itself be a genus... But the term "substance" designates the essence to which such being is due, i.e. being in itself, which, however, is not its very essence."

Thomas rejects Avicenna's definition of substance as a being in itself (*ens per se*), since the latter considered being as a genus that can be divided into being-in-itself and being-in-another. Being is not a genus, Thomas believes, and substance is a being in the proper sense of the word. If we define substance as *ens per se*, as Avicenna did, then God will also be substance, which is not true. Substance means an essential form to which being is given (*esse per se*). However, she is not her own being, while God is his own being. Moreover, God is not the bearer of accidental determinations, like a substance.

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