

How Can the Foundations of Democracy be Weakened? Case Study of Inaccuracy and Independency of Election Data in Indonesia

Alexsander Yandra¹, Adrian Faridhi², Eddy Asnawi³, Husni Setiawan⁴, Sudaryanto⁵, Gilham Muhammad Yasir⁶

Abstract

One of the efforts to strengthen democracy in a country is by conducting an honest and fair process of the general election. However, several cases have resulted in a decline in the quality of general and local leader elections with various potential problematic politics, such as the potential for novice voters who are 17 years old or married, relocated, and not being registered as voters. This phenomenon is a problem that has always been an evaluation material for every election organizer, even the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum-General Elections Commission)'s performance has always been a concern regarding this matter. This research was conducted using a qualitative method with a case study approach to uncover this fatal problem. Data were obtained through in-depth interviews with informants and literature related to research issues. This study refers to the case of the voter data updating process by the Riau's KPUD (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah-Regional General Elections Commission), where there were 51,469 ineligible voters (TMS) registered as permanent voters. As a reference for analysis, this study used the theory of democracy and the political rights of voters. The data were processed with an Emic-etic approach to find a complete and in-depth analysis. The results show that the problem of voter inaccuracy occurs due to poor accuracy of the Final Voter List (Daftar Pemilih Tetap-DPT) and lack of transparency in the KPU and Disdukcapil (Dinas Kependudukan dan Catatan Sipil-Department of Population and Civil Registration) systems. In addition, the supply of voter data through the Disdukcapil limits the KPU in accessing population data, resulting in poor voter data updating. This also has implications for a continuous voter data independence strategy to minimize fraud in the general election process and Local Leader Election in the coming period. This study has implications for the DPT strategy recommendation where the KPU should get the authority to use voter data independently ahead of the election with the provisions of implementing a continuous voter registration system well. KPU can make data renewal anytime. The integrity of the foundation of democracy needs to be maintained in running the country to achieve noble ideas and goals.

Keywords: *Inaccuracy, Independency, Democracy, Political Rights.*

Introduction

The presidential and regional leader election in the general election (pemilu) and local leader elections (pilkada) fairly and prudently is an essential and absolute thing as a continuation of participatory democratic ideology (Blais et al., 2017; Héritier, 2010). The implementation of dignified general and local leader elections will impact voter satisfaction as people's sovereignty (Blais et al., 2017; Reinl & Schäfer, 2021). This will also maintain the electability of a country with integrity and independence (Thorlakson, 2020)

Elections are part of the political process in a democracy because every political system also uses elections as a symbol of democracy. However, if the elections themselves are flawed in the process, it is clear that democracy based on the elections can be fraudulent (Chitlaoarporn, 2018; Prabowo, 2016). This certainly negatively impacts people's satisfaction with their leaders (Farrer & Zingher, 2019; Lundmark et al., 2020; Singh, 2014), which can lead to structural violence, which will certainly be challenging to overcome (Nieto-Matiz, 2019). In fact, elections that are harmed in quality might eliminate the essence of political rights and people's democratic rights (Gaughan, 2017).

¹ Department of Public Administration, Universitas Lancang Kuning, Indonesia, Email: alexsy@unilak.ac.id/alexsanderyandra6@gmail.com, (Corresponding Author)

² Department of Law Science, Universitas Lancang Kuning, Indonesia.

³ Department of Law Science, Universitas Lancang Kuning, Indonesia.

⁴ Department of Governance Science, STISIP Imam Bonjol, 25128, Indonesia.

⁵ Department of Public Administration, Universitas Lancang Kuning, Indonesia

⁶ journalist and democracy activist

In Indonesia, it must be recognized that there is still a Final Voter List (DPT) which becomes a problem due to its inaccurate and independent data in the general and local leader elections (Ulyanisa & Satrio, 2021; Yandra, 2016). In 2018-2019, the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) in one of the provinces in Indonesia conducted a survey regarding the implementation of general elections at the central and regional levels, one of which was Riau Province. The survey results show that DPT data ahead of the general election and local leader elections in 2019 showed as many as 34,696 anomalous voters, and before the election, it was found that 51,469 voters did not meet the requirements (TMS) to be registered in the final voter list. The findings of this anomaly data should not have happened twice at the same time because, in 2018, Riau Province held the Pilkada. Less than a year apart, there seems to be an increase in the number and the variety of conditions where unrecognized (anomaly) DPT problems are found. In fact, due to inaccuracies and unreliability of the data, it weakens the foundations of democracy in Indonesia (Schickler, 2018).

Based on the research on the final voter list (DPT) that has been carried out (Liando, 2019; Putra, 2017; Sari et al., 2019), it was found that the problem of DPT in various regions in Indonesia is caused by the performance of the general election commission (KPU) which has not been maximum. However, the research trend has not revealed the cause of the inaccurate DPT from the perspective of the quality of voter data received by the KPU from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Research by Fitri Sukma (Sari et al., 2019) showed that after the DPT was established, there were still duplicate data, and there were still residents not registered in Bungo Regency in the 2019 election. Furthermore, Liando (2019) also showed that the KPU had not worked effectively in determining the DPT in the Minahasa Regency during the 2018 local leader elections. Next, in the 2015 Bengkalis Regency local leader election, it was also found that an officer's negligence caused mistakes on the voter list update, so the DPT was problematic (Putra, 2017). The experience from the last election that the accuracy of voter data contained in the Temporary Voter List (DPS) as the basis for determining the Final Voters List (DPT) seems to have not been able to accommodate all voters.

Several studies that were mentioned earlier have not discussed the poor performance of the KPU in the stage of determining the DPT. The three studies have not discussed the DPT problems from the aspect of the quality of the data on the population of potential voters (DP4) from the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is the main reason for finding double voter data. In the 2019 election, the total erasure of duplicate data by the KPU and Bawaslu was 10,856. The recapitulation of the double voter lists that were deleted by the Riau KPU and the Riau Bawaslu (Election Supervisory Agency) can be seen in table 1.

Table 1. Number of Double Voter Data Erasure in the 2019 Election in Riau

No	City/ Regency	Number of Findings in Potential Double Data			Amount of Double Voter Data Erasure	
		Bawaslu (Election Supervisory Agency)	KPU (General Elections Commissio	Parpol Political Party)	Bawaslu (Election Supervisory Agency)	KPU (General Elections Commissio
1	Bengkalis	2.343	267	-	910	267
2	Dumai	26	58	-	13	29
3	Indragiri Hilir	3.587	-	-	1.097	-
4	Indragiri Hulu	1.632	1.908	-	1.127	-
5	Kampar	1.593	794	-	327	794
6	Kantan Singingi	704	39	1.006	243	39
7	Kepulauan Meranti	835	-	-	398	-
8	Pekanbaru	1.956	198	-	988	198
9	Pelalawan	783	-	-	373	23
10	Rokan Hilir	4.483	260	-	2.968	260
11	Rokan Hulu	1.218	294	-	600	146
12	Siak	109	6	-	53	3

Total	19.269	3.824	1.006	9.097	1.759
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Source: (Yandra, Faridhi, & Andrizal, 2022)

From the table 1 above, it can be inferred that the Riau Bawaslu played a significant role in improving the voter list quality. From a total of 10,856 voter data that were deleted, 84% of the results came from Bawaslu data and 16% from KPU data. Then of the total potential double data findings of 24,099 by Bawaslu, KPU, and Political Parties, 79% came from Bawaslu findings, 16% from KPU findings, and 5% came from political parties. Based on this percentage, the Riau Bawaslu plays significant role in finding the double data compared to the KPU and Political Parties.

The finding of DPT problem also occurred in the 2020 regional elections in Riau. Based on voter data from the Riau's General Elections Commission (KPU) from 15 July to 10 August 2020, some voters did not meet the administrative requirements. The data tracing found as many as 51,469 voters who were not eligible for registration (Ineligible voters-TMS), which is presented in table 2.

Table 2. Total Amount of Ineligible Voters

No	Ineligible Voters	Voters	Percentage
1	"Unknown" Resident (not local resident)	19.820	38 %
2	Deceased Voters	13.321	26 %
3	Voters with TNI/Polri (Indonesian national army/Police Officer) Status	479	1 %
4	Double Voters	1.349	3 %
5	Underage Voters	1.115	2 %
6	Relocated Voters	15.385	30 %
Jumlah		51.469	100 %

Source: (Yandra, Faridhi, Andrizal, et al., 2022)

Based on the table 2 above, it can be understood that "unknown" residents, relocated voters, and deceased voters are the most common problems. More than 70% of TMS (ineligible) voter problems are related to the accuracy of data originating from the DP4 (the list of potential voters for the election) of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This also shows to the public that the accuracy of Indonesia's population data is in poor condition. Such administrative problems like this are still found in every election implementation.

General and local leader elections in Riau show the poor quality of population data received from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The erasure of tens of thousands of data is strong evidence to claim that the voter registration system in Indonesia is still not good; thus, a thorough evaluation and improvement must be carried out so that the DPT problem no longer becomes the primary problem of every election.

Inaccurate voter data can weaken the foundation of democracy in Indonesia. This statement is supported by studies in several countries that show catastrophic impacts that cause low electability of countries (Daoust et al., 2021; Gaughan, 2017; Hasen, 2020; von Borzyskowski, 2016). Of course, in Indonesia, it can also impact the level of people's trust in its leaders if there is valid evidence that the elections held are fraudulent.

The problem of inaccuracies and independency of the final voter lists in the KPU is very ironic because Indonesia already has various regulations governing the election administration system, such as PKPU No. 2 of 2017 and PKPU No. 6 of 2021, that have become concerns of many election observers such as NGOs, academics, practitioners, and politicians. Apparently, the existing regulations have not been effective in regulating the implementation of elections, which is one of the political rights of citizens that no one can neglect. The KPU is responsible for fulfilling the rights of the citizens. The cause of this poor voter data quality is the inaccurate source of data on the list of potential voters for the election (DP4). The voter list

provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the KPU still contained much data on ineligible voters (TMS) in the DP4, even though the data had been deleted in the previous election.

Efforts to improve the quality of voter data in Indonesia have several relevant models: First, the PKPU model No. 2 of 2017 concerning Data Update and Compilation of Voter Lists. Second, PKPU No. 6 of 2021 concerning the Continuous Update of Voter Data. These two regulations have a pretty significant and fundamentally different basis for thinking. PKPU No. 2 of 2017 focuses on the factual verification (Coklit) process, which relies heavily on KPU ad hoc officers in the field to find the truth of voter data (voter validity). The more problematic voter data, the more energy and time are consumed to carry out the verification. In this model, the KPU relies heavily on the quality of DP4 data from the Ministry of Home Affairs for updating voter data. The more complete the DP4 data, the better the voter list results.

On the other hand, the worse the accuracy of the DP4 data, the worse the results will be. This has been the weakness of the KPU so far because it only relies on data from the DP4 for updating voter data. The emphasis on the process of updating voter data is known as the periodic list model.

Unlike before, in PKPU No. 6 of 2021, the updating of voter data is carried out by the KPU in coordination with agencies related to changes in population data such as sub-districts, Disdukcapil (Department of Population and Civil Registration), KUA (Religious Affairs Office), schools and institutions or other agencies related to changes in population data. This regulation focuses on the independence of voter data by the KPU and is no longer entirely dependent on DP4 data from the Ministry of Home Affairs. This is a good change where the KPU can independently be creative in tracking voter data. A pattern like this is known as a continuous list.

The two differences in this model are a good thing considering that the KPU, the organizer of the general election, must have excellent and accurate voter data independence so that it does not depend on other agencies. Nevertheless, the concept must be strengthened with a precise mechanism that can be implemented by all levels of the KPU in Indonesia. A comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-date study is needed to fill the gaps in previous research based on the results of research and literature studies. It also needs an analysis of the accuracy of the final voter list is needed, as the transparency of voter data by the KPU and the Department of Population and Civil Registration and the data independence of continuous voter data, which will be used as a framework for modeling accuracy and independence in updating voter data.

Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

Democracy and Political Rights of Citizens

There are two kinds of democracy from the political science perspective: normative and empirical understanding (Ulyanisa & Satrio, 2021). In a normative understanding, democracy is something that a country ideally wants to do or implement. For example, we know the expression "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people" for realizing a fair government based on the people's choice (Shapiro, 2009). These normative expressions are usually implemented into the constitutions of each country (Reilly, 2016). However, we must also note that what is normative may not necessarily be seen in the context of everyday political life in a country. Therefore, it is essential to see the meaning of democracy empirically, particularly democracy in its manifestation in practical political life (Mariana & Husin, 2017; Ulum, 2019).

People's suffrage must be clearly regulated in the constitution (Moynihan & Silva, 2008; Reilly, 2016; Ulum, 2019). In this regard, Ramlan Surbakti provides 3 (three) parameters to assess whether a Final Voters List (DPT) meets the requirements of a democratic election. According to Ramlan Surbakti (Surbakti, 1992), the DPT assessment that meets the election's requirements must fulfill the following criteria: a) Comprehensive. It means that every citizen with the right to vote must be registered in the DPT; b) Up-to-date. DPT has been adapted to the latest developments; and c) Accurate. The identity of the voters is checked correctly. Citizens who have not been entitled to vote are not included in the Final Voters List.

The three indicators above become a reference for election organizers so that the people's political rights are guaranteed. Within the framework of a democracy that recognizes society as the highest sovereignty. To see the government's efforts through the Ministry of Home Affairs, Disdukcapil, and KPUD Riau in increasing the accuracy of voter data, theoretical approaches to democracy, DPI, and people's political rights have become analytical tools in in-depth studies related to securing citizens' voting rights in elections (Pivato, 2017; van Aaken, 2009). Particularly the potential for misuse of DPI, as well as carefully examining the empowerment of the political rights of citizens (Álvares, 2014; Kartoni et al., 2021; Montero & Torcal, 1990)

Maintaining a complete, accurate, and up-to-date voter list is vital for the KPU because it greatly affects the protection of citizens' voting rights (Yandra, 2016). Thus, Constitutional Court Decision Number 102/PUUVI/2009 and Constitutional Court Decision Number 20/PUUXVII/2019 stipulate that the right to vote is a constitutional and basic human right. From Article 27 of the 1945 Constitution and Article 21 of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights), the state is obliged to protect all citizens who meet eligibility requirements to be able to vote in parliamentary elections, even if the voter is not on a ballot with an electronic identity card (Moynihan & Silva, 2008).

Continuous Final Voter Lists Update

In carrying out the process of continuously updating voter data, at least eleven prerequisites must be met. Those are excellent and integrated infrastructure for collecting election information among state institutions, adequate infrastructure for election management institutions, adequate resources and budget, smooth and efficient transportation and information, easy access, reliable documents to identify voters, systems that can avoid double registration, trained and experienced staff, stable regulation, ability to collect detailed and accurate geographic information, voter education and provision of effective election information, and excellent voter and stakeholder participation (Kartoni et al., 2021; Subkhi, 2020). Nevertheless, many of these eleven prerequisites cannot be implemented in the 2019 general election. This is because the general election law does not fully regulate the application of these requirements. This has led to the internal structuring of the KPU and the restructuring of the KPU's relations with other state institutions (Reilly, 2016; Sears et al., 1980).

Methodology

Research Design

This research on the Inaccuracy and Independency of Election Data Eliminates the Foundations of Democracy in Indonesia employed a qualitative approach with a case study method and an embedded single-case study design. The qualitative approach was used in this study because it explored the problem and developed an understanding of the central phenomenon through research questions according to the respondent's experience and based on the respondent's expression of his views on the phenomenon of the inaccuracy of final voter lists (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Heri Yusuf Muslih, Dodi Suryana, Ahman, Uman Suherman, 2022).

A study's research design was needed to avoid situations where evidence obtained from the field did not answer the research question. It relates to what will be studied, what data is relevant, what data is collected, and how to analyze it (Creswell et al., 2007; Moleong, 2011; Rukajat, 2018). In this study, the research design used was an embedded single-case study since the context and the phenomenon or case being studied were only one but had more than one unit of analysis regarding the central phenomenon being studied, as shown in the figure. 1 (Creswell et al., 2007).




Figure 1. Embedded Single-Case Study Research Design (Creswell Et Al., 2007).

In Figure 1, the context of this study is the Inaccuracy and Independency of Election Data that eliminate the Foundations of Democracy in Indonesia, and the first unit of analysis is the Provincial and Regency/City KPU institutions. The second unit of analysis is from the Provincial and Regency/City Bawaslu.

Participants

The respondents in this study were the people of Riau who were determined using a purposive sampling technique with the type of extreme case sampling (Creswell et al., 2007). The purposive sampling technique used in this study was based on the importance of the participants involved in understanding in depth the prominent phenomenon under study.

This research was conducted in Riau Province, considering that there were data inaccuracies involving the number of voters who did not meet the requirements and double data resulting in election results where one voter is eligible for two or three times votings. There is also an indication that there were underage voters.

The total number of respondents who answered the interview questions was 27 people consisting of 13 people from the Provincial and Regency/City KPU institutions and 14 people from the Provincial and Regency City Bawaslu. In detail, it can be seen in table 3.

Table 3. Respondents

No.	Institutions	Total
1	Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Election Supervisory Agency):	14
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kab. Siak	1
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kab. Bengkalis	2
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kab. Rokan Hilir	1
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kab. Kepulauan Meranti	1
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kab. Indragiri Hilir	2
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kab. Indragiri Hulu	1
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kab. Kuantan Singingi	1
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kab. Pelalawan	1
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kota Pekanbaru	2
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Kota Dumai	1
	<i>Bawaslu</i> Prov. Riau	1

2	Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Elections Commission)	13
	KPU Kota Pekanbaru	2
	KPU Kota Dumai	1
	KPU Kab. Siak	1
	KPU Kab. Bengkalis	1
	KPU Kab. Pelalawan	2
	KPU Kab. Indragiri Hilir	1
	KPU Kab. Indragiri Hulu	1
	KPU Prov. Riau	1
	Independent Body	3

Questionnaire

The data collection techniques used in this study were interviews, observations, audiovisuals, and documents. Interviews with a qualitative approach need to use open-ended questions so that participants can express their opinions and feelings according to their own experiences without being limited by the researcher's perspective and previous research findings (Creswell et al., 2007). In this study, interviews were conducted using the type of one-on-one interview in which the submission of questions and notes of answers was only from one participant at a time with the consideration that participants could voice their opinions, feelings, and ideas more comfortably without hesitation (Creswell et al. , 2007). Before conducting interviews, interview guidelines must be made in advance so that the questions given to participants do not get out of the research objectives (Creswell et al., 2007).

The stages in collecting data in this research were: creating informed consent as a guarantee of confidentiality for participants, developing interview protocols to make it easier to find out what information is needed to answer the problem formulation in accordance with the research objectives, and creating observational protocols. Giving informed consent was the main stage in the implementation of this research to explain to participants what must be done during the study and to determine whether participants were willing and agreed to commit to conducting research. When the participants were willing and agreed to commit to the research, they would then be given a list of questions that needed to be answered by the participants. The credibility of the answers was checked through interviews by making audiovisual recordings and asking for documents that could support the research. The following questions for KPU RI, Bawaslu RI, KPUD Riau, Bawaslu Riau, and Independent Election Monitoring Institutions (Perludem, KIPP, NETGRIT, CODE, etc.) can be seen in table 4.

Table 4. Interview Instruments

No	Conceptual Indicators	Questions
1	Information Dissemination	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the Riau KPUD's efforts to increase public participation in elections? 2. Has information about the election been provided to the maximum number of voters? 3. What media does KPUD use in disseminating information? 4. Is voter data open to the public? 5. How are voter data published?
2	Consultation and Collaboration	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What institutions are involved in the process of determining voter data? 2. Why are multiple agencies involved in the process of determining the voter list? 3. Does the determination of the voter list receive criticism and input from other agencies? 4. Is the decision to determine the voter list based on input from other agencies?

		5. Has the Riau KPUD conducted consultations with the Indonesian KPU before determining the voter list?
3	Joint Decision Making	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Does the KPUD's decision in determining the voter list have to be agreed upon by other relevant agencies? 2. Have all parties invited to collaborate agreed upon the voter list decision? 3. What are the points proposed/initiated by other agencies that become stipulations in determining the voter list?
4	Voter Empowerment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How can the decision to determine the voter list be controlled? 2. Who is the agency that controls the determination of the voter list? 3. Is there a particular agency in charge of controlling the determination of the voter list? 4. How does the Riau KPUD anticipate voters who are not registered in the civil registry but are already eligible to vote in the general election?

Table 5. Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Population and Civil Registration

No	Indicators	Questions
1	Voter Data Source	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the mechanism for updating population data by the Department of Population and Civil Registration? 2. How does the Department of Population and Civil Registration update the data for new voters? 3. How long does the Department of Population and Civil Registration take to prepare data for the voter list?
2	Voter data anomaly	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How is the mechanism for submitting population data from the Department of Population and Civil Registration to the KPU to be used as a data source in determining the voter list? 2. How does the Department of Population and Civil Registration anticipate double voter data?
3	Constraint	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the problems faced by the Department of Population and Civil Registration in anticipating double voter data? 2. Why does the KPU have to carry out field verification to confirm the data?
4	Data Validity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Does the Department of Population and Civil Registration update voter data? What is the process like? 2. What kind of coordination is expected between institutions so that the voter list can be accurate? 3. Is access to voter data open to the public?

Data Collection Procedure

The initial stage in analyzing qualitative data is organizing the results of the research data found, such as creating tables about what data you already have, grouping data according to data type, or grouping according to place and participants (Creswell et al., 2007). This study grouped the data based on participants and data types.

The second stage in qualitative data analysis is to copy data or create data transcripts by writing down interview results from recordings (Creswell et al., 2007). Writing a copy of this data or transcript can start with writing the questions the researcher gave and writing down the answers from the participants. All recorded conversations must be written down, such as if the participant pauses or thinks, it needs to be explained in the verbatim interview. Besides that, the critical part must be highlighted to facilitate the subsequent data analysis stage (Creswell et al., 2007). In this study, the data was copied back in the form of verbatim interviews and notes from observations.

The third stage in qualitative data analysis is analyzing the data by hand or computer. At this stage, there were two things to do: coding the data and determining the theme of the analysis (Creswell et al., 2007). If data analysis is done manually without a computer, researchers need to mark essential data, such as coloring important words or sentences to facilitate coding and determining themes (Creswell et al., 2007).

If the data is too much and takes much time when analyzed manually, the results of the data transcript can be analyzed through computer programs such as the NVivo application (Creswell et al., 2007). In analyzing data using a computer, the data obtained must be uploaded to the selected application. The data type can be uploaded, such as verbatim interviews, photographs, and documents (Creswell et al., 2007). After the data is uploaded to the application, each piece of data needs to be given a name so that it is not confusing and makes it easier to analyze. Then, code the important words or sentences and group the coding into several major themes (Creswell et al., 2007). After the coding is complete, data reduction will be carried out to be used as analysis themes.

Data Analysis Procedure Ethics

This research has been approved by the research ethics committee (Lancang Kuning University Research and Community Service Institute) with no: 269/LPPM/Pn/2021 and fully refers to the Research and Community Service Guide Book Edition XIII by the Ministry of Research and Technology of the Republic of Indonesia (2020).

The participants in this study were informants who had agreed to fill the informed consent in order to provide the information needed during the study, where research data were collected through interviews, observations, audiovisuals, and documents containing information about the themes studied. This study did not have a negative impact, either physically or psychologically, on the participants because the identity of the informants involved in this study is confidential, and other data are attached based on the results of discussions with the participants.

Results and Discussion

Poor Quality of Final Voter List Accuracy (DPT)

The main cause of this anomalous data is that the population data source was not updated, resulting in invalid data. The voter list provided by the Department of Population and Civil Registration to the KPU was considered the cause of the problem of ineligible voters (TMS) who were still listed in the Final Voter List (DPT). There were several types of problems with TMS voters (Bawaslu Riau, 2019), such as:

- Double voters are voters whose names are registered more than once in the Final Voter Lists (DPT). The vulnerability of this double voter can potentially make voters exercise their voting rights more than once.
- Voters with invalid data. Voters whose information is invalid because the information data elements are incorrect or inappropriate in the DPT, such as information on birth date, NIK (Citizen Identification Number), or NKK (Family Registration Number), which was not normal.
- Deceased Voters. Deceased voters were those who had passed away but were still registered in the DPT. Voters who have passed away can potentially have their voting rights misused by irresponsible people.
- Underage voters who have never been married. Underage voters who have never been married are voters who have not met the requirements to exercise their right to vote. According to Article 347 of Law Number 7 of 2017, voters are residents who have Citizen Identification cards.

- Relocated Voters. Relocated Voters are voters who do not exercise their right to vote at the TPS (Polling Station) located at the address in the e-KTP (Electronic Citizen Card). This vulnerability to voting can lead to losing the voter's right to vote.
- Voters with TNI/POLRI (National Army/Police) status. Residents who are members of the TNI/POLRI do not have the right to exercise their right to vote in elections.
- Voters whose voting rights are revoked based on a court decision that has permanent legal force;
- WNA (Foreign Citizens). WNA is a foreign citizen but is included in the DPT. This is one of the vulnerabilities found because foreign citizens had no voting rights in the 2019 election.

There was no clear data source on how the KPU would update the data every month (data on mortality, migration, TMS, and MS). In the KPU Circular Letter Number 132 concerning the continuous update of the 2021 Election Data, it is stipulated that the Regency/City's KPU should periodically coordinate with the relevant agencies in updating election data. This includes local government agencies that handle population and death/funeral, TNI/Polri (National Army and Police), courts, and district/city's voter data services.

The Department of Population and Civil Registration is the primary partner of the KPU in updating the voter list. This is confirmed by Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning general elections. Article 201 (8) confirms that the government provides consolidated population data to the KPU every 6 (six) months as additional material in updating voter data. Looking at the article above, it can be assumed that the KPU government only provides population data every 6 (six) months. Regency/City's KPU currently updates the voter data every month. This unclear data source is one of the obstacles for the KPU to continue to update voter data.

Discussion of the Results

The Transparency of Voter Data by Kpu and The Department of Population and Civil Registration

One of the problems in implementing DPB was the availability of data. The Department of Population and Civil Registration, which was initially the main partner of the KPU, seemed to have closed the data by not providing data access to the Regency/City's KPU if it was not in the election stage. On the other hand, the KPU was also not fully open to Bawaslu as the supervisor of the election organizers.


Based on the results of interviews with members of the former KPU member, one of the things that caused the poor accuracy of the DPT was that coordination at the central level had not been adequate in coordinating population data. Therefore, the regency/city's KPUs had difficulties accessing population data. It is suggested that the data updating process is compared to previous election data to facilitate the updating process significantly.

The Ministry of Home Affairs only gives the KPU access during the election stage, so the KPU cannot do much to update voter data prior to the election. The KPU only relies on DP4 data obtained from the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is then matched and researched. Since the DP4 data still contains errors, many anomalous data are found on the voter list.

Continuous Voter Data Independence

The voter list is still a problem that contributes to election insecurity in Indonesia. The problem in voting rights was due to the problems in the voters' administration process, Incomplete voter data that is not accurate and up-to-date, and communication problems between election organizers and the Department of Population and Civil Registry in the regions. These were the dominant factors that shape election vulnerability in terms of the dimensions of holding free and fair elections (Bawaslu Riau, 2019).

DP4 becomes another problem in terms of the mismatch of DPT data. This is because DP4 data is updated every 6 (six) months, and with the current data update method, the Department of Population and Civil Registry is passive. For example, the department will not register residents who passed away or who migrated or relocated if they do not actively report it (Yandra, 2016). It is suggested that the KPU no longer hold the responsibility of anomalous voter data if it has the right and authority to update voter data independently. To understand the DPT determination model, Chart 1 shows the process.



The primary voter data was obtained by the KPU from the Ministry of Home Affairs' data of the population that has been adjusted to the eligibility requirements as voters. This voter potential population data was then adjusted to the final voter lists (DPT) by the KPU in each region (province and district/city). After the synchronization, both data that met the requirement (valid) and the complex data (anomalies) could be determined; then, factual verification (coklit) is needed. After the verification process was complete, the temporary DPT was published for 14 days to receive complaints/input from the community. After that, the DPT was determined through a plenary meeting.


The problem during the election was that the accuracy of data issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs was still low. Many anomaly voter data are detected after DP4 data was synchronized with the last voter DPT. This condition resulted in problems for the KPU and especially for the community. In each election period, the KPU was busy with voter data that were still not accurate. Furthermore, the community was threatened not getting the right to vote as citizens.

This is one of the reasons there is always a problem with election data during updating data and preparation of voter lists. There are problems where residents are registered at two or more polling stations, and deceased residents are still registered as voters. The chaos of this DPT pairing model will also appear in the results of this DPB (Continuous Voter Lists).

Continuous Voter Lists: Recommendations For Improvement

KPU, as an election-organizing institution, should have a strategy and ability to increase the accuracy of the DPT each period. However, in some cases, KPU is not given the trust to rely on the latest DPT data from the last election as the primary reference to determine the final voter lists for the next election. Until now, KPU needs to wait for data from the Ministry of Home Affairs, whose level of accuracy is not good.


KPU should be given more authority to manage voter data independently without having to wait for data from other institutions because KPU is an institution that is fully responsible for the implementation of elections, including the determination of the DPT. The current DPT determination model by the KPU must be evaluated and improved gradually. Therefore, this study offers a model of the accuracy of DPT determination by the KPU. This study suggests that KPU must have the authority to manage election data and regular data renewal independently. The DPT determination model offered can be seen in chart 2.

Chart 2. Recommendations for DPT improvement

The problem identified by much anomalous data is that the KPU does not have the authority to provide data independently. This is also added by the fact that there is no kelurahan (village)-based voter data update system. The above model focuses on the ability of the KPU to form an accurate data collection system and update each period so that it has the power to be used as a basis for determining the DPT.

KPU's data bank continues to undergo data renewal through the village officers' monthly reports on adding and reducing voter data. The report can be identified from the number of people taking care of KTP (Citizen Identification Card) and the number of mortality in the village. This recapitulation is carried out regularly and continues to be updated by the KPU's data bank. So that when the election is held, the KPU already has good data without waiting for data from other institutions.

The data can be compared with data from the district/city's office of population and civil registration to ensure the reliability of KPU's data. If this is done, the potential of anomalous voter data will be minimized. Data collection can be more effective and efficient without waiting for reports of death, migration, marriage, and others from related institutions.

Chart 3. Design of the DPT Development and Improvement Model

The proposal of the model's design can be seen in chart 3. This model comprehensively involves various essential elements to create easier DPT in terms of bureaucracy. In addition, in the design of this model, the voter data bank is not used directly. The data in the data bank must go through field verification to anticipate the transfer of residents who have not reported to the village officers. However, the verification will be easier and faster to be done by field officers than the previous system since the anomaly data is estimated to be less.

Conclusion

General elections are a forum for people's sovereignty to uphold democracy so that the goals and ideas of the state can be achieved based on the principle of justice. However, some cases in Indonesia indicate fraud and system errors that can benefit one party. This study's results indicate that the problem's localization lies within the accuracy of the final voter list (DPT). It was caused by the quality of the potential data of the voter of the election (DP4) from the Ministry of Home Affairs that has not been maximized. The KPU and Bawaslu find so many data anomalies. KPU, as an election organizer, does not have the authority to establish the DPT independently. In fact, it must wait for the population data from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Continuous Voter List system initiated by the KPU in 2017 has not been effective in

implementing elections. The lack of transparency in the DPU and the Department of Population and Civil Registration systems is another factor that causes such cases. Even voter data intake through this department limits the KPU in accessing population data which has implications for the poor quality of voter data updates.

This study has implications for the DPT strategy recommendation where the KPU should get the authority to use voter data independently ahead of the election with the provisions of implementing a continuous voter registration system well. KPU can make data renewal anytime. This is carried out so that the process of population update is administratively recorded. Thus, during its implementation, there is no overlapping data. This strategy can be implemented to maintain the integrity of the foundation of democracy in running the country to achieve noble ideas and goals.

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