

## Suleiman Al-Nabulsi and His Position on Arab Nationalist Causes

Ibrahim Ahmad Al Shyyab<sup>1</sup>, Ali Ibrahim Al-Bashayreh<sup>2</sup>, Mohammed Salem Amayreh<sup>3</sup>, Omar Saleh Al Omari<sup>4</sup>, Khaled Hassan Al-jabali<sup>5</sup>

### Abstract

*This study addressed the position of Suleiman Al-Nabulsi on many Arab and national causes, as Al-Nabulsi is considered one of the men of Jordan had a prominent role in the Jordanian and Arab political life. His life reflected to a large extent the reality of political life and its interactions in the Jordanian arena and the Arab world at large, this study aims to underline Al-Nabulsi's position regarding all causes at Jordanian and Arab national levels, such as the Palestinian situation, Arab unity, the Algerian revolution, the Baghdad Pact, the tripartite aggression against Egypt and other Jordanian and national causes, in addition to clarifying Al-Nabulsi's philosophy of national loyalty, which stems from principle of Arab existence unity. he is one of the prime ministers in Jordan who did not limit nationalism just at Jordan's level, besides his role in the social reform that aims to attain more of democracy and opposition to foreign mandates which he considered as a form of colonialism (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 57), and therefore it was natural that this philosophy will be in conflict with the philosophy of the state which aims to maintain its entity and independence, the descriptive historical method was used that relies on the historical events as they appeared in their sources, and to apply critical approach and analyze them in a scientific, rational and neutral objectivity far from prejudice. the study reached many conclusions some of which are: the national philosophy of Al-Nabulsi that transcends the political and geographical boundaries of Jordan, because he upholds the high values and ideals in his calculations, and in fact he tried to subject reality to those values, also President Nasser's ideas regarding unity has a great impact on his personality, so he experienced a conflict between the loyalty to the country, and the loyalty to Arab nationalism by president Nasser, so naturally he saw no conflict between the two loyalties to the country on the one hand and the larger Arab nationalism on the other hand (Al-Mousa 1986, P 58), but the two loyalties complimented each other and he defended this concept until the last day of his life.*

**Keywords:** *Suleiman Al-Nabulsi, Jordan, Jordanian Governments, Arab Nationalism, Political Thought.*

### Introduction

#### *Suleiman Al-Nabulsi - His Birth and Upbringing*

Al-Nabulsi was born Salt in 1908, from a family that hails from the city of Nablus, the family moved Salt to work in agriculture and trade in the early nineteenth century (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 58). He learned the principles of reading, writing, arithmetic and memorizing the Holy Qur'an at the religious school of Sheikh Abdul Halim Zaid Al-Kilani in Salt (Mahafza, 1997, p. 19) He received his primary and secondary education at Al-Najah School in Nablus until he completed secondary school in 1926, then joined the English College in Jerusalem, and after a year of study he joined the American University of Beirut to study economics, and graduated in 1932 (Mahafza, 1997, pp. 19-20, Al-Shaer, 1999, p. 67).

He was appointed as a teacher at Al-Karak School, and the first day he enters the school on Nov 2<sup>nd</sup>, he teaches us a lesson in national belonging and defending our country and nationalistic causes, especially the Palestinian cause, when he took the initiative to ask the students about a day, but did the students did know what he meant, he shouted nervously (this is the day of the Balfour Declaration) and then shouted in English (Down with the Balfour Declaration) and began to explain to them the history of this declaration and its objectives, Then he went out with all school students in a demonstration denouncing the declaration

<sup>1</sup> Department of Basic Sciences, Al-Husn University College, Al-Balqa Applied University- Jordan.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Basic Sciences, Al-Husn University College, Al-Balqa Applied University- Jordan.

<sup>3</sup> Ajloun National University- Jordan

<sup>4</sup> Department of history, Yarmouk university, Jordan.

<sup>5</sup> Ajloun National University- Jordan

of ill fame . (Majali, 1960, pp. 18-19). Shortly after these demonstrations, he was transferred to Al- Salt School.

After that, he took many government jobs, including the position of Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1942 (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 60), in 1945 he was opposed to the concession the Prime minister granted to a company said to be Zionist for mineral exploration in Jordan and began to inflame public opinion throughout the country in Jerusalem and Haifa, and upon his return he was arrested and exiled to Shoubak for 13 months until Prince Abdullah ordered his release (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 60).

After the independence of the Kingdom in 1946, Al-Nabulsi was among those who submitted a request to the government in order to license a political party named the Jordanian Arab Party headed by Dr. Sobhi Abu Ghanima (Al-Mousa, 2021, p. 488), and in February 1947 Al-Nabulsi was a minister in the second government of Samir Al-Rifai and after a short period his resignation from the ministry was accepted, so Al-Nabulsi devoted himself to political work and worked on issuing Al-Ahed newspaper in Amman with a number of Jordanian youth, and also stood in opposition to the Jordanian-British treaty in 1948, he wrote an article in the newspaper opposing Tawfiq Abu al-Huda's policy of signing the treaty, and this was the reason for his imprisonment for 9 months in Al-Mahatta prison in Amman (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 61).

Al-Nabulsi continued his political activity after his release from prison, and he opposed the government of Abu al-Huda as a government subject to British policy in Jordan, and as soon as the union between the two banks of the Jordan river was made, this stage gave new horizons to those working in politics in Jordan, and this is what encouraged Al-Nabulsi and a group of his followers to submit a request to the government in 1950 in order to license a party called (National Front Party), which included a group of leftists, Baathists and centrist parties (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 62).

Al-Nabulsi loved his homeland and felt with his Arab nation, and being involved in taking responsibility in governing the country is not contradictory with the political trends of Al-Nabulsi , and for that we see that King Abdullah bestowed upon him the title of (Pasha) and was in the second government of Samir Rifai (1950-1951), and then opposed the government of Abu al-Huda in the two years when he exiled to Ma'an, and in the government of Fawzi Mulki first in 1953 he was appointed as an ambassador to great Britain for one year and then returned in June 1954 after the appointment of Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda as a prime minister (Al-Sharaa, 2013, p. 107 and the linguists, 2020, p. 84).

Then Al-Nabulsi held the secretariat of the National Socialist Party, which was established in 1954 after Hazza Majali submitted his resignation from the party's secretariat, and the National Socialist Party emerged as a popular political force that has weight, so he worked to open many offices in a number of major cities in the Kingdom and issued a weekly magazine called Al- Mithaq (the Charter) calling for freedom, socialism and the expression of people's concerns, and the party cooperated with Baathists , Arab nationalists and communists, forming the national front , where the strength of the party was derived from supporting for the policy of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, so he represented the Nasserist Party in Jordan (Al-Hamdani, 1994, p. 125; Al-Azra'i, 1997, pp. 57-58).

On October 29, 1956, His Majesty King Hussein chose Al-Nabulsi as a Prime Minister after he failed to run for the parliamentary elections that took place at that time, however the National Socialist Party is the one who won the most deputies as this victory came at a time when the popularity of the political line that was supported by the party increased, which is the Nasserist line, and the party became the largest bloc in the Parliament, and his appointment as a prime Minister came as a natural culmination of the political struggle he did for a long time, and under these circumstances he was the right man for this new transformation that took place after Glubb's dismissal from the command of the army and Jordan's orientation towards the Arab states that declared a rebellion against the traditional policies and association with Western countries (Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 70-71).

On the evening of the same day that Al-Nabulsi became prime minister (29/October 1956), that the Israeli aggression against Egypt or the so-called tripartite aggression started by (Israel, Britain and France) because of Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, Jordan's position was consistent with the signing of a military agreement for joint defense with Egypt and Syria and the establishment of a joint command for the forces of the three countries, His Majesty the King announced to stand by Egypt and ordered the Council of Ministers to harness all the capabilities of the state to stand with Egypt and His Majesty also contacted President Nasser announcing his readiness to fight the battle with Egypt until the end (Al-Shaer, 1999, p. 71; Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 71).

The position of the Al-Nabulsi's government regarding this aggression was that it took a number of decisions, the most prominent of which was the formation of a national steering committees by the people, and the call for Saudi and Iraqi forces to enter Jordanian territory to take part against the Israeli aggression on Egypt, and to break political relations with France, but the most important topic that was going on in the minds of politicians in Jordan is the subject of obtaining financial aid from Arab countries instead of British aid, and Al-Nabulsi announced this in the government's statement, which He submitted to the House of Representatives to request confidence, as his government decided to accept the aid offered by the Arab countries Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in order to take needed measures to end the treaty , Indeed, a month and a half later, on 16/Jan/1957, negotiations were held with the British government in order to discuss the future of the treaty, and after the signing in Cairo of the Arab Solidarity Agreement, which Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia pledged to provide financial aid that will replace British aid, Jordan entered into negotiations with the British government and the termination of the treaty was signed on March 13<sup>th</sup> 1957 ,and the withdrawal of British forces from Jordanian territory within six months (Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 73-75).

The Al-Nabulsi government has announced its policy to establish the rules of democratic constitutional parliamentary life through respect for the constitution and the rule of law ,and public freedoms, and the replacement of laws that limit freedom and hinder the development of democratic life with progressive laws, and the Al-Nabulsi's government was seeking to develop relations with liberal countries (Egypt and Syria) in preparation for the establishment of a federal union between them, as it rejects the policy of foreign alliances and considers it a threat to the unity of the nation (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 73), it also decided to exchange diplomatic representation with the Soviet Union as a rapprochement while rejecting the Eisenhower doctrine which aimed to fill the vacuum in the Middle East ,and in the words of Prime Minister Suleiman Al-Nabulsi , saying that "there is no vacuum in Jordan, but the vacuum is in Eisenhower's head" (Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 78-79).

Despite all the positions and circumstances that made Al-Nabulsi a patriotic and loyal nationalist, a number of reasons led to a loss of trust between the head of state (the king) and his cabinet, including the disagreement regarding the policy of Al-Nabulsi government with the general policy of the state led by His Majesty the King, and the departure of partisan activity from the framework of low key practices through the coordination of the policy of some members of ministers from the two parties with the policy of the Cairo-Damascus axis, which raised questions about the loyalty of the government and its head to Jordan's national interests, in addition to the policy of Al-Nabulsi 's government to remove all opponents of its policy from senior government positions , which provoked a state of grumbling and indignation among opponents of the government, and that led the Al-Nabulsi to make a cabinet reshuffle on his government, but failed to form a new government, then His Majesty the King asked Al-Nabulsi to submit the resignation of his government on (10 / April / 1957) (Moussa, 1986, pp. 79-84).

After the resignation of the government of Al-Nabulsi , Hussein Al-Khalidi formed the new government with Al-Nabulsi as a Minister of Foreign Affairs and Transportation, but it did not last long, where Al-Khalidi submitted his resignation and came the government of Ibrahim Hashim imposed martial law and dissolved the parties ,and placed Al-Nabulsi in house arrest for more than four years until the government of Talhouni came ,and a royal order was issued to restore his freedom in (August 1961) and in 1962 appointed a member of the Senate (Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 84-86).

The position of Al-Nabulsi of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations was similar to all members of the Jordanian people who supported the guerrilla movement after the 1967 war, where the Jordanian government opened its doors to the fedayeen and provided them with the necessary aid and facilities, and a national force in Jordan called (National Assembly) was formed and Al-Nabulsi was chosen as its president blessed by His Majesty the King, and in March 1970 Al-Nabulsi called to establish a national body, and the formation of a national political leadership going with the organizations and formed a follow-up committee headed by Al-Nabulsi but the pressures of the Central Committee The PLO made it deviate from its goals (Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 89-90). Al-Nabulsi's support for guerrilla organizations was influenced by Gamal Abdel Nasser's support for them, and Egypt also supported its acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories, Which was occupied in the 1967 war because he believed that it was in the interest of the Arabs because of their inability to defend themselves (Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 91-92).

In his last years of his life regained his political activity, and made trips to many countries, especially Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and performed the Hajj, and remained a member of the Senate, and remained the popular leader rebellious against injustice and deviation, where his home was open for politicians who loved his conversations, he was rebellious by nature, his talk is fun and appealing, and described by ones who knew him as a forthright, clean and honest person with a sense of social justice, he fell ill in February 1975 with acute flu and went for treatment in Beirut, London and America, he died on Thursday, October 14, 1976 at the University of Jordan Hospital and was buried in Amman the next day (Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 92-93).

#### *Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi and His Position on Arab Nationalist Causes*

Al-Nabulsi is considered one of the Jordanian politicians, whose intellectual and political ambitions exceeded the limits of reality, as his loyalty was not limited to the borders of Jordan, but went beyond to the notion of Arab cooperation that went beyond the country boundaries to the larger Arab world on a national basis, and due to his positions led to a clash with the political reality and the framework of the system, where number of interactions helped build his thought and also refining his political orientations.

#### *Suleiman Al-Nabulsi's Position on The Palestinian Cause*

Al-Nabulsi believed in the armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine, and that the guerrilla movements are qualified to liberate the Palestinian land and that his acceptance of Resolution (242) after the 1967 war is nothing more than an attempt to remove the effects of aggression on Egypt and its acceptance of this decision (Al-Rifu', 1997, p. 93).

Despite his position in support of the Egyptian point of view and the acceptance of Resolution (242), he took a negative attitude towards the rogers initiative in July 1968 calling for a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel, which was accepted by the Egyptian government, also supporting the guerrilla movements that were rejecting Resolution (242) and the Rogers initiative and everything that calls for reconciliation with Israel (Al-Rifu', 1997, p. 93; Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 91).

The National Socialist Party, represented by its leader Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi, has adopted from the beginning a clear policy towards the Palestinian cause, as the party's constitution stipulated not to recognize the legitimacy of the Jewish state in Palestine, and to preserve all Arab rights there while rejecting any settlement of the issue that does not achieve the national aspirations of the Arab nation, and the party considered the refugee issue an integral part of the general Palestinian cause (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, p. 115).

The party also opposed the statements of John Dulles, US Secretary of State, regarding the proposed solutions to resolve the Palestinian cause, which contradicted the United Nations resolutions based on partition and the return of refugees to their homes, as the party considered Dulles' proposals as an evasion of the US government to implement its commitments, with its clear bias in favor of the Jews at the expense of Arab rights, and therefore do not guarantee the security and stability in the Middle East, saying that the Arab nation is capable of solving its own causes (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, pp. 115-116).

Suleiman Al-Nabulsi and his party took a stand against the Johnston project, the envoy of US President Eisenhower to the Middle East, and this project was aimed to exploit the waters of the Jordan River and its tributaries to establish irrigation projects between Jordan and Israel, and the party prepared a memorandum developed by the party's experts in the irrigated lands, which included its rejection of the Yarmouk project, the Jordan River and its tributaries for its cooperation with Israel that aims to liquidating the cause of the refugees by settling them in the eastern bank of Jordan through this project (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, pp. 112-114).

The party had a clear position on the repeated Israeli attacks on the Jordanian and Egyptian borders, where it sent a delegation to meet the Prime Minister and inform him of the attacks on the Gaza Strip, and also sent a telegram to the ambassadors of the US and Britain condemning the successive attacks on the Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip, and another telegram in support of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Al-Nabulsi also headed a delegation of the National Socialist Party to participate in the Popular Conference in Damascus on September 18<sup>th</sup>, 1956, to discuss the repeated attacks on the Jordanian borders; also Al-Nabulsi proposed organizing work in order to support providing the necessary weapons to the Popular Resistance Army to be formed in Jordan (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, pp. 117-118).

#### *The Position of Suleiman Al-Nabulsi and The National Party on the Arab Unity Project*

Al-Nabulsi and his party (National Socialist Party) believed that Arab nationalism is a reality, and does not accept controversy and disagreement, and believes that every nationalistic movement has the right to freedom, territorial integrity, sovereignty, cooperation and equality among nations, and that the interest of the Arab nation lies in the unity or union of the Arab world in one state, and that colonialism is what prevents achieving Arab nationalism, and it is necessary to believe in the need for an Arab front (political, economic and military) that believes in the national goal, and to stand against colonialism, and work to liberate the Arab world, and the belief in achieving unity, cooperation and solidarity with national parties and organizations that believe in the unity of the Arab ranks (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, p. 96).

The idea of the leader of the National Socialist Party for unity is based on a historical basis, by considering unity a basic historical reality in Arab society, and linking it to the prosperous historical stages in the life of the nation during its unity, and that solidarity and unity are the basis for opposing colonialism and its projects, and the party has remained a believer in the idea of democracy through state institutions and that the nation is the source of authorities (Al-Azza, 1957, p. 13, Al-Masry, 1995, p. 66, and Al-Ghwyin, 2020, p. 96).

However, the National Socialist Party was not explicitly calling for the cancellation of the Jordanian-British treaty in (1948), until after the 1956 elections, which is reflected in the project of independence and Arab unity, and this is what drew the attention of the British ambassador and caused him concern, which made him contact his government to express his concern about the statements issued by party members of the need to abrogate the Jordanian-British treaty, and to reject British aid and replace it with Arab aid, and this is what was stated in the statement of the Al-Nabulsi government before the National Assembly (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, p. 97; Al-Mashaqba, 2022, pp. 228-229).

Al-Nabulsi and his party also sought to establish a single Arab state under an independent democratic rule, calling for union with Iraq on the grounds that Iraq enjoys great economic power, and that the Hashemite family is the ruling family in both countries, and that the Jordanian and Iraqi army form one strong army confront the Israeli threat (Majali, 1960, p. 143; Shar,a , 2013, p. 54), and the party's constitution stressed the need to eliminate the Jewish entity, change the social system, liberate the people from poverty, illiteracy and disease, stressing public freedoms, and the liberation of the Arab world. He called for the abrogation of the Jordanian-British treaty, and the establishment of another state or union that includes Jordan, Iraq and Syria as a second step after Jordan's union with Iraq (Al-Sharaa, 2013, p. 55, Al-Ghwyin, 2020, p. 71).

Al-Nabulsi and his party also called for the liberation of the Arab world and contribute to the struggle of its peoples against foreign influence, and the need for an Arab political, economic and military front to be an obstacle to economic colonial exploitation and foreign invasion, and the National Socialist Party has

enjoyed unparalleled popular support and this is proven by the parliamentary elections in 1956, achieving the majority in the House of Representatives thanks to the tribal, popular and financial influence of a number of party members, and through political propaganda by Al-Mithaq (Charter Magazine) of the National Party, which was later licensed, until the party's policy gradually moved towards the idea of cooperation with Egypt's Nasser instead of union with Iraq after the emergence of the Baghdad Pact at the end of 1955 (Al-Sayed, 1990, p. 120; Al-Sharaa, 2013, pp. 56-57).

*The Position of Al-Nabulsi and The National Party on the Algerian Revolution (October 2<sup>nd</sup> / 1954)*

Al-Nabulsi and his National Party denounced the French aggression in Algeria following the Algerian revolution that broke out in (Nov 1<sup>st</sup> / 1954) against the French colonizer, the National Party established a popular conference headed by Al-Nabulsi in (July 7<sup>th</sup> 1957) to support Algeria in the city of Jerusalem, demanding a boycott of France and supplying the Algerian Liberation Army with money and weapons, as the party sent a letter to the US government condemning the US policy supporting colonialism in Algeria, and the National Party participated with the Jordanian parties strike In October 1<sup>st</sup> 1956) in protest against France's policy in arresting the leaders of the Algerian National Liberation Front, he also called for a meeting at his headquarters to organize a donation campaign for Algeria in support the Algerian people, and a festival was held in Jerusalem in solidarity with the Algerian revolution headed by Suleiman Al-Nabulsi on (may 8<sup>th</sup> 1955) in the presence of His Majesty King Hussein (Abu Gharbia, 2004, p. 94; Al-Ghwyin, 2020, pp. 118-120; Al-Sharaa, 2013, 236-pp. 236-237).

The National Socialist Party also submitted a protest to the US government, condemning the US policy of supporting the French in Algeria, stating that the National Socialist Party in Jordan declares its indignation and rejection of America's policy of providing France with weapons and aircraft to kill Algerians, and warns that this brutal policy that it pursues in the Arab world, will not hinder achieving freedom and independence by the Arab world (Al-Sharaa, 2013, p. 237).

*The Position of Al-Nabulsi and The National Party on the Baghdad Pact (1955)*

The Jordanian government sided with entry and accession to the Baghdad Pact with the encouragement of Britain, but the Jordanian people of all political spectrum, led by the National Socialist Party by Al-Nabulsi was against this alliance, and massive demonstrations erupted in the streets of the capital Amman expressing its absolute rejection, and Britain was pressing with all its strength to suppress the demonstrations, but the Jordanian Prime Minister at the time, Hazza Majali, did not use force to quell the demonstrations, despite Glubb Pasha contact with a Ministry of Interior, and his attendance at the Council of Ministers session to pressure the demonstrators and arrest their national leaders (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, p. 109; Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 64-65).

The Interior Minister Abbas Mirza in the government of Hazza al-Majali says that he received a paper from the Prime Minister to arrest the leaders of the demonstrations and mentioned Suleiman Al-Nabulsi by name, he refused to arrest them and said I will investigate the matter myself, and after the end of the cabinet session, says Mirza I called Suleiman Al-Nabulsi and asked him to come to my house, he apologized because of the curfew imposed during the night, but I sent him a private car, and upon his arrival I asked him about the demonstrations that they are making, and that we want to make arrests, and you have to go out of Amman, and he replied Angrily refusing to leave Amman and saying shall I leave Amman to Glubb, I tell you either me or Glubb, I threatened him with arrest, he said arrest me, and then I told him and what do you see, and how can calm the situation, he said there is only one way, which is to dismiss the issue of the inclusion of Jordan in the Baghdad Pact, and I pledge to you that the demonstrations will end immediately (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 65; Al-Ghwyin, 2020, 109).

The demonstrations continued in the streets, until the government of Hazza al-Majali submitted its resignation in compliance with the will of the masses, and Al-Nabulsi remained on his position rejecting the Baghdad Pact, and entered prison as a price for that (Madanat, 1977, pp. 44-45; Al-Ghwyin, 1986, p. 109).

The official Jordanian position approving the entry into the Baghdad Pact stemmed from the conviction of King Hussein and a number of Jordanian politicians, that the alliance will provide the country with much-needed military and political support, but the solid will of the Jordanian people and public opinion that stood opposing this alliance, imposed on the Jordanian government a shift in line with the general trend of the Jordanian people and the Arab countries, this was influenced by the Nasserist nationalist trend in Egypt at the time (Al-Mousa, 1986, pp. 65-66).

Al-Nabulsi has rejected the pressure exerted on him and the Jordanian state to accept the Baghdad Pact, which was one of a series of Western projects to defend the Middle East, which was put forward at the initiative of (John Dulles) US Secretary of State with the aim of establishing a defense alliance of Middle Eastern countries opposing the communist threat, Al-Nabulsi has traveled to Baghdad to learn about the usefulness of this alliance for Jordan, and despite the justifications provided by Nouri Al-Saeed for accepting the alliance, after his return he announced opposition to the pact along with all Jordanian and nationalist parties to lead a national struggle against the alliance until it achieves what it wanted (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, pp. 103-109).

*Al-Nabulsi's Position on The Arabization of the Jordanian Army Command In (March 1<sup>st</sup> 1956)*

The decision to Arabize the Jordanian army is a case in Jordan and its people being affected by the state of Arab nationalism and the Nasserist current that was sweeping the Arab region, and the leaders of the Jordanian opposition, headed by Suleiman Al-Nabulsi and their positions on the Baghdad Pact, had a clear impact on changing Jordanian policy towards the popular will rejecting the policy of Britain and its allies in the region. The position of the British command in the Arab army has therefore become a major embarrassment for the Jordanian government and its young king.

The Jordanian popular anger and all its spectrums towards British policy reached a difficult situation to accept, refusing to keep the British leadership at the head of the Jordanian army, after doubt, mistrust and fear filled the people and army officers because of the positions of Glubb Pasha on the penetration of Jewish immigrants in Palestine and the great developments after the 1948 war and the establishment of the State of Israel and the demonstrations of the Baghdad Pact, which replaced doubt with certainty about the position of the British leadership of the Jordanian Arab Army, which was hostile to the aspirations of the Jordanian people for freedom and independence (Al-Mousa, 1986, p. 66).

The position of the National Socialist Party and its president, Suleiman Al-Nabulsi, was similar to the position of the rest of the national parties and popular forces towards Glubb Pasha, commander of the Arab army, demanding the Arabization of the army leadership and getting rid of foreign influence as stated in the text of the constitution (Al-Ghwyin, 2020, p. 99).

When His Majesty King Hussein announced the decision to Arabize the army on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1956, the majority of the detainees of the National forces were released from Al-Jafer prison, and Al-Nabulsi received them giving a speech in which he saluted their struggle and steadfastness and welcomed their return to take the role with the people for freedom and independence (Al-Atti, 2012, p. 129; Al-Ghwyin, 2020, p. 100). The decision to Arabize the Arab army, taken by His Majesty King Hussein, was an important element in the convergence of national and nationalist forces in the Jordanian arena (Al-Sharaa, 2013, p. 129).

In a speech of the late Suleiman Al-Nabulsi "Abu Fares" as saying: "Glubb disappeared and this Arab army became Arab both in flesh and blood, an Arab in ideals and spirit, an Arab in dreams and ambitions .... I do express the sincere loyalty of those people of struggle and their deep thanks to the leap of Hussein bin Talal, your supreme leader and your king, and the pride of people in you, the officers and soldiers, also the people take pride in your actions and their reliance on your heroism and sacrifices (Al-Hmoud, 1999, p. 86).

*The Position of Al-Nabulsi and His Government on the Tripartite Aggression Against Egypt in (29<sup>th</sup> Of October /1956)*

The tripartite aggression (British, French, Israeli) on Egypt began on the evening of the day in which the government of Al-Nabulsi was formed in (29<sup>th</sup> of October 1956) under the pretext of chasing the Palestinian fedayeen, Jordan has stood by Egypt, especially after the signing of the Arab Joint Defense Agreement on (October 24<sup>th</sup> 1956) between the three Arab countries (Jordan, Egypt, Syria) (Al-Hourani, 2000, p. 2153; Makhademeh, 1999, p. 181). King Hussein's contact with Gamal Abdel Nasser was clear and explicit, saying, "We are with Egypt and ready to fight the battle alongside you until the end" (Al-Mady and Moussa, 2021, p. 647). His Majesty also called on the Council of Ministers to convene and asked Al-Nabulsi to help Egypt open a front to confront Israel, but Al-Nabulsi's position was to wait and not to involve Jordan in a military adventure that affects its future, so the agreement between the government and His Majesty the King to wait until the request of the Egyptian government (Al-Ghwiyin, 2012, p. 209; Al-Ghwiyin, 2020, p. 159).

On November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1956, His Majesty King Hussein sent a telegram to Nasser condemning the tripartite aggression, saying, "The civilized world has condemned the forces of evil and colonialism for their barbaric acts against Egypt." On (October 4<sup>th</sup>, 1956), Al-Nabulsi informed Army Commander Abu Nuwar that President Abdel Nasser spoke to the king and told him that the issue had gone out of its regional framework and became international, after the intervention of Britain and France, and asked to stop military preparations in Jordan, and for he feared that the Israeli forces would move from the Sinai to occupy the West Bank, and asked just to defend the Jordanian territory (Abu Nuwar, 1991, p. 259; Al-Ghwiyin, 2020, pp. 161-162).

The Al-Nabulsi government also requested the Syrian and Saudi forces to enter Jordan, and announced the breaking of diplomatic relations with France, and demanded the cancellation of the Jordanian-British treaty, and the exchange of diplomatic representation with the Soviet Union and China, and the government also issued a warning to Britain not to use its bases or airports in Jordan to raid Egypt, and Al-Nabulsi also stated that his government will not allow British forces to use their military bases in Jordan against Egypt or any Arab country (Al-Hourani, 1999, p. 36; Al-Ghwiyin, 2020, pp. 163-165).

Al-Nabulsi attended with the Jordanian delegation, together with His Majesty the King, the conference called by the Lebanese President Camille Chamoun with heads of Arab states in Beirut on (13-14 November 1956), and one of the most important decisions that came out of this conference was the need to implement the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly asking the aggressors to withdraw from Egypt and the Suez Canal, respect Egypt's sovereignty over its territory, and support the Algerian people in their struggle against the French occupier (Al-Madi, 2021, pp. 717-718; Al-Ghwiyin, 2020, p 168 )

*Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi's Position on the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957)*

The beginning of the Jordanian-American relationship dates back to (1951) when the US signed with Jordan the first technical agreement called (point four), which is the fourth item of the speech of US President Truman, that targets economically backward countries, especially the countries of the Middle East, in order help them grow economically, where the program began to focus on development in the fields of agriculture, health, education, technological means, loans and financial assistance for the development of small industries (Bashayreh, 1994, p. 153 and Al-Shara'a, 2013, p. 186).

In 1957 Jordan asked for financial assistance according to previous agreements signed with the US government in 1951 within the domain of US assistance program which is considered part of a series of colonial projects in the region.

The Eisenhower doctrine came within these colonial projects, as the United States saw an opportunity to replace Britain and France after the Suez War (1956) in the Middle East, which began to diminish their in the region, allowing the Americans to fill the vacuum in the Middle East (Darwaza, 1957, p. 321; Mahafza, 1973, p. 357), and in order to get rid of its Western rivals, America began to use the territory of Arab countries to achieve its military purposes, especially the resistance to international communism.



Jordan agreed to the Eisenhower doctrine , as it saw in the doctrine an opportunity to get rid of the financial difficulties that the Kingdom was facing because the Arab aid provided to Jordan is insufficient to meet Jordan's needs, but all political parties with their different directions were against American policy in the region, led by the National Socialist Party steered by Suleiman Al-Nabulsi , which demanded to get rid of economic pressures, espionage, sabotage and conspiracy carried out by experts and employees of the cooperative departments supervised by the Americans, and when it was announced that Project Al-Nabulsi and his party rejected the justifications invoked by Eisenhower under the pretext of defending the Arab countries against the communist threat, and welcomed only unconditional American aid, and said that Jordan will not succumb to pressure from America until it implements its policy (Kamel, d.t., pp. 21-22) Al-Nabulsi has condemned this doctrine and considered it a neo-colonial project as an alternative to the Baghdad Pact at that stage.

## Conclusions

The study concluded that Suleiman Al-Nabulsi was one of the political figures with clear national leanings and indisputable in his national affiliations and nationalism, he is the head of the National Socialist Party, and the head of the Jordanian opposition, adopts the national socialist thought, and enjoys broad popular support, influenced by Gamal Abdel Nasser and luster of Abdel Nasser reflected on him , his political background stemmed from the common denominators of the ways and trends of the Jordanian parties, which were characterized by liberal reformism that relies in its political work on parliamentary democratic methods in the establishment of national governance as a way to liberate the nation, as he believes in building national relations with free Arab countries.

Al-Nabulsi came in thorny and overlapping regional and international circumstances, and in an atmosphere of regional and international competition and conflict. Influenced by the Jordanian public opinion and vice versa, which chose figures belonging to parties, movements and national ideologies, and this was the result of several factors, including the Palestinian cause and its repercussions on Jordanian public opinion, that placed it on top of priorities, as also the impact of the Arab nationalist tide on the personality of Al-Nabulsi , which originated and interacted with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and if unity constituted the supreme national goal in the eyes of Al-Nabulsi , this unity can only be done with the demise of the enemy ,the Israeli Zionist threat that represents a danger to the nation, and confronting it is a national responsibility that falls on all its citizens.

Al-Nabulsi's stand on all Arab national causes, was an original Arab position worthy of the principles and principles on which he was raised, which are the same principles on which the free Arab street, which ultimately shaped the personality of Al-Nabulsi, who honorably defended all the causes of the nation with all sincerity and steadfastness, defying all obstacles that hindered his march of struggle.

## References

- Abu Gharbieh, B (2004). *Bahjat's Memoirs (From the Nakba to the Intifada (1949-2000 AD))*, 1st Edition, Beirut, Arab Institute for Studies and Publishing, Beirut, 1st Edition.
- Abu Nuwar, A. (1991). *When the Arabs Faded, Memoirs in Arab Politics (48-1956)* London, Dar Al-Saqi
- Al-Azra'i, M. (1997). *Suleiman Al-Nabulsi in the light of the stage, the proceedings of the symposium Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi , his decision in his biography and experience*, Jordan Center for Studies and Information, Amman
- Bashayreh, A. (1994), *Jordan and Western Defense Projects for the Middle East (1950-1957)*, Master's Thesis, Yarmouk University.
- Al-Hamdani, Khalil (1994). *Political Parties in Jordan, a historical study for the period (1921-1957)*, Master's thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad.
- Al-Hmoud, M. (1999), *National Socialist Party, Al-Nabulsi Government Symposium 56/1957*, New Jordan Center for Studies, Sindbad Publishing House, Amman, Jordan.
- Al-Hourani, A (2000), *Memoirs of Akram Al-Hourani*, 1st Edition, Cairo, Madbouly Library
- Al-Hourani, H. (1999), *October 1st /1956 Elections and the Fifth Parliament, Proceedings of the Symposium of the Government of Suleiman Al-Nabulsi56/1957*, New Jordan Center for Studies, Sindbad Publishing House, Amman, Jordan.
- Darwaza, M. (1957), *Arab Unity*, Beirut, Commercial Office Publications
- Al-Rafou, F. (1997), *Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi , A Reading of His Political thought , Proceedings of Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi 's Symposium, A Reading in His Biography and Experience*, Jordan Center for Studies and Information. Oman

- Al-Saadi, E. (2014), *the Jordanian National Movement (46-1953)*, 1st Edition, Amman, Dar Azmanah Publishing House
- Al-Sayed, K. (1990), *Factions of the National Movement*, New Jordan, pp. 17-18
- Al-Shaer, J. (1999), *Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi , His Thought and Political Role*, Proceedings of the Symposium of the Government of Suleiman Al-Nabulsi 56/1957, Amman, Jordan, New Jordan Center for Studies, Sindbad Publishing House
- Al-Sharaa, A (2013). *Jordanian parties and national and nationalistic causes between (1950-1957)* Amman, Jordan, publications of the Supreme Authority for Writing the History of Jordan.
- Al-Azza, S. (1957), *Our Concepts*, Al-Mithaq Magazine, pp. 12-13.
- Al-Atti, A. (2012), *the Journey of a Lifetime, from the Gaza Shore to the Jafer Desert*, 1st Edition. Oman
- Al-Ghwiyin, F (2020). *Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi and his role in the Jordanian political life*, Jordan, Ministry of Culture
- Al-Ghwiyin, F. (2012). *Political History of Jordanian-Egyptian Relations (1945-1970)*, Amman, Ministry of Culture Publications
- Kamel, M (D.T) *American conspiracy in Jordan*
- Al-Madi, M (2021). *History of Jordan in the in the twentieth century (1900-1959)*, first part, Amman, Ministry of Culture
- Majali, H. (1960), *My Memoirs*, Amman.
- Mahafza, A (1974) *Jordanian-British relations from the establishment of the emirate until the abolition of the treaty (21-1957)* Beirut, Dar An-Nahar,
- Mahafza , A. (1997). *Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi , His upbringing and the Factors that Influenced the Formation of His Personality*, Proceedings of Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi 's Symposium, A Reading of His Biography and Experience, Jordanian Center for Studies and Information.
- Makhademeh, Th (1999). *Foreign Policy in the Era of the Al-Nabulsi Government*, Proceedings of the Symposium of the Government of Suleiman Al-Nabulsi 56/1957 Amman, Jordan, New Jordan Center for Studies, Sindbad Publishing House
- Madanat, I. (1997), *Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi , Portrait of the Leader*, Proceedings of Suleiman Al-Al-Nabulsi 's Symposium, A Reading of His Biography and Experience, Amman, Jordanian Center for Studies and Information.
- Al-Mashaqba, Th (2022) *Jordan's Political History (1967-53) Study of Internal Political Developments and Parties*, 1st Edition, Amman, Royal Documentation Center
- Al-Masri, M. (1995), *Jordan, Policy Study (53-1957)*, Master's Thesis, University of Jordan. Jordan
- Al-Mousa, S. (1986), *prominent individuals from Jordan*, 1st Edition. Amman, Jordan.